THE  CHRONICLES 

OF  AMERICA  SERIES 

ALLEN  JOHNSON 

EDITOR 


THE 

OF  EM.PIR 


CARL  RUSSELL  FISH 


COLLEGE  OF  AGRICULTURE 
DAVIS,  CALIFORNIA 


THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 


TEXTBOOK  EDITION 


THE  CHRONICLES 

OF  AMERICA  SERIES 

ALLEN  JOHNSON 

EDITOR 

GERHARD  R.  LOMER 

CHARLES   W.   JEFFERYS 

ASSISTANT  EDITORS 


THE 
PATH    OF    EMPIRE 

A    CHRONICLE   OF   THE 

UNITED   STATES  AS  A  WORLD  POWER 

BY  CARL  RUSSELL  FISH 


NEW    HAVEN:    YALE    UNIVERSITY    PRESS 

TORONTO:    GLASGOW.    BROOK    &    CO. 

LONDON:    HUMPHREY    MILFORD 

OXFORD     UNIVERSITY    PRESS 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

LIBRARY 

COLLEGE  OF  AGRICULTURE 


Copyright,  19199  by  Yale  University  Press 


CONTENTS 

I.    THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  Page  1 

II.     CONTROVERSIES  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN  "  19 

III.  ALASKA  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS  "  39 

IV.  ELAINE  AND  PAN-AMERICANISM  -  54 
V.    THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  PACIFIC  "  66 

VL    VENEZUELA  "  79 

VII.    THE   OUTBREAK  OF  THE   WAR   WITH 

SPAIN  "  90 

VIII.    DEWEY  AND  MANILA  BAY  "  116 

IX.    THE  BLOCKADE  OF  CUBA  "  131 

X.    THE  PREPARATION  OF  THE  ARMY  "  142 

XI.    THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  SANTIAGO  DE  CUBA  -  153 

XII.    THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  «•  173 

XIII.  A  PEACE  WHICH  MEANT  WAR  -  198 

XIV.  THE  OPEN  DOOR  -  218 
XV.    THE  PANAMA  CANAL  -  240 

XVI.    PROBLEMS  OF  THE  CARIBBEAN  *•  259 

XVH.    WORLD  RELATIONSHIPS  -  278 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE  -  «89 

INDEX  -  203 


THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 


CHAPTER  I 

THE   MONROE   DOCTRINE 

IN  1815  the  world  found  peace  after  twenty-two 
years  of  continual  war.  In  the  forests  of  Canada 
and  the  pampas  of  South  America,  throughout  all 
the  countries  of  Europe,  over  the  plains  of  Russia 
and  the  hills  of  Palestine,  men  and  women  had 
known  what  war  was  and  had  prayed  that  its  hor- 
rors might  never  return.  In  even  the  most  auto- 
cratic states  subjects  and  rulers  were  for  once  of  one 
mind:  in  the  future  war  must  be  prevented.  To 
secure  peace  forever  was  the  earnest  desire  of  two 
statesmen  so  strongly  contrasted  as  the  impression- 
able Czar  Alexander  I  of  Russia,  acclaimed  as  the 
"White  Angel"  and  the  "Universal  Savior,"  and 
Prince  Metternich,  the  real  ruler  of  Austria,  the 
spider  who  was  for  the  next  thirty  years  to  spin 


2  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

the  web  of  European  secret  diplomacy.  While  the 
Czar  invited  all  governments  to  unite  in  a  "Holy 
Alliance"  to  prevent  war,  Metternich  for  the  same 
purpose  formed  the  less  holy  but  more  powerful 
"Quadruple  Alliance"  of  Russia,  Prussia,  Austria, 
and  England. 

The  designs  of  Metternich,  however,  went  far 
beyond  the  mere  prevention  of  war.  To  his  mind 
the  cause  of  all  the  upheavals  which  had  convulsed 
Europe  was  the  spirit  of  liberty  bred  in  France  in 
the  days  of  the  Revolution;  if  order  was  to  be  re- 
stored, there  must  be  a  return  to  the  former  auto- 
cratic principle  of  government,  to  the  doctrine  of 
"Divine  Right";  it  was  for  kings  and  emperors 
to  command;  it  was  the  duty  of  subjects  to  obey. 
These  principles  had  not,  it  was  true,  preserved 
peace  in  the  past,  but  Metternich  now  proposed 
that,  in  the  future,  sovereigns  or  their  representa- 
tives should  meet  "at  fixed  periods"  to  adjust  their 
own  differences  and  to  assist  one  another  in  enforc- 
ing the  obedience  of  subjects  everywhere.  The 
rulers  were  reasonably  well  satisfied  with  the  world 
as  it  was  arranged  by  the  Congress  of  Vienna  in 
1815  and  determined  to  set  their  faces  against  any 
change  in  the  relations  of  governments  to  one  an- 
other or  to  their  subjects.  They  regretted,  indeed, 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  3 

that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  was  built 
upon  the  sands  of  a  popular  vote,  but  they  recog- 
nized that  it  was  apparently  well  established  and 
decently  respectable,  and  therefore  worthy  of  rec- 
ognition by  the  mutual  protection  society  of  the 
Holy  Alliance. 

The  subjects  of  these  sovereigns,  however,  did 
not  all  share  the  satisfaction  of  their  masters,  and 
some  of  them  soon  showed  that  much  as  they  de- 
sired peace  they  desired  other  things  even  more. 
The  inhabitants  of  Spanish  America,  while  their  im- 
perial mother  was  in  the  chaos  of  Napoleon's  wars, 
had  nibbled  at  the  forbidden  fruit  of  freedom.  They 
particularly  desired  freedom  to  buy  the  products  of 
British  factories,  which  cost  less  and  satisfied  better 
than  those  previously  furnished  by  the  Spanish  mer- 
chants, secure  in  their  absolute  monopoly.  With 
peace  came  renewed  monopoly,  haughty  officials, 
and  oppressive  laws  dictated  by  that  most  stupid 
of  the  restored  sovereigns,  Ferdinand  VII  of  Spain. 
Buenos  Aires,  however,  never  recognized  his  rule, 
and  her  general,  the  knightly  San  Martin,  in  one  of 
the  most  remarkable  campaigns  of  history,  scaled 
the  Andes  and  carried  the  flag  of  revolution  into 
Chili  and  Peru.  Venezuela,  that  hive  of  revolution, 
sent  forth  Bolivar  to  found  the  new  republics  of 


4  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Colombia  and  Bolivia.  Mexico  freed  herself,  and 
Brazil  separated  herself  from  Portugal.  By  1822 
European  rule  had  been  practically  swept  off  the 
American  mainland,  from  Cape  Horn  to  the  bor- 
ders of  Canada,  and,  except  for  the  empire  of  Dom 
Pedro  in  Brazil,  the  newly  born  nations  had 
adopted  the  republican  form  of  government  which 
the  European  monarchs  despised.  The  spirit  of 
unrest  leaped  eastward  across  the  Atlantic.  Revo- 
lutions in  Spain,  Portugal,  and  Naples  sought  im- 
piously and  with  constitutions  to  bind  the  hands  of 
their  kings.  Even  the  distant  Greeks  and  Serbians 
sought  their  independence  from  the  Turk. 

Divine  Right,  just  rescued  from  the  French  Rev- 
olution, was  tottering  and  had  yet  to  test  the 
strength  of  its  new  props,  the  "Holy"  and  the 
"Quadruple"  alliances,  and  the  policy  of  interven- 
tion to  maintain  the  status  quo.  Congresses  at 
Aix-la-Chapelle  in  1818,  at  Troppau  in  1820,  and  at 
Laibach  in  1821,  decided  to  refuse  recognition  to 
governments  resting  on  such  revolutions,  to  offer 
mediation  to  restore  the  old  order,  and,  if  this  were 
refused,  to  intervene  by  force.  In  the  United 
States,  on  the  other  hand,  founded  on  the  right  of 
revolution  and  dedicated  to  government  by  the 
people,  these  popular  movements  were  greeted  with 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  5 

enthusiasm.  The  fiery  Clay,  speaker  and  leader  of 
the  House  of  Representatives,  made  himself  cham- 
pion of  the  cause  of  the  Spanish  Americans;  Daniel 
Webster  thundered  forth  the  sympathy  of  all  lov- 
ers of  antiquity  for  the  Greeks;  and  Samuel  Grid- 
ley  Howe,  an  impetuous  young  American  doctor, 
crossed  the  seas,  carrying  to  the  Greeks  his  serv- 
ices and  the  gifts  of  Boston  friends  of  liberty.  A 
new  conflict  seemed  to  be  shaping  itself  —  a  strug- 
gle of  absolutism  against  democracy,  of  America 
against  Europe. 

Between  the  two  camps,  both  in  her  ideas  and 
in  her  geographical  situation,  stood  England.  De- 
voted as  she  was  to  law  and  order,  bulwark  against 
the  excesses  of  the  French  Terror  and  the  world 
dominion  that  Napoleon  sought,  she  was  neverthe- 
less equally  strong  in  her  opposition  to  Divine 
Right.  Her  people  and  her  government  alike  were 
troubled  at  the  repressive  measures  by  which  the 
Allies  put  down  the  Revolution  of  Naples  in  1821 
and  that  of  Spain  in  1823.  Still  more  were  they 
disturbed  at  the  hint  given  at  the  Congress  of  Ve- 
rona in  1822  that,  when  Europe  was  once  quieted, 
America  would  engage  the  attention  of  Europe's  ar- 
biters. George  Canning,  the  English  foreign  minis- 
ter, soon  discovered  that  this  hint  foreshadowed 


6  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

a  new  congress  to  be  devoted  especially  to  the 
American  problem.  Spain  was  to  be  restored  to 
her  sovereignty,  but  was  to  pay  in  liberal  grants  of 
American  territory  to  whatever  powers  helped  her. 
Canning  is  regarded  as  the  ablest  English  foreign 
minister  of  the  nineteenth  century;  at  least  no  one 
better  embodied  the  fundamental  aspirations  of 
the  English  people.  He  realized  that  liberal  Eng- 
land would  be  perpetually  a  minority  in  a  united 
Europe,  as  Europe  was  then  organized.  He  be- 
lieved that  the  best  security  for  peace  was  not  a 
union  but  a  balance  of  powers.  He  opposed  inter- 
vention in  the  internal  affairs  of  nations  and  stood 
for  the  right  of  each  to  choose  its  own  form  of 
government.  Particularly  he  fixed  his  eyes  on 
America,  where  he  hoped  to  find  weight  to  help  him 
balance  the  autocrats  of  the  Old  World.  He  wished 
to  see  the  new  American  republics  free,  and  he  be- 
lieved that  in  freedom  of  trade  England  would  ob- 
tain from  them  all  that  she  needed.  Alarmed  at 
the  impending  European  intervention  to  restore 
the  rule  of  Spain  or  of  her  monarchical  assignees 
in  America,  he  sought  an  understanding  with  the 
United  States.  He  proposed  to  Richard  Rush,  the 
United  States  minister  in  London,  that  the  two  coun- 
tries declare  concurrently  that  the  independence 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  7 

of  Spanish  America  was  a  fact,  that  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  new  governments  was  a  matter  of  time 
and  circumstance,  that  neither  country  desired  any 
portion  of  Spain's  former  dominions,  but  that  nei- 
ther would  look  with  indifference  upon  the  transfer 
of  any  portion  of  them  to  another  power. 

On  October  9,  1823,  this  proposal  reached  Wash- 
ington. The  answer  would  be  framed  by  able  and 
most  experienced  statesmen.  The  President,  James 
Monroe,  had  been  almost  continuously  in  public 
service  since  1782.  He  had  been  minister  to  France, 
Spain,  and  England,  and  had  been  Secretary  of 
State.  In  his  earlier  missions  he  had  often  shown 
an  unwise  impetuosity  and  an  independent  judg- 
ment which  was  not  always  well  balanced.  He 
had,  however,  grown  in  wisdom.  He  inspired  re- 
spect by  his  sterling  qualities  of  character,  and 
he  was  an  admirable  presiding  officer.  William  H. 
Crawford,  his  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  John  C. 
Calhoun,  his  Secretary  of  War,  William  Wirt,  his 
Attorney-General,  and  even  John  McLean,  his 
Postmaster-General,  not  then  a  member  of  the 
Cabinet,  were  all  men  who  were  considered  as  of 
presidential  caliber. 

Foremost  in  ability  and  influence,  however,  was 
John  Quincy  Adams,  the  Secretary  of  State. 


8  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Brought  up  from  early  boyhood  in  the  atmosphere 
of  diplomacy,  familiar  with  nearly  every  country  of 
Europe,  he  had  nevertheless  none  of  those  arts  of 
suavity  which  are  popularly  associated  with  the 
diplomat.  Short,  bald-headed,  with  watery  eyes, 
he  on  the  one  hand  repelled  familiarity,  and  on  the 
other  hand  shocked  some  sensibilities,  as  for  ex- 
ample when  he  appeared  in  midsummer  Washing- 
ton without  a  neckcloth.  His  early  morning  swim 
in  the  Potomac  and  his  translations  of  Horace  did 
not  conquer  a  temper  which  embittered  many  who 
had  business  with  him,  while  the  nightly  records 
which  he  made  of  his  interviews  show  that  he  was 
generally  suspicious  of  his  visitors.  Yet  no  Amer- 
ican can  show  so  long  a  roll  of  diplomatic  successes. 
Preeminently  he  knew  his  business.  His  intense  de- 
votion and  his  native  talent  had  made  him  a  mas- 
ter of  the  theory  and  practice  of  international  law 
and  of  statecraft.  Always  he  was  obviously  honest, 
and  his  word  was  relied  on.  Fundamentally  he  was 
kind,  and  his  work  was  permeated  by  a  generous 
enthusiasm.  Probably  no  man  in  America  had  so 
intense  a  conviction  not  only  of  the  correctness 
of  American  principles  and  the  promise  of  Ameri- 
can greatness  but  of  the  immediate  strength  and 
greatness  of  the  United  States  as  it  stood  in  1823. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  9 

Fully  aware  as  Adams  was  of  the  danger  that 
threatened  both  America  and  liberty,  he  was  not 
in  favor  of  accepting  Canning's  proposal  for  the  co- 
operation of  England  and  the  United  States.  He 
based  his  opposition  upon  two  fundamental  objec- 
tions. In  the  first  place  he  was  not  prepared  to 
say  that  the  United  States  desired  no  more  Spanish 
territory.  Not  that  Adams  desired  or  would  toler- 
ate conquest.  At  the  time  of  the  Louisiana  Pur- 
chase he  had  wished  to  postpone  annexation  until 
the  assent  of  the  people  of  that  province  could  be  ob- 
tained. .  But  he  believed  that  all  the  territory  neces- 
sary for  the  geographical  completeness  of  the  United 
States  had  not  yet  been  brought  under  the  flag.  He 
had  just  obtained  Florida  from  Spain  and  a  claim 
westward  to  the  Pacific  north  of  the  forty-second 
parallel,  but  he  considered  the  Southwest  —  Texas, 
New  Mexico,  and  California  —  a  natural  field  of  ex- 
pansion. These  areas,  then  almost  barren  of  white 
settlers,  he  expected  time  to  bring  into  the  United 
States,  and  he  also  expected  that  the  people  of  Cuba 
would  ultimately  rejoice  to  become  incorporated  in 
the  Union.  He  wished  natural  forces  to  work  out 
their  own  results,  without  let  or  hindrance. 

Not  only  was  Adams  opposed  to  Canning's  pro- 
posed self-denying  ordinance,  but  he  was  equally 


10  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

averse  to  becoming  a  partner  with  England.  Such 
cooperation  might  well  prove  in  time  to  be  an 
"entangling  alliance,"  involving  the  United  States 
in  problems  of  no  immediate  concern  to  its  people 
and  certainly  in  a  partnership  in  which  the  other 
member  would  be  dominant.  If  Canning  saw  lib- 
eral England  as  a  perpetual  minority  in  absolutist 
Europe,  Adams  saw  republican  America  as  a  per- 
petual inferior  to  monarchical  England.  Although 
England,  with  Canada,  the  West  Indies,  and  her 
commerce,  was  a  great  American  power,  Adams 
believed  that  the  United  States,  the  oldest  inde- 
pendent nation  in  America,  with  a  government 
which  gave  the  model  to  the  rest,  could  not  ad- 
mit her  to  joint  leadership,  for  her  power  was  in, 
not  of,  America,  and  her  government  was  mon- 
archical. Already  Adams  had  won  a  strategic  ad- 
vantage over  Canning,  for  in  the  previous  year, 
1822,  the  United  States  had  recognized  the  new 
South  American  republics. 

Great  as  were  the  dangers  involved  in  coopera- 
tion with  England,  however,  they  seemed  to  many 
persons  of  little  moment  compared  with  the  men- 
ace of  absolutist  armies  and  navies  in  the  New 
World  or  of,  perhaps,  a  French  Cuba  and  a  Rus- 
sian Mexico.  The  only  effective  obstacle  to  such 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  11 

foreign  intervention  was  the  British  Navy.  Both 
President  Monroe  and  Thomas  Jefferson,  who  in 
his  retirement  was  still  consulted  on  all  matters  of 
high  moment,  therefore  favored  the  acceptance  of 
Canning's  proposal  as  a  means  of  detaching  Eng- 
land from  the  rest  of  Europe.  Adams  argued, 
however,  that  England  was  already  detached;  that, 
for  England's  purposes,  the  British  Navy  would 
still  stand  between  Europe  and  America,  whatever 
the  attitude  of  the  United  States;  that  compro- 
mise or  concession  was  unnecessary;  and  that  the 
country  could  as  safely  take  its  stand  toward  the 
whole  outside  world  as  toward  continental  Europe 
alone.  To  reject  the  offer  of  a  country  whose  as- 
sistance was  absolutely  necessary  to  the  safety  of 
the  United  States,  and  to  declare  the  American  case 
against  her  as  well  as  against  the  more  menacing 
forces  whose  attack  she  alone  could  prevent,  re- 
quired a  nerve  and  poise  which  could  come  only 
from  ignorant  f oolhardiness  or  from  absolute  knowl- 
edge of  the  facts.  The  self-assurance  of  Adams 
was  well  founded,  and  no  general  on  the  field  of 
battle  ever  exhibited  higher  courage. 

Adams  won  over  the  Cabinet,  and  the  President 
decided  to  incorporate  in  his  annual  message  to  Con- 
gress a  declaration  setting  forth  the  attitude  of  the 


12  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

United  States  toward  all  the  world,  and  in  particu- 
lar denying  the  right  of  any  European  power,  Eng- 
land included,  to  intervene  in  American  affairs. 
In  making  such  a  statement,  however,  it  was  neces- 
sary to  offer  compensation  in  some  form.  The 
United  States  was  not  prepared  to  offer  Canning's 
self-denying  ordinance  barring  the  way  to  fur- 
ther American  expansion,  but  something  it  must 
offer.  This  compensating  offset  Adams  found  in  the 
separation  of  the  New  World  from  the  Old  and  in 
abstention  from  interference  in  Europe.  Such  a 
renunciation  involved,  however,  the  sacrifice  of 
generous  American  sympathies  with  the  republi- 
cans across  the  seas.  Monroe,  Gallatin,  and  many 
other  statesmen  wished  as  active  a  policy  in  sup- 
port of  the  Greeks  as  of  the  Spanish  Americans. 
Adams  insisted,  however,  that  the  United  States 
should  create  a  sphere  for  its  interests  and  should 
confine  itself  to  that  sphere.  His  plan  for  peace  pro- 
vided that  European  and  American  interests  should 
not  only  not  clash  but  should  not  even  meet. 

The  President's  message  of  December  2,  1823, 
amounted  to  a  rejection  of  the  Holy  Alliance  as 
guardian  of  the  world's  peace,  of  Canning's  request 
for  an  entente,  and  of  the  proposal  that  the  United 
States  enter  upon  a  campaign  to  republicanize  the 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  13 

world.  It  stated  the  intention  of  the  Government 
to  refrain  from  interference  in  Europe,  and  its  be- 
lief that  it  was  "impossible  that  the  allied  powers 
should  extend  their  political  system  to  any  portion 
of  either  continent  [of  America]  without  endanger- 
ing our  peace  and  happiness. "  The  message  con- 
tained a  strong  defense  of  the  republican  system  of 
government  and  of  the  right  of  nations  to  control 
their  own  internal  development.  It  completed  the 
foreign  policy  of  the  United  States  by  declaring, 
in  connection  with  certain  recent  encroachments 
of  Russia  along  the  northwest  coast,  that  the  era 
of  colonization  in  the  Americas  was  over.  The 
United  States  was  to  maintain  in  the  future  that 
boundaries  between  nations  holding  land  in  Am- 
erica actually  existed  and  could  be  traced  —  a 
position  which  invited  arbitration  in  place  of  force. 
Both  Canning  and  Adams  won  victories,  but 
neither  realized  his  full  hopes.  Canning  prevented 
the  interference  of  Europe  in  Spanish  America, 
broke  up  the  Quadruple  Alliance,  rendered  the 
Holy  Alliance  a  shadow,  and  restored  a  balance  of 
power  that  meant  safety  for  England  for  almost  a 
hundred  years;  but  he  failed  to  dictate  American 
policy.  Adams  on  his  part  detached  the  United 
States  from  European  politics  without  throwing 


14  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

England  into  the  arms  of  Europe.  He  took  advan- 
tage of  the  divisions  of  the  Old  World  to  establish  the 
priority  of  the  United  States  in  American  affairs; 
but  he  failed  in  his  later  attempt  to  unite  all  the 
Americas  in  cordial  cooperation.  Earnest  as  was 
his  desire  and  hard  as  he  strove  in  1825  when  he 
had  become  President  with  Clay  as  his  Secretary 
of  State,  Adams  found  that  the  differences  in  point 
of  view  between  the  United  States  and  the  other 
American  powers  were  too  great  to  permit  a  Pan- 
American  policy.  The  Panama  Congress  on  which 
he  built  his  hopes  failed,  and  for  fifty  years  the 
project  lay  dormant. 

Under  the  popular  name  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, however,  Adams's  policy  has  played  a  much 
larger  part  in  world  affairs  than  he  expected. 
Without  the  force  of  law  either  in  this  country  or 
between  nations,  this  doctrine  took  a  firm  hold  of 
the  American  imagination  and  became  a  national 
ideal,  while  other  nations  have  at  least  in  form 
taken  cognizance  of  it.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  has 
survived  because  Adams  did  not  invent  its  main 
tenets  but  found  them  the  dominating  principles  of 
American  international  politics;  his  work,  like  that 
of  his  contemporary  John  Marshall,  was  one  of  codi- 
fication. But  not  all  those  who  have  commented 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  15 

on  the  work  of  Adams  have  possessed  his  ana- 
lytical mind,  and  many  have  confused  what  was 
fundamental  in  his  pronouncement  with  what  was 
temporary  and  demanded  by  the  emergency  of 
the  time. 

Always  the  American  people  have  stood,  from 
the  first  days  of  their  migration  to  America,  for  the 
right  of  the  people  of  a  territory  to  determine  their 
own  development.  First  they  have  insisted  that 
their  own  right  to  work  out  their  political  destiny 
be  acknowledged  and  made  safe.  For  this  they 
fought  the  Revolution.  It  has  followed  that  they 
have  in  foreign  affairs  tried  to  keep  their  hands  free 
from  entanglements  with  other  countries  and  have 
refrained  from  interference  with  foreign  politics. 
This  was  the  burden  of  Washington's  Farewell 
Address,  and  it  was  a  message  which  Jefferson  re- 
iterated in  his  inaugural.  These  are  the  perma- 
nent principles  which  have  controlled  enlightened 
American  statesmen  in  their  attitude  toward  the 
world,  from  the  days  of  John  Winthrop  to  those  of 
Woodrow  Wilson. 

It  was  early  found,  however,  that  the  affairs  of 
the  immediate  neighbors  of  the  United  States 
continually  and  from  day  to  day  affected  the 
whole  texture  of  American  life  and  that  actuallv 


16  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

they  limited  American  independence  and  therefore 
could  not  be  left  out  of  the  policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment. The  United  States  soon  began  to  recognize 
that  there  was  a  region  in  the  affairs  of  which  it 
must  take  a  more  active  interest.  As  early  as 
1780  Thomas  Pownall,  an  English  colonial  official, 
predicted  that  the  United  States  must  take  an 
active  part  in  Cuban  affairs.  In  1806  Madison, 
then  Secretary  of  State,  had  instructed  Monroe, 
Minister  to  Great  Britain,  that  the  Government  be- 
gan to  broach  the  idea  that  the  whole  Gulf  Stream 
was  within  its  maritime  jurisdiction.  The  message 
of  Monroe  was  an  assertion  that  the  fate  of  both  the 
Americas  was  of  immediate  concern  to  the  safety 
of  the  United  States,  because  the  fate  of  its  sister 
republics  intimately  affected  its  own  security.  This 
proved  to  be  an  enduring  definition  of  policy,  be- 
cause for  many  years  there  was  a  real  institutional 
difference  between  the  American  hemisphere  and 
the  rest  of  the  world  and  because  oceanic  bounda- 
ries were  the  most  substantial  that  the  world  affords. 
Adams,  however,  would  have  been  the  last  to 
claim  that  his  method  of  securing  the  fundamental 
purposes  of  the  United  States  was  itself  funda- 
mental. It  is  particularly  important  for  Amer- 
icans to  make  a  distinction  between  the  things 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  1? 

which  they  have  always  wished  to  obtain  and  the 
methods  which  they  have  from  time  to  time  used. 
To  build  a  policy  today  on  the  alleged  isolation 
of  the  American  continents  would  be  almost  as  ab- 
surd as  to  try  to  build  a  government  on  the  belief  in 
Divine  Right.  The  American  continents  are  no 
longer  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  world  by  their 
national  institutions,  because  the  spirit  of  these 
institutions  has  permeated  much  of  Europe,  Asia, 
and  even  Africa.  No  boundaries,  not  even  oceans, 
can  today  prohibit  international  interference.  But 
while  the  particular  method  followed  in  1823  is  no 
longer  appropriate,  the  ends  which  the  United 
States  set  out  to  attain  have  remained  the  same. 
Independence,  absolute  and  complete,  including 
the  absence  of  all  entanglements  which  might  draw 
the  country  into  other  peoples'  quarrels;  the  rec- 
ognition of  a  similar  independence  in  all  other 
peoples,  which  involves  both  keeping  its  own  hands 
off  and  also  strongly  disapproving  of  interference 
by  one  nation  with  another  —  these  have  been  the 
guiding  principles  of  the  United  States.  These 
principles  the  Government  has  maintained  by  such 
means  as  seemed  appropriate  to  the  time.  In 
colonial  days  the  people  of  America  fought  in 
courts  for  their  charter  rights;  at  the  time  of  the 


18  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Revolution,  by  arms  for  their  independence  from 
England ;  during  the  Napoleonic  wars,  for  their  inde- 
pendence from  the  whole  system  of  Europe.  The 
Monroe  Doctrine  declared  that  to  maintain  Amer- 
ican independence  from  the  European  system  it  was 
necessary  that  the  European  system  be  excluded 
from  the  Americas.  In  entering  the  Great  War 
in  the  twentieth  century  the  United  States  has 
recognized  that  the  system  of  autocracy  against 
which  Monroe  fulminated  must  disappear  from  the 
entire  world  if,  under  modern  industrial  conditions, 
real  independence  is  to  exist  anywhere. 

It  is  the  purpose  of  the  following  chapters  to  trace 
the  expansion  of  American  interests  in  the  light  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  to  explain  those  contro- 
versies which  accompanied  this  growth  and  taxed 
the  diplomatic  resources  of  American  Secretaries  of 
State  from  the  times  of  Adams  and  Webster  and 
Seward  to  those  of  Blaine  and  Hay  and  Elihu  Root. 
The  diplomacy  of  the  Great  War  is  reserved  for 
another  volume  in  this  Series. 


CHAPTER  II 

CONTROVERSIES   WITH   GREAT   BRITAIN 

No  two  nations  have  ever  had  more  intimate  re- 
lationships than  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain.  Speaking  the  same  language  and  owning 
a  common  racial  origin  in  large  part,  they  have 
traded  with  each  other  and  in  the  same  regions, 
and  geographically  their  territories  touch  for  three 
thousand  miles.  During  the  nineteenth  century 
the  coastwise  shipping  of  the  United  States  was 
often  forced  to  seek  the  shelter  of  the  British  West 
Indies.  The  fisherfolk  of  England  and  America 
mingled  on  the  Grand  Bank  of  Newfoundland  and 
on  the  barren  shores  of  that  island  and  of  Labrador, 
where  they  dried  their  fish.  Indians,  criminals, 
and  game  crossed  the  Canadian  boundary  at  will, 
streams  flowed  across  it,  and  the  coast  cities  vied 
for  the  trade  of  the  interior,  indifferent  to  the 
claims  of  national  allegiance.  One  cannot  but  be- 
lieve that  this  intimacy  has  in  the  long  run  made 

19 


20  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

for  friendship  and  peace;  but  it  has  also  meant  con- 
stant controversy,  often  pressed  to  the  verge  of 
war  by  the  pertinacious  insistence  of  both  nations 
on  their  full  rights  as  they  saw  them. 

The  fifteen  years  following  Adams's  encounter 
with  Canning  saw  the  gradual  accumulation  of  a 
number  of  such  disputes,  which  made  the  situation 
in  1840  exceptionally  critical.  Great  Britain  was 
angered  at  the  failure  of  the  United  States  to  grant 
her  the  right  to  police  the  seas  for  the  suppression 
of  the  slave  trade,  while  the  United  States,  with 
memories  of  the  vicious  English  practice  of  impress- 
ment before  the  War  of  1812,  distrusted  the  motives 
of  Great  Britain  in  asking  for  this  right.  Nearly 
every  mile  of  the  joint  boundary  in  North  America 
was  in  dispute,  owing  to  the  vagueness  of  treaty 
descriptions  or  to  the  errors  of  surveyors.  Twelve 
thousand  square  miles  and  a  costly  American  fort 
were  involved;  arbitration  had  failed;  rival  camps 
of  lumberjacks  daily  imperiled  peace;  and  both 
the  Maine  Legislature  and  the  National  Congress 
had  voted  money  for  defense.  In  a  New  York  jail 
Alexander  McLeod  was  awaiting  trial  in  a  state 
court  for  the  murder  of  an  American  on  the  steamer 
Caroline,  which  a  party  of  Canadian  militia  had 
cut  out  from  the  American  shore  near  Buffalo  and 


CONTROVERSIES  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN  21 

had  sent  to  destruction  over  Niagara  Falls.  The 
British  Government,  holding  that  the  Caroline  was 
at  the  time  illegally  employed  to  assist  Canadian 
insurgents,  and  that  the  Canadian  militia  were 
under  government  orders  justifiable  by  interna- 
tional law,  assumed  the  responsibility  for  McLeod's 
act  and  his  safety.  Ten  thousand  Americans  along 
the  border,  members  of  "Hunters'  Lodges,"  were 
anxious  for  a  war  which  would  unleash  them  for 
the  conquest  of  Canada.  Delay  was  causing  all 
these  disputes  to  fester,  and  the  public  mind  of  the 
two  countries  was  infected  with  hostility. 

Fortunately  in  1841  new  administrations  came 
into  power  in  both  England  and  the  United  States. 
Neither  the  English  Tories  nor  the  American  Whigs 
felt  bound  to  maintain  all  the  contentions  of  their 
predecessors,  and  both  desired  to  come  to  an  agree- 
ment. The  responsibility  on  the  American  side  fell 
upon  Daniel  Webster,  the  new  Secretary  of  State. 
With  less  foreign  experience  than  John  Quincy 
Adams,  he  was  more  a  man  of  the  world  and  a  man 
among  men.  His  conversation  was  decidedly  less 
ponderous  than  his  oratory,  and  there  was  no  more 
desirable  dinner  guest  in  America.  Even  in  Web- 
ster's lightest  moments,  his  majestic  head  gave  the 
impression  of  colossal  mentality,  and  his  eyes,  when 


22  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

he  was  in  earnest,  almost  hypnotized  those  upon 
whom  he  bent  his  gaze.  A  leading  figure  in  public 
life  for  twenty-five  years,  he  now  attained  adminis- 
trative position  for  the  first  time,  and  his  constant 
practice  at  the  bar  had  given  something  of  a  lawyer- 
like  trend  to  his  mind. 

The  desire  of  the  British  Government  for  an 
agreement  with  the  United  States  was  shown  by 
the  selection  of  Washington  instead  of  London  as 
the  place  of  negotiation  and  of  Lord  Ashburton  as 
negotiator.  The  head  of  the  great  banking  house 
of  Baring  Brothers,  he  had  won  his  title  by  service 
and  was,  moreover,  known  to  be  a  friend  of  the 
United  States.  While  in  Philadelphia  in  his  youth, 
he  had  married  Miss  Bingham  of  that  city,  and  she 
still  had  American  interests.  In  the  controver- 
sies before  the  War  of  1812  Lord  Ashburton  had 
supported  many  of  the  American  contentions.  He 
knew  Webster  personally,  and  they  both  looked 
forward  to  the  social  pleasure  of  meeting  again 
during  the  negotiations.  The  two  representatives 
came  together  in  this  pleasant  frame  of  mind  and 
did  most  of  their  business  at  the  dinner  table, 
where  it  is  reported  that  more  than  diplomatic 
conversation  flowed.  They  avoided  an  exchange 
of  notes,  which  would  bind  each  to  a  position  once 


CONTROVERSIES  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN  23 

taken,  but  first  came  to  an  agreement  and  then 
prepared  the  documents. 

It  must  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  either 
Ashburton  or  Webster  sacrificed  the  claims  of  his 
own  Government.  Webster  certainly  was  a  good 
attorney  for  the  United  States  in  settling  the  bound- 
ary disputes,  as  is  shown  by  the  battle  of  the  maps. 
The  territorial  contentions  of  both  countries  hung 
largely  upon  the  interpretation  of  certain  clauses 
of  the  first  American  treaty  of  peace.  Webster 
therefore  ordered  a  search  for  material  to  be  made 
in  the  archives  of  Paris  and  London.  In  Paris 
there  was  brought  to  light  a  map  with  the  bound- 
ary drawn  in  red,  possibly  by  Franklin,  and  sup- 
porting the  British  contention.  Webster  refrained 
from  showing  this  to  Ashburton  and  ordered  search 
in  London  discontinued.  Ironically  enough,  how- 
ever, a  little  later  there  was  unearthed  in  the  Brit- 
ish Museum  the  actual  map  used  by  one  of  the 
British  commissioners  in  1782,  which  showed  the 
boundary  as  the  United  States  claimed  it  to  be. 
Though  they  had  been  found  too  late  to  affect  the 
negotiations,  these  maps  disturbed  the  Senate  dis- 
cussion of  the  matter.  Yet,  as  they  offset  each 
other,  they  perhaps  facilitated  the  acceptance  of 
the  treaty. 


24  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Rapidly  Webster  and  Ashburton  cleared  the 
field.  Webster  obtained  the  release  of  McLeod 
and  effected  the  passage  of  a  law  to  prevent  a  simi- 
lar crisis  in  the  future  by  permitting  such  cases  to 
be  transferred  to  a  federal  court.  The  Caroline 
affair  was  settled  by  an  amicable  exchange  of  notes 
in  which  each  side  conceded  much  to  the  other. 
They  did  not  indeed  dispose  of  the  slave  trade,  but 
they  reached  an  agreement  by  which  a  joint  squad- 
ron was  to  undertake  to  police  efficiently  the  Afri- 
can seas  in  order  to  prevent  American  vessels  from 
engaging  in  that  trade. 

Upon  the  more  important  matter  of  boundary, 
both  Webster  and  Ashburton  decided  to  give  up 
the  futile  task  of  convincing  each  other  as  to  the 
meaning  of  phrases  which  rested  upon  half -known 
facts  reaching  back  into  the  misty  period  of  first 
discovery  and  settlement.  They  abandoned  inter- 
pretation and  made  compromise  and  division  the 
basis  of  their  settlement.  This  method  was  more 
difficult  for  Webster  than  for  Ashburton,  as  both 
Maine  and  Massachusetts  were  concerned,  and 
each  must  under  the  Constitution  be  separately 
convinced.  Here  Webster  used  the  "Red  Line" 
map,  and  succeeded  in  securing  the  consent  of  these 
States.  They  finally  settled  upon  a  boundary 


CONTROVERSIES  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN  25 

which  was  certainly  not  that  intended  in  1782  but 
was  a  compromise  between  the  two  conceptions  of 
that  boundary  and  divided  the  territory  with  a  re- 
gard for  actual  conditions  and  geography.  From 
Passamaquoddy  Bay  to  the  Lake  of  the  Woods, 
accepted  lines  were  substituted  for  controversy, 
and  the  basis  of  peace  was  thus  made  more  se- 
cure. The  treaty  also  contained  provision  for  the 
mutual  extradition  of  criminals  guilty  of  specified 
crimes,  but  these  did  not  include  embezzle- 
ment, and  "gone  to  Canada"  was  for  years  the 
epitaph  of  many  a  dishonest  American  who  had 
been  found  out. 

The  friendly  spirit  in  which  Webster  and  Ash- 
burton  had  carried  on  their  negotiations  inaugurated 
a  period  of  reasonable  amity  between  their  two  na- 
tions. The  United  States  annexed  Texas  without 
serious  protest;  in  spite  of  the  clamor  for  "fifty- 
four  forty  or  fight,"  Oregon  was  divided  peace- 
fully; and  England  did  not  take  advantage  of  the 
war  with  Mexico.  Each  of  these  events,  however, 
added  to  American  territory,  and  these  additions 
gave  prominence  to  a  new  and  vexing  problem. 
The  United  States  was  now  planted  solidly  upon 
the  Pacific,  and  its  borders  were  practically  those 
to  which  Adams  had  looked  forward.  Natural 


26  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

and  unified  as  this  area  looks  upon  the  map  and 
actually  is  today,  in  1850  the  extent  of  territorial 
expansion  had  overreached  the  means  of  trans- 
portation. The  Great  Plains,  then  regarded  as  the 
Great  American  Desert,  and  the  Rockies  presented 
impossible  barriers  to  all  but  adventurous  indi- 
viduals. These  men,  uniting  in  bands  for  self- 
protection  and  taking  their  lives  in  their  hands, 
were  able  with  good  luck  to  take  themselves  but 
little  else  across  this  central  region  and  the  western 
barrier.  All  ordinary  communication,  all  mail  and 
all  freight,  must  go  by  sea.  The  United  States 
was  actually  divided  into  two  very  unequal  parts, 
and  California  and  Oregon  were  geographically  far 
distant  colonies. 

The  ocean  highroad  belonged  to  the  United 
States  in  common  with  all  nations,  but  it  took 
American  ships  to  the  opposite  ends  of  the  earth. 
No  regular  shuttle  of  traffic  sufficient  to  weave  the 
nation  together  could  be  expected  to  pass  Cape 
Horn  at  every  throw.  The  natural  route  lay  ob- 
viously through  the  Caribbean,  across  some  one  of 
the  isthmuses,  and  up  the  Pacific  coast.  Here,  how- 
ever, the  United  States  would  have  to  use  territory 
belonging  to  other  nations,  and  to  obtain  the  right 
of  transit  and  security  agreement  was  necessary. 


CONTROVERSIES  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN  27 

All  these  isthmus  routes,  moreover,  needed  improve- 
ment. Capital  must  be  induced  to  do  the  work,  and 
one  necessary  inducement  was  a  guarantee  of  stable 
conditions  of  investment. 

This  isthmus  route  became  for  a  time  the  prime 
object  of  American  diplomacy.  The  United  States 
made  in  1846  satisfactory  arrangements  with  the 
Republic  of  New  Granada  (later  Colombia),  across 
which  lay  the  most  southern  route,  and  in  1853 
with  Mexico,  of  whose  northern  or  Tehuantepec 
route  many  had  great  expectations;  but  a  further 
difficulty  was  now  discovered.  The  best  lanes  were 
those  of  Panama  and  of  Nicaragua.  When  the 
discovery  of  gold  in  California  in  1848  made  haste 
a  more  important  element  in  the  problem,  "  Com- 
modore" Vanderbilt,  at  that  time  the  shipping 
king  of  the  United  States,  devoted  his  attention  to 
the  Nicaragua  route  and  made  it  the  more  popular. 
Here,  however,  the  United  States  encountered  not 
only  the  local  independent  authorities  but  also 
Great  Britain.  Just  to  the  north  of  the  proposed 
route  Great  Britain  possessed  Belize,  now  British 
Honduras,  a  meager  colony  but  with  elastic  boun- 
daries. For  many  generations,  too,  she  had  con- 
cerned herself  with  securing  the  rights  of  the 
Mosquito  Indians,  who  held  a  territory,  also  with 


£8  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

elastic  boundaries,  inconveniently  near  the  San 
Juan  River,  the  Caribbean  entrance  to  the  Nicara- 
guan  thoroughfare.  From  Great  Britain,  more- 
over, must  come  a  large  portion  of  the  capital  to 
be  employed  in  constructing  the  canal  which  was 
expected  soon  to  cut  the  isthmus. 

The  local  situation  soon  became  acute.  Costa 
Rica,  Nicaragua,  and  the  Mosquitoes  all  claimed 
the  mouth  of  the  San  Juan;  Honduras  and  Nica- 
ragua, the  control  of  the  Pacific  outlet.  British  dip- 
lomatic and  naval  officers  clashed  with  those  of  the 
United  States  until,  in  their  search  for  complete  con- 
trol, both  exceeded  the  instructions  which  they  had 
received  from  home.  The  British  occupied  Grey- 
town  on  the  San  Juan  and  supported  the  Mosqui- 
toes and  Costa  Rica.  The  Americans  won  favor  in 
Nicaragua  and  Honduras,  framed  treaties  allowing 
transit  and  canal  construction,  and  proposed  the 
annexation  of  Tigre  Island,  which  commanded  the 
proposed  Pacific  outlet. 

To  untie  these  knots,  Sir  Henry  Bulwer  was  sent 
to  Washington  to  negotiate  with  John  M.  Clayton, 
President  Taylor's  Secretary  of  State.  Neither  of 
these  negotiators  was  of  the  caliber  of  Webster 
and  Ashburton,  and  the  treaty  which  they  drew  up 
proved  rather  a  Pandora's  box  of  future  difficulties 


CONTROVERSIES  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN  29 

than  a  satisfactory  settlement.  In  the  first  place  it 
was  agreed  that  any  canal  to  be  constructed  over  any 
of  the  isthmuses  was  to  be  absolutely  neutral,  in  time 
of  war  as  well  as  of  peace.  Both  nations  were  to 
guarantee  this  neutrality,  and  other  nations  were 
invited  to  join  with  them.  No  other  nations  did 
join,  however,  and  the  project  became  a  dual  af- 
fair which,  owing  to  the  superiority  of  the  British 
Navy,  gave  Britain  the  advantage,  or  would  even- 
tually have  done  so  if  a  canal  had  been  constructed. 
Subsequently  the  majority  of  Americans  decided 
that  such  a  canal  must  be  under  the  sole  control 
of  the  United  States,  and  the  treaty  then  stood 
as  a  stumbling  block  in  the  way  of  the  realization 
of  this  idea. 

More  immediately  important,  however,  and  a 
great  wrench  to  American  policies,  was  the  provision 
that  neither  power  "will  ever  erect  or  maintain  any 
fortifications  commanding"  the  canal  "or  occupy, 
or  fortify,  or  colonize,  or  assume  or  exercise  any 
dominion  over  .  .  .  any  part  of  Central  Amer- 
ica. "  This  condition  violated  Adams's  principle 
that  the  United  States  was  not  on  the  same  footing 
with  any  European  power  in  American  affairs  and 
should  not  be  bound  by  any  self-denying  ordinance, 
and  actually  it  reversed  the  principle  against  the 


30  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

United  States.  An  explanatory  note  accompany- 
ing the  treaty  recognized  that  this  provision  did  not 
apply  to  Belize  and  her  dependencies,  and  Great 
Britain  promptly  denied  that  it  applied  to  any 
rights  she  already  possessed  in  Central  America, 
including  the  Mosquito  protectorate  and  certain 
Bay  Islands  which  were  claimed  by  Great  Britain 
as  dependencies  of  Belize  and  by  Honduras  as  a 
part  of  her  territory. 

In  vain  did  Webster,  who  succeeded  Clayton, 
seek  an  agreement.  His  term  of  office  passed,  and 
the  controversy  fell  into  the  hands  of  Lord  Palmer- 
ston,  the  jingoistic  spirit  who  began  at  this  time 
to  dominate  British  foreign  policy,  and  of  James 
Buchanan,  who,  known  to  us  as  a  spineless  seeker 
after  peace  where  there  was  no  peace,  was  at  this 
time  riding  into  national  leadership  on  a  wave  of 
expansionist  enthusiasm.  Buchanan  and  Palmer- 
ston  mutually  shook  the  stage  thunder  of  ver- 
bal extravagance,  but  probably  neither  intended 
war.  Poker  was  at  this  time  the  national  American 
game,  and  bluff  was  a  highly  developed  art.  The 
American  player  won  a  partial  victory.  In  1856 
Great  Britain  agreed  to  withdraw  her  protectorate 
over  the  Mosquitoes,  to  acknowledge  the  suprem- 
acy of  Honduras  over  the  Bay  Islands,  and  to 


CONTROVERSIES  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN  31 

accept  a  reasonable  interpretation  of  the  Belize 
boundary.  Though  this  convention  was  never 
ratified,  Great  Britain  carried  out  its  terms,  and  in 
1860  Buchanan  announced  himself  satisfied. 

The  dreams  of  1850,  however,  were  not  satisfied. 
A  railroad  was  completed  across  Panama  in  1855, 
but  no  canal  was  constructed  until  years  after  the 
great  transcontinental  railroads  had  bound  Cali- 
fornia to  the  East  by  bonds  which  required  no 
foreign  sanction.  Yet  the  Clay  ton-Bui  wer  Treaty 
remained  an  entangling  alliance,  destined  to  give 
lovers  of  peace  and  amity  many  more  uncomfort- 
able hours. 

During  the  Civil  War  other  causes  of  irritation 
arose  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain. 
The  proclamation  of  neutrality,  by  which  the  Brit- 
ish Government  recognized  the  Confederacy  as 
a  belligerent,  seemed  to  the  North  an  unfriendly 
act.  Early  in  the  war  occurred  the  Trent  affair, 
which  added  to  the  growing  resentment.1  It  was 
held  to  be  a  violation  of  professed  neutrality  that 
Confederate  commerce  destroyers  were  permitted 
to  be  built  and  fitted  out  in  British  yards.  The 
subsequent  transfer  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of 

1  See  Stephenson,  Abraham  Lincoln  and  the  Union,  in  The  Chronicle* 
of  America. 


32  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

tons  of  American  shipping  to  British  registry,  ow- 
ing to  the  depredations  of  these  raiders,  still  further 
incensed  the  American  people.  It  was  in  the  midst 
of  these  strained  relations  that  the  Fenian  Brother- 
hood in  the  United  States  attempted  the  invasion 
of  Canada. 

America  laid  claims  against  Great  Britain,  based 
not  merely  on  the  actual  destruction  of  merchant- 
men by  the  Alabama,  the  Florida,  and  other  Con- 
federate vessels  built  in  British  yards,  but  also  on 
such  indirect  losses  as  insurance,  cost  of  pursuit, 
and  commercial  profits.  The  American  Minister, 
Charles  Francis  Adams,  had  proposed  the  arbitra- 
tion of  these  claims,  but  the  British  Ministry  de- 
clined to  arbitrate  matters  involving  the  honor  of 
the  country.  Adams's  successor,  Reverdy  John- 
son, succeeded  in  arranging  a  convention  in  1868 
excluding  from  consideration  all  claims  for  indirect 
damages,  but  this  arrangement  was  unfavorably 
reported  from  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs 
in  the  Senate.  It  was  then  that  Charles  Sumner, 
Chairman  of  the  Committee,  gave  utterance  to  his 
astounding  demands  upon  Great  Britain.  The  di- 
rect claims  of  the  United  States,  he  contended,  were 
no  adequate  compensation  for  its  losses;  the  indi- 
rect claims  must  also  be  made  good,  particularly 


CONTROVERSIES  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN  33 

those  based  on  the  loss  of  the  American  mer- 
chant marine  by  transfer  to  the  British  flag.  The 
direct  or  "individual"  American  losses  amounted 
to  $15,000,000.  "But  this  leaves  without  recog- 
nition the  vaster  damage  to  commerce  driven  from 
the  ocean,  and  that  other  damage,  immense  and 
infinite,  caused  by  the  prolongation  of  the  war,  all 
of  which  may  be  called  national  in  contradistinction 
to  individual."  Losses  to  commerce  he  reckoned 
at  $110,000,000,  adding  that  this  amount  must  be 
considered  only  an  item  in  the  bill,  for  the  pro- 
longation of  the  war  was  directly  traceable  to  Eng- 
land. "The  rebellion  was  suppressed  at  a  cost 
of  more  than  four  thousand  million  dollars  .  .  . 
through  British  intervention  the  war  was  doubled 
in  duration;  .  .  •.  England  is  justly  responsible 
for  the  additional  expenditure."  Sumner's  total 
bill  against  Great  Britain,  then,  amounted  to  over 
$2,000,000,000;  "everyone,"  said  he,  "can  make 
the  calculation." 

Had  an  irresponsible  member  of  Congress  made 
these  demands,  they  might  have  been  dismissed  as 
another  effort  to  twist  the  British  lion's  tail;  but 
Charles  Sumner  took  himself  seriously,  expected 
others  to  take  him  seriously,  and  unhappily  was 
taken  seriously  by  a  great  number  of  his  fellow 


34  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

countrymen.  The  explanation  of  his  preposterous 
demand  appeared  subsequently  in  a  memorandum 
which  he  prepared.  To  avoid  all  possible  future 
clashes  with  Great  Britain,  he  would  have  her  with- 
draw from  the  American  continents  and  the  West- 
ern Hemisphere.  Great  Britain  might  discharge  her 
financial  obligations  by  transferring  to  the  United 
States  the  whole  of  British  America !  And  Sumner 
seems  actually  to  have  believed  that  he  was  pro- 
moting the  cause  of  international  good  will  by  this 
tactless  proposal. 

For  a  time  it  was  believed  that  Sumner  spoke 
for  the  Administration,  and  public  opinion  in  the 
United  States  was  disposed  to  look  upon  his  speech 
as  a  fair  statement  of  American  grievances  and  a  just 
demand  for  compensation.  The  British  Govern- 
ment, too,  in  view  of  the  action  of  the  Senate  and 
the  indiscreet  utterances  of  the  new  American  Min- 
ister in  London,  John  Lothrop  Motley,  believed 
that  President  Grant  favored  an  aggressive  policy. 
Further  negotiations  were  dropped.  Both  Gov- 
ernments, nevertheless,  were  desirous  of  coming  to 
an  understanding,  though  neither  wished  to  take 
the  first  step. 

Fortunately  it  happened  that  Caleb  Gushing  for 
the  United  States  and  John  Rose  for  Canada  were 


CONTROVERSIES  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN  35 

then  engaged  at  Washington  in  the  discussion  of 
some  matters  affecting  the  two  countries.  In  the 
course  of  informal  conversations  these  accom- 
plished diplomats  planned  for  a  rapprochement. 
Rose  presented  a  memorandum  suggesting  that  all 
questions  in  dispute  be  made  the  subject  of  a  gen- 
eral negotiation  and  treaty.  It  was  at  this  moment 
that  Sumner  came  forward  with  his  plan  of  com- 
pensation and  obviously  he  stood  in  the  way  of  any 
settlement.  President  Grant,  however,  already  in- 
censed by  Motley's  conduct  and  by  Sumner's  op- 
position to  his  own  favorite  project,  the  annexation 
of  Santo  Domingo,  now  broke  definitely  with  both 
by  removing  Motley  and  securing  Sumner's  deposi- 
tion from  the  chairmanship  of  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Affairs.  The  way  was  now  prepared  for  an 
agreement  with  Great  Britain. 

On  February  27,  1871,  a  Joint  High  Commission, 
composed  of  five  distinguished  representatives 
from  each  Government,  began  its  memorable  ses- 
sion at  Washington.  The  outcome  was  the  Treaty 
of  Washington,  signed  on  May  8,  1871.  The  most 
important  question  —  the  "Alabama  Claims"  — 
was  by  this  agreement  to  be  submitted  to  a  tribunal 
of  five  arbitrators,  one  to  be  selected  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  another  by  the  Queen  of 


36  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Great  Britain,  a  third  by  the  King  of  Italy,  a  fourth 
by  the  President  of  the  Swiss  Republic,  and  a  fifth 
by  the  Emperor  of  Brazil.  This  tribunal  was  to 
meet  at  Geneva  and  was  to  base  its  award  on  three 
rules  for  the  conduct  of  neutral  nations:  "First, 
to  use  due  diligence  to  prevent  the  fitting  out,  .  .  . 
within  its  jurisdiction,  of  any  vessel  which  it  has 
reasonable  ground  to  believe  is  intended  to  cruise 
y;n,  .  against  a  Power  with  which  it  is  at  peace 
tu'.  .  ;  secondly,  not  to  permit  .  .  .  either  bel- 
ligerent to  make  use  of  its  ports  or  waters  as  a  base 
of  naval  operations  .  .  .  ;  thirdly,  to  exercise 
due  diligence  in  its  own  ports  and  waters  ...  to 
prevent  any  violation  of  the  foregoing  obligations 
and  duties." 

Another  but  less  elaborate  tribunal  was  to  decide 
all  other  claims  which  had  arisen  out  of  the  Civil 
War.  Still  another  arbitration  commission  was  to 
assess  the  amount  which  the  United  States  was  to 
pay  by  way  of  compensation  for  certain  privileges 
connected  with  the  fisheries.  The  vexed  question 
of  the  possession  of  the  San  Juan  Islands  was  to  be 
left  to  the  decision  of  the  Emperor  of  Germany. 
A  series  of  articles  provided  for  the  amicable  set- 
tlement of  border  questions  between  the  United 
States  and  Canada.  Never  before  in  history 


CONTROVERSIES  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN  37 

had  such  important  controversies  been  submitted 
voluntarily  to  arbitration  and  judicial  settlement. 
The  tribunal  which  met  at  Geneva  in  December 
was  a  body  of  distinguished  men  who  proved  fully 
equal  to  the  gravity  of  their  task.  Charles  Francis 
Adams  was  appointed  to  represent  the  United 
States;  Sir  Alexander  Cockburn,  to  represent  Great 
Britain;  the  commissioners  from  neutral  States 
were  also  men  of  distinction.  J.  C.  Bancroft  Davis 
was  agent  for  the  United  States,  and  William  M. 
Evarts,  Caleb  Cushing,  and  Morrison  R.  Waite 
acted  as  counsel.  The  case  for  the  United  States 
was  not  presented  in  a  manner  worthy  of  the  occa- 
sion. According  to  Adams  the  American  conten- 
tions "were  advanced  with  an  aggressiveness  of 
tone  and  attorney-like  smartness,  more  appropri- 
ate to  the  wranglings  of  a  quarter-sessions  court 
than  to  pleadings  before  a  grave  international  tri- 
bunal. "  The  American  counsel  were  instructed  to 
insist  not,  indeed,  on  indemnity  for  the  cost  of  two 
years  of  war,  but  on  compensation  because  of  the 
transfer  of  our  commerce  to  the  British  merchant 
marine,  by  virtue  of  the  clause  of  the  treaty  which 
read  "acts  committed  by  the  several  vessels  which 
have  given  rise  to  the  claims  generally  known  as 
the  *  Alabama  Claims."5  British  public  opinion 


38  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

considered  this  contention  an  act  of  bad  faith. 
Excitement  in  England  rose  to  a  high  pitch  and 
the  Gladstone  Ministry  proposed  to  withdraw  from 
the  arbitration. 

That  the  tribunal  of  arbitration  did  not  end  in 
utter  failure  was  due  to  the  wisdom  and  courage  of 
Adams.  At  his  suggestion  the  five  arbitrators 
announced  on  June  19,  1872,  that  they  would  not 
consider  claims  for  indirect  damages,  because  such 
claims  did  "not  constitute,  upon  the  principles  of 
international  law  applicable  to  such  cases,  good 
foundation  for  an  award  of  compensation,  or  com- 
putations of  damages  between  nations."  These 
claims  dismissed,  the  arbitrators  entered  into  an 
examination  of  the  direct  American  claims  and  on 
September  14,  1872,  decided  upon  an  award  of  fif- 
teen and  a  half  million  dollars  to  the  United  States. 
The  Treaty  of  Washington  and  the  Geneva  Tri- 
bunal constituted  the  longest  step  thus  far  taken 
by  any  two  nations  toward  the  settlement  of  their 
disputes  by  judicial  process. 


CHAPTER  IH 

ALASKA   AND   ITS   PROBLEMS 

THE  impulse  for  expansion  upon  which  Buchanan 
floated  his  political  raft  into  the  presidency  was 
not  a  party  affair.  It  was  felt  by  men  of  all  party 
creeds,  and  it  seemed  for  a  moment  to  be  the  domi- 
nant national  ideal.  Slaveholders  and  other  men 
who  had  special  interests  sought  to  make  use  of  it, 
but  the  fundamental  feeling  did  not  rest  on  their 
support.  American  democracy,  now  confident  of 
its  growing  strength,  believed  that  the  happiness 
of  the  people  and  the  success  of  the  institutions  of 
the  United  States  would  prove  a  loadstone  which 
would  bring  under  the  flag  all  peoples  of  the 
New  World,  while  those  of  the  Old  World  would 
strike  off  their  shackles  and  remold  their  govern- 
ments on  the  American  pattern.  Attraction,  not 
compulsion,  was  the  method  to  be  used,  and  none 
of  the  pseans  of  American  prophets  in  the  editorials 

39 


40  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

or  the  fervid  orations  of  the  fifties  proposed  an 
additional  battleship  or  regiment. 

No  one  saw  this  bright  vision  more  clearly  than 
did  William  H.  Seward,  who  became  Secretary  of 
State  under  Lincoln.  Slight  of  build,  pleasant,  and 
talkative,  he  gave  an  impression  of  intellectual  dis- 
tinction, based  upon  fertility  rather  than  consist- 
ency of  mind.  He  was  a  disciple  of  John  Quincy 
Adams,  but  his  tireless  energy  had  in  it  too  much 
of  nervous  unrest  to  allow  him  to  stick  to  his  books 
as  did  his  master,  and  there  was  too  wide  a  gap 
between  his  beliefs  and  his  practice.  He  held  as 
idealistic  views  as  any  man  of  his  generation,  but  he 
believed  so  firmly  that  the  right  would  win  that  he 
disliked  hastening  its  victory  at  the  expense  of  bad 
feeling.  He  was  shrewd,  practical  —  maliciously 
practical,  many  thought.  When,  in  the  heat  of 
one  of  his  perorations,  a  flash  of  his  hidden  fires 
would  arouse  the  distrust  of  the  conservative,  he 
would  appear  to  retract  and  try  to  smother  the 
flames  in  a  cloud  of  conciliatory  smoke.  Only  the 
restraining  hand  of  Lincoln  prevented  him  from 
committing  fatal  blunders  at  the  outset  of  the  Civil 
War,  yet  his  handling  of  the  threatening  episode  of 
the  French  in  Mexico  showed  a  wisdom,  a  patient 
tact,  and  a  subtle  ingenuity  which  make  his  conduct 


ALASKA  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS  41 

of  the  affair  a  classic  illustration  of  diplomacy  at 
almost  its  best. z 

In  1861  Seward  said  that  he  saw  Russia  and 
Great  Britain  building  on  the  Arctic  Ocean  out- 
posts on  territory  which  should  belong  to  his  own 
country,  and  that  he  expected  the  capital  of  the 
great  federal  republic  of  the  future  would  be  in 
the  valley  of  Mexico.  Yet  he  nevertheless  retained 
the  sentiment  he  had  expressed  in  1846:  "I  would 
not  give  one  human  life  for  all  the  continent  that 
remains  to  be  annexed."  The  Civil  War  pre- 
vented for  four  years  any  action  regarding  expan- 
sion, and  the  same  conspiracy  which  resulted  in 
the  assassination  of  Lincoln  brought  Seward  to 
the  verge  of  the  grave.  He  recovered  rapidly,  how- 
ever, and  while  on  a  recuperating  trip  through  the 
West  Indies  he  worked  for  the  peaceable  annexa- 
tion of  the  Danish  Islands  and  Santo  Domingo. 
His  friend,  Charles  Sumner,  the  chairman  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  was  fram- 
ing his  remarkable  project  for  the  annexation  of 
Canada.  President  Johnson  and,  later,  President 
Grant  endorsed  parts  of  these  plans.  Denmark 
and  Santo  Domingo  were  willing  to  acquiesce  for 

1  See  Abraham  Lincoln  and  the  Union  and  The  Hispanic  Nations  of 
the  New  World  (in  The  Chronicles  of  America). 


42  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

money,  and  Sumner  believed,  although  he  was  pre- 
posterously wrong,  that  the  incorporation  of  Can- 
ada in  our  Union  would  be  welcomed  by  the  best 
sentiment  of  England  and  of  Canada. 

To  willing  ears,  therefore,  came  in  1867  the  offer  of 
the  Russian  Minister,  Baron  Stoeckl,  to  sell  Alaska. 
The  proposal  did  not  raise  a  question  which  had 
been  entirely  unthought  of.  Even  before  the  Civil 
War,  numbers  of  people  on  the  Pacific  coast,  far 
from  being  overawed  by  the  responsibility  of  de- 
veloping the  immense  territories  which  they  already 
possessed,  had  petitioned  the  Government  to  ob- 
tain Alaska,  and  even  the  proper  purchase  price  had 
been  discussed.  The  reasons  for  Russia's  decision 
to  sell,  however,  have  not  been  sufficiently  investi- 
gated. It  is  apparent  from  the  conduct  of  the 
negotiation  that  it  was  not  a  casual  proposal  but 
one  in  which  Baron  Stoeckl,  at  least,  was  deeply 
interested.  It  is  to  be  remembered  that  at  this 
time  Russia's  ambitions  were  in  Asia,  and  that  her 
chief  rival  was  Great  Britain.  Russia's  power  was 
on  land;  the  seas  she  could  not  hope  to  control. 
The  first  moment  of  war  would  put  Russian  rule 
in  Alaska  at  the  mercy  of  the  British  fleet.  In 
those  days  when  a  Siberian  railroad  was  an  idle 
dream,  this  icebound  region  in  America  was  so 


ALASKA  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS  43 

remote  from  the  center  of  Russian  power  that  it 
could  be  neither  enjoyed  nor  protected.  As  Na- 
poleon in  1803  preferred  to  see  Louisiana  in  the 
hands  of  the  United  States  rather  than  in  those  cf 
his  rival  England,  so  Russia  preferred  Alaska  to 
fall  to  the  United  States  rather  than  to  Canada, 
especially  as  she  could  by  peaceful  cession  obtain 
money  into  the  bargain. 

Seward  was  delighted  with  the  opportunity,  but 
diplomatically  concealed  his  satisfaction  and  bar- 
gained closely.  Stoeckl  asked  ten  million  dollars; 
Seward  offered  five.  Stoeckl  proposed  to  split  the 
difference;  Seward  agreed,  if  Stoeckl  would  knock 
off  the  odd  half  million.  Stoeckl  accepted,  on  con- 
dition that  Seward  add  two  hundred  thousand  as 
special  compensation  to  the  Russian  American  Com- 
pany. It  was  midnight  of  the  29th  of  March  when 
$7,200,000  was  made  the  price.  Seward  roused 
Sumner  from  bed,  and  the  three  worked  upon  the 
form  of  a  treaty  until  four  o'clock  in  the  morning. 
No  captains  of  industry  could  show  greater  decision. 

The  treaty,  however,  was  not  yet  a  fact.  The 
Senate  must  approve,  and  its  approval  could  not 
be  taken  for  granted.  The  temper  of  the  majority 
of  Americans  toward  expansion  had  changed.  The 
experiences  of  the  later  fifties  had  caused  many  to 


44  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

look  upon  expansion  as  a  Southern  heresy.  Carl 
Schurz  a  little  later  argued  that  we  had  already 
taken  in  all  those  regions  the  climate  of  which 
would  allow  healthy  self-government  and  that 
we  should  annex  no  tropics.  Hamilton  Fish,  then 
Secretary  of  State,  wrote  in  1873  that  popular 
sentiment  was,  for  the  time  being,  against  all  ex- 
pansion. In  fact,  among  the  people  of  the  United 
States  the  idea  was  developing  that  expansion  was 
contrary  to  their  national  policy,  and  their  indis- 
position to  expand  became  almost  a  passion.  They 
rejected  Santo  Domingo  and  the  Danish  Islands 
and  would  not  press  any  negotiations  for  Canada. 

What  saved  the  Alaska  Treaty  from  a  similar  dis- 
approval was  not  any  conviction  that  Alaska  was 
worth  seven  million  dollars,  although  Sumner  con- 
vinced those  who  took  the  trouble  to  read,  that  the 
financial  bargain  was  not  a  bad  one.  The  chief 
factor  in  the  purchase  of  Alaska  was  almost  pure 
sentiment .  Throughout  American  history  there  has 
been  a  powerful  tradition  of  friendliness  between 
Russia  and  the  United  States,  yet  surely  no  two 
political  systems  have  been  in  the  past  more  dia- 
metrically opposed.  The  chief  ground  for  friend- 
ship has  doubtless  been  the  great  intervening  dis- 
tance which  has  reduced  intercourse  to  a  minimum. 


ALASKA  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS  45 

Some  slight  basis  for  congeniality  existed  in  the 
fact  that  the  interests  of  both  countries  favored  a 
similar  policy  of  freedom  upon  the  high  seas.  What 
chiefly  influenced  the  public  mind,  however,  was 
the  attitude  which  Russia  had  taken  during  the 
Civil  War.  When  the  Grand  Duke  Alexis  visited 
the  United  States  in  1871,  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes 
greeted  him  with  the  lines: 

Bleak  are  our  coasts  with  the  blasts  of  December, 
Thrilling  and  warm  are  the  hearts  that  remember 
Who  was  our  friend  when  the  world  was  our  foe. 

This  Russian  friendship  had  presented  itself  dra- 
matically to  the  public  at  a  time  when  American 
relations  with  Great  Britain  were  strained,  for  Rus- 
sian fleets  had  in  1863  suddenly  appeared  in  the 
harbors  of  New  York  and  San  Francisco.  These 
visits  were  actually  made  with  a  sole  regard  for 
Russian  interests  and  in  anticipation  of  the  out- 
break of  a  general  European  war,  which  the  Czar 
then  feared.  The  appearance  of  the  fleets,  however, 
was  for  many  years  popularly  supposed  to  signify 
sympathy  with  the  Union  and  a  willingness  to  de- 
fend it  from  attack  by  Great  Britain  and  France. 
Many  conceived  the  ingenuous  idea  that  the  pur- 
chase price  of  Alaska  was  really  the  American  half 


46  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

of  a  secret  bargain  of  which  the  fleets  were  the 
Russian  part.  Public  opinion,  therefore,  regarded 
the  purchase  of  Alaska  in  the  light  of  a  favor  to 
Russia  and  demanded  that  the  favor  be  granted. 

Thus  of  all  the  schemes  of  expansion  in  the  fifty 
years  between  the  Mexican  and  the  Spanish  wars, 
for  the  Gadsden  Purchase  of  1853  was  really  only 
a  rectification  of  boundary,  this  alone  came  to 
fruition.  Seward  could  well  congratulate  himself 
on  his  alertness  in  seizing  an  opportunity  and  on 
his  management  of  the  delicate  political  aspects  of 
the  purchase.  Without  his  promptness  the  gold- 
en opportunity  might  have  passed  and  never  re- 
curred. Yet  he  could  never  have  saved  this  frag- 
ment of  his  policy  had  not  the  American  people 
cherished  for  Russia  a  sentimental  friendship  which 
was  intensified  at  the  moment  by  anger  at  the 
supposed  sympathy  of  Great  Britain  for  the  South. 

If  Russia  hoped  by  ceding  Alaska  to  involve  the 
United  States  in  difficulties  with  her  rival  Great 
Britain,  her  desire  was  on  one  occasion  nearly 
gratified.  The  only  profit  which  the  United  States 
derived  from  this  new  possession  was  for  many 
years  drawn  from  the  seal  fishery.  The  same  gen- 
eration of  Americans  which  allowed  the  extermi- 
nation of  the  buffalo  for  lap  robes  found  in  the 


ALASKA  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS  47 

sealskin  sack  the  hall  mark  of  wealth  and  fashion. 
While,  however,  the  killing  of  the  buffalo  was  al- 
lowed to  go  on  without  official  check,  the  Govern- 
ment in  1870  inaugurated  a  system  to  preserve  the 
seal  herds  which  was  perhaps  the  earliest  step  in 
a  national  conservation  policy.  The  sole  right  of 
killing  was  given  to  the  Alaska  Commercial  Com- 
pany with  restrictions  under  which  it  was  be- 
lieved that  the  herds  would  remain  undiminished. 
The  catch  was  limited  to  one  hundred  thousand 
a  year;  it  was  to  include  only  male  seals;  and  it 
was  to  be  limited  to  the  breeding  grounds  on  the 
Pribilof  Islands. 

The  seals,  however,  did  not  confine  themselves 
to  American  territory.  During  the  breeding  season 
they  ranged  far  and  wide  within  a  hundred  miles  of 
their  islands;  and  during  a  great  part  of  the  yea-r 
they  were  to  be  found  far  out  in  the  Pacific.  The 
value  of  their  skins  attracted  the  adventurous  of 
many  lands,  but  particularly  Canadians;  and  Van- 
couver became  the  greatest  center  for  deep-sea 
sealing.  The  Americans  saw  the  development  of 
the  industry  with  anger  and  alarm.  Considering 
the  seals  as  their  own,  they  naturally  resented  this 
unlimited  exploitation  by  outsiders  when  Ameri- 
cans themselves  were  so  strictly  limited  by  law. 


48  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

They  also  believed  that  the  steady  diminution  of 
the  herds  was  due  to  the  reckless  methods  of  their 
Tivals,  particularly  the  use  of  explosives  which  de- 
)stroyed  many  animals  to  secure  a  few  perfect  skins. 

Public  opinion  on  the  Pacific  coast  sought  a 
remedy  and  soon  found  one  in  the  terms  of  the 
treaty  of  purchase.  That  document,  in  dividing 
Alaska  from  Siberia,  described  a  line  of  division 
running  through  Bering  Sea,  and  in  1881  the  Act- 
ing Secretary  of  the  Treasury  propounded  the 
theory  that  this  line  divided  not  merely  the  islands 
but  the  water  as  well.  There  was  a  widespread 
feeling  that  all  Bering  Sea  within  this  line  was 
American  territory  and  that  all  intruders  from 
other  nations  were  poachers.  In  accordance  with 
this('theory,  the  revenue  cutter  Corwin  in  1886  seized 
three  British  vessels  and  haled  their  skippers  before 
the  United  States  District  Court  of  Sitka.  Thomas 
P.  Bayard,  then  Secretary  of  State  under  Presi- 
dent Cleveland,  did  not  recognize  this  theory  of  in- 
terpreting the  treaty,  but  endeavored  to  right  the 
grievance  by  a  joint  agreement  with  France,  Ger- 
many, Japan,  Russia,  and  Great  Britain,  the  seal- 
ing nations,  "for  the  better  protection  of  the  fur 
seal  fisheries  in  Bering  Sea. " 

A  solution  had  been  almost  reached,  when  Canada 


ALASKA  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS  49 

interposed.  Lord  Morley  has  remarked,  in  his  Re- 
collections, how  the  voice  of  Canada  fetters  Great 
Britain  in  her  negotiations  with  the  United  States. 
While  Bayard  was  negotiating  an  agreement  con- 
cerning Bering  Sea  which  was  on  the  whole  to  the 
advantage  of  the  United  States,  he  completed  a 
similar  convention  on  the  more  complicated  ques- 
tion of  the  northeastern  or  Atlantic  fisheries  which 
was  more  important  to  Canada.  This  latter  con- 
vention was  unfavorably  reported  by  the  Senate 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  which  foreshadowed 
rejection.  Thereupon,  in  May,  1888,  Lord  Salis- 
bury, the  British  Foreign  Minister,  withdrew  from 
the  Bering  Sea  negotiation. 

At  this  critical  moment  Cleveland  gave  place  to 
Harrison,  and  Bayard  was  succeeded  by  James  G. 
Blaine,  the  most  interesting  figure  in  our  diplomatic 
activities  of  the  eighties.  These  years  marked  the 
lowest  point  in  the  whole  history  of  our  relations 
with  other  countries,  both  in  the  character  of  our 
agents  and  in  the  nature  of  the  public  opinion  to 
which  they  appealed.  Blaine  was  undoubtedly  the 
most  ill-informed  of  our  great  diplomats;  yet  a 
trace  of  greatness  lingers  about  him.  The  exact 
reverse  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  he  knew  neither 
law  nor  history,  and  he  did  not  always  inspire 


50  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

others  with  confidence  in  his  integrity.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  magnetic  charm  of  his  personality 
won  many  to  a  devotion  such  as  none  of  our  great 
men  except  Clay  has  received.  Blaine  saw,  more- 
over, though  through  a  glass  darkly,  farther  along 
the  path  which  the  United  States  was  to  take  than 
did  any  of  his  contemporaries.  It  was  his  fate  to 
deal  chiefly  in  controversy  with  those  accomplished 
diplomats,  Lord  Salisbury  and  Lord  Granville,  and 
it  must  have  been  among  the  relaxations  of  their 
office  to  point  out  tactfully  the  defects  and  errors 
in  his  dispatches.  Nevertheless  when  he  did  not 
misread  history  or  misquote  precedents  but  wielded 
the  broadsword  of  equity,  he  often  caught  the  pub- 
lic conscience,  and  then  he  was  not  an  opponent  to 
be  despised. 

Blame  at  once  undertook  the  defense  of  the  con- 
tention that  Bering  Sea  was  "closed"  and  the  ex- 
clusive property  of  the  United  States,  in  spite  of 
the  fact  that  this  position  was  opposed  to  the  whole 
trend  of  American  opinion,  which  from  the  days  of 
the  Revolution  had  always  stood  for  freedom  of 
the  high  seas  and  the  limitation  of  the  water  rights 
of  particular  nations  to  the  narrowest  limits.  The 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  had  jointly  pro- 
tested against  the  Czar's  ukase  of  1821,  which  had 


ALASKA  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS  51 

asserted  Russia's  claim  to  Bering  Sea  as  territorial 
waters;  and  if  Russia  had  not  possessed  it  in  1821, 
we  certainly  could  not  have  bought  it  in  1867. 
In  the  face  of  Canadian  opinion,  Great  Britain 
could  never  consent,  even  for  the  sake  of  peace,  to 
a  position  as  unsound  as  it  was  disadvantageous 
to  Canadian  industry.  Nor  did  Blaine's  contention 
that  the  seals  were  domestic  animals  belonging 
to  us,  and  therefore  subject  to  our  protection  while 
wandering  through  the  ocean,  carry  conviction  to 
lawyers  familiar  with  the  fascinating  intricacies 
of  the  law,  domestic  and  international,  relating  to 
migratory  birds  and  beasts.  To  the  present  gen- 
eration it  seems  amusing  that  Blaine  defended  his 
basic  contention  quite  as  much  on  the  ground  of 
the  inhumanity  of  destroying  the  seals  as  of  its 
economic  wastefulness.  Yet  Blaine  rallied  Con- 
gress to  his  support,  as  well  as  a  great  part  of 
American  sentiment. 

The  situation,  which  had  now  become  acute,  was 
aggravated  by  the  fact  that  most  American  public 
men  of  this  period  did  not  separate  their  foreign 
and  domestic  politics.  Too  many  sought  to  secure 
the  important  Irish  vote  by  twisting  the  tail  of 
the  British  lion.  The  Republicans,  in  particular, 
sought  to  identify  protection  with  patriotism  and 


52  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

were  making  much  of  the  fact  that  the  recall  of 
Lord  Sackville-West,  the  British  Minister,  had  been 
forced  because  he  had  advised  a  correspondent  to 
vote  for  Cleveland.  It  spoke  volumes  for  the 
fundamental  good  sense  of  the  two  nations  that, 
when  relations  were  so  strained,  they  could  agree 
to  submit  their  differences  to  arbitration.  For  this 
happy  outcome  credit  must  be  given  to  the  cooler 
heads  on  both  sides,  but  equal  credit  must  be  given 
to  their  legacy  from  the  cool  heads  which  had  pre- 
ceded them.  The  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
had  acquired  the  habit  of  submitting  to  judicial 
decision  their  disputes,  even  those  closely  touching 
honor,  and  this  habit  kept  them  steady. 

In  accepting  arbitration  in  1892,  the  United 
States  practically  gave  up  her  case,  although  Blaine 
undoubtedly  believed  it  could  be  defended,  and  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  it  was  ably  presented  by  John 
W.  Foster  from  a  brief  prepared  by  the  American 
counsel,  Edward  J.  Phelps,  Frederic  R.  Coudert, 
and  James  C.  Carter  The  tribunal  assembled  at 
Paris  decided  that  Bering  Sea  was  open  and  deter- 
mined certain  facts  upon  which  a  subsequent  com- 
mission assessed  damages  of  nearly  half  a  million 
against  the  United  States  for  the  seizure  of  British 
vessels  during  the  period  in  which  the  American 


ALASKA  AND  ITS  PROBLEMS  53 

claim  was  being  asserted.  Blaine,  however,  did 
not  lose  everything.  The  treaty  contained  the  ex- 
traordinary provision  that  the  arbitration  tribunal, 
in  case  it  decided  against  the  United  States,  was 
to  draw  up  regulations  for  the  protection  of  the 
seal  herds.  These  regulations  when  drafted  did 
not  prove  entirely  satisfactory,  and  bound  only 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain.  It  required 
many  years  and  much  tinkering  to  bring  about 
the  reasonably  satisfactory  arrangement  that  is  now 
in  force.  Yet  to  leave  to  an  international  tribunal 
not  merely  the  decision  of  a  disputed  case  but  the 
legislation  necessary  to  regulate  an  international 
property  was  in  itself  a  great  step  in  the  develop- 
ment of  world  polity.  The  charlatan  who  almost 
brought  on  war  by  maintaining  an  indefensible  case 
was  also  the  statesman  who  made  perhaps  the 
greatest  single  advance  in  the  conservation  of  the 
world's  resources  by  international  regulation. 


CHAPTER  IV 

BLAINE   AND    PAN-AMERICANISM 

DURING  the  half  century  that  intervened  between 
John  Quincy  Adams  and  James  G.  Elaine,  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  it  was  commonly  believed,  had 
prevented  the  expansion  of  the  territories  of  Euro- 
pean powers  in  the  Americas.  It  had  also  relieved 
the  United  States  both  of  the  necessity  of  continual 
preparation  for  war  and  of  that  constant  tension  in 
which  the  perpetual  shifting  of  the  European  bal- 
ance of  power  held  the  nations  of  that  continent. 
But  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  not  solely  responsible 
for  these  results.  Had  it  not  been  for  the  British 
Navy,  the  United  States  would  in  vain  have  pro- 
claimed its  disapproval  of  encroachment.  Nor,  had 
Europe  continued  united,  could  the  United  States 
have  withstood  European  influence;  but  Canning's 
policy  had  practically  destroyed  Metternich's  dream 
of  unity  maintained  by  intervention,  and  in  1848  that 
whole  structure  went  hopelessly  tumbling  before  a 

54 


ELAINE  AND  PAN- AMERICANISM         55 

new  order.  Yet  British  policy,  too,  failed  of  full 
realization,  for  British  statesmen  always  dreamed 
of  an  even  balance  in  continental  Europe  which 
Great  Britain  could  incline  to  her  wishes,  whereas 
it  usually  proved  necessary,  in  order  to  preserve 
a  balance  at  all,  for  her  to  join  one  side  or  the 
other.  Divided  Europe  therefore  stood  opposite 
united  America,  and  our  inferior  strength  was  en- 
hanced by  an  advantageous  position. 

The  insecurity  of  the  American  position  was 
revealed  during  the  Civil  War.  When  the  United 
States  divided  within,  the  strength  of  the  nation 
vanished.  The  hitherto  suppressed  desires  of  Euro- 
pean nations  at  once  manifested  themselves.  Spain, 
never  satisfied  that  her  American  empire  was  really 
lost,  at  once  leaped  to  take  advantage  of  the  change. 
On  a  trumped  up  invitation  of  some  of  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Santo  Domingo,  she  invaded  the  formerly 
Spanish  portion  of  the  island  and  she  began  war 
with  Peru  in  the  hope  of  acquiring  at  least  some 
of  the  Pacific  islands  belonging  to  that  state. 

More  formidable  were  the  plans  of  Napoleon  III, 
for  the  French,  too,  remembered  the  glowing  prom- 
ise of  their  earlier  American  dominions.  They  had 
not  forgotten  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  Americas 
as  far  north  as  the  southern  borders  of  the  United 


56  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

States  were  of  Latin  blood,  at  least  so  far  as  they 
were  of  European  origin.  In  Montevideo  there  was 
a  French  colony,  and  during  the  forties  France  had 
been  active  in  proffering  her  advice  in  South  Ameri- 
can disputes.  When  the  second  French  Republic 
had  been  proclaimed  in  1848,  one  of  the  French  min- 
isters in  South  America  saw  a  golden  chance  for  his 
country  to  assume  the  leadership  of  all  Latin  Ameri- 
ca, which  was  at  that  time  suspicious  of  the  designs 
of  the  United  States  and  alarmed  by  its  rapid  expan- 
sion at  the  expense  of  Mexico.  With  the  power  of 
the  American  Government  neutralized  in  1861,  and 
with  the  British  Navy  immobilized  by  the  necessity 
of  French  friendship,  which  the  "Balance"  made 
just  then  of  paramount  interest  to  Great  Britain, 
Napoleon  III  determined  to  establish  in  Mexico  an 
empire  under  French  influence. 

It  is  instructive  to  notice  that  General  Bern- 
hardi  states,  in  Germany  and  the  Next  War  which 
has  attracted  such  wide  attention  and  which  has 
done  so  much  to  convince  Americans  of  the  bad  mor- 
als of  autocracy,  that  Great  Britain  lost  her  great 
chance  of  world  dominance  by  not  taking  active 
advantage  of  this  situation,  as  did  France  and 
Spain.  It  is  indeed  difficult  to  see  what  would  have 
been  the  outcome  had  Great  Britain  also  played 


ELAINE  AND  PAN-AMERICANISM        57 

at  that  time  an  aggressive  and  selfish  part.  She 
stayed  her  hand,  but  many  British  statesmen 
were  keenly  interested  in  the  struggle,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  British  interests.  They  did  not 
desire  territory,  but  they  foresaw  that  the  perma- 
nent separation  of  the  two  parts  of  the  United 
States  would  leave  the  country  shorn  of  weight 
in  the  affairs  of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  North 
and  South,  if  separated,  would  each  inevitably  seek 
European  support,  and  the  isolation  of  the  United 
States  and  its  claim  to  priority  in  American  affairs 
would  disappear.  The  balance  of  power  would  ex- 
tend itself  to  the  Western  Hemisphere  and  the  as- 
sumption of  a  sphere  of  influence  would  vanish 
with  the  unity  of  the  United  States. 

Nor  did  the  close  of  the  Civil  War  reveal  less 
clearly  than  its  beginning  the  real  international 
position  of  the  United  States.  When  the  coun- 
try once  more  acquired  unity,  these  European 
encroachments  were  renounced,  and  dreams  of 
colonial  empire  in  America  vanished.  There  was 
a  moment's  questioning  as  to  the  reality  of  the 
triumph  of  the  North  —  a  doubt  that  the  South 
might  rise  if  foreign  war  broke  out;  but  the  uncer- 
tainty was  soon  dispelled.  It  was  somewhat  em- 
barrassing, if  not  humiliating,  for  the  Emperor  of 


58  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

the  French  to  withdraw  from  his  Mexican  under- 
taking, but  the  way  was  smoothed  for  him  by  the 
finesse  of  Seward.  By  1866  the  international  posi- 
tion of  the  United  States  was  reestablished  and  was 
perhaps  the  stronger  for  having  been  tested. 

In  all  these  years,  however,  the  positive  side  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  development  of  friendly 
cooperation  between  the  nations  of  America  under 
the  leadership  of  the  United  States,  had  made  no 
progress.  In  fact,  with  the  virtual  disappearance 
of  the  American  merchant  marine  after  the  Civil 
War,  the  influence  of  the  United  States  diminished. 
Great  Britain  with  her  ships,  her  trade,  and  her 
capital,  at  that  time  actually  counted  for  much 
more,  while  German  trade  expanded  rapidly  in  the 
seventies  and  eighties  and  German  immigration 
into  Brazil  gave  Prussia  a  lever  hold,  the  ultimate 
significance  of  which  is  not  even  yet  fully  evident. 

Under  these  circumstances,  Blaine  planned  t& 
play  a  brilliant  role  as  Secretary  of  State  in  Presi- 
dent Garfield's  Cabinet.  Though  the  President 
was  his  personal  friend,  Blaine  regarded  him  as  his 
inferior  in  practical  statecraft  and  planned  to  make 
his  own  foreign  policy  the  notable  feature  of  the 
Administration.  His  hopes  were  dashed,  however, 
by  the  assassination  of  Garfield  and  by  the  accession 


BLAINE  AND  PAN-AMERICANISM        59 

of  President  Arthur.  The  new  Secretary  of  State, 
F  T.  Frelinghuysen,  reversed  nearly  all  of  his  pred- 
ecessor's policies.  When  Elaine  returned  to  the 
Department  of  State  in  1889,  he  found  a  less  sym- 
pathetic chief  in  President  Harrison  and  a  less 
brilliant  role  to  play.  Whether  his  final  retire- 
ment before  the  close  of  the  Harrison  Administra- 
tion was  due  directly  to  the  conflict  of  views  which 
certainly  existed  or  was  a  play  on  his  part  for  the 
presidency  and  for  complete  control  is  a  question 
that  has  never  been  completely  settled. 

Narrow  as  was  Elaine's  view  of  world  affairs, 
impossible  as  was  his  conception  of  an  America 
divided  from  Europe  economically  and  spiritually 
as  well  as  politically  and  of  an  America  united  in 
itself  by  a  provoked  and  constantly  irritated  hos- 
tility to  Europe,  he  had  an  American  program 
which,  taken  by  itself,  was  definite,  well  conceived, 
and  in  a  sense  prophetic.  It  is  interesting  to  note 
that  in  referring  to  much  the  same  relationship, 
Elaine  characteristically  spoke  of  the  United  States 
as  "Elder  Sister"  of  the  South  American  republics, 
while  Theodore  Roosevelt,  at  a  later  period,  con- 
ceived the  role  to  be  that  of  a  policeman  wielding 
the  "Big  Stick." 

Elaine's  first  aim  was  to  establish  peace  in  the 


60  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Western  Hemisphere  by  offering  American  media- 
tion in  the  disputes  of  sister  countries.  When 
he  first  took  office  in  1881,  the  prolonged  and 
bitter  war  existing  between  Chili,  Bolivia,  and  Peru 
for  the  control  of  the  nitrate  fields  which  lay  just 
where  the  territories  of  the  three  abutted,  pro- 
vided a  convenient  opportunity.  If  he  could  re- 
store peace  on  an  equitable  basis  here,  he  would  do 
much  to  establish  the  prestige  of  the  United  States 
as  a  wise  and  disinterested  counselor  in  Spanish 
American  affairs.  In  this  his  first  diplomatic  un- 
dertaking, there  appeared,  however,  one  of  the 
weaknesses  of  execution  which  constantly  inter- 
fered with  the  success  of  his  plans.  He  did  not 
know  how  to  sacrifice  politics  to  statesmanship, 
and  he  appointed  as  his  agents  men  so  incompe- 
tent that  they  aggravated  rather  than  settled  the 
difficulty.  Later  he  saw  his  mistake  and  made 
a  new  and  admirable  appointment  in  the  case 
of  Mr.  William  H.  Trescot  of  South  Carolina. 
Blaine  himself,  however,  lost  office  before  new 
results  could  be  obtained;  and  Frelinghuysen 
recalled  Trescot  and  abandoned  the  attempt  to 
force  peace. 

A  second  object  of  Elaine's  policy  was  to  prevent 
disputes  between  Latin  American  and  European 


ELAINE  AND  PAN- AMERICANISM         61 

powers  from  becoming  dangerous  by  acting  as  me- 
diator between  them.  When  he  took  office,  France 
was  endeavoring  to  collect  from  Venezuela  a  claim 
which  was  probably  just.  When  Venezuela  proved 
obdurate,  France  proposed  to  seize  her  custom 
houses  and  to  collect  the  duties  until  the  debt  was 
paid.  Elaine  protested,  urged  Venezuela  to  pay, 
and  suggested  that  the  money  be  sent  through 
the  American  agent  at  Caracas.  He  further  pro- 
posed that,  should  Venezuela  not  pay  within  three 
months,  the  United  States  should  seize  the  custom 
houses,  collect  the  money,  and  pay  it  to  France. 
Again  his  short  term  prevented  him  from  carrying 
out  his  policy,  but  it  is  nevertheless  of  interest  as 
anticipating  the  plan  actually  followed  by  President 
Roosevelt  in  the  case  of  Santo  Domingo. 

Elaine  was  just  as  much  opposed  to  the  peaceful 
penetration  of  European  influence  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  as  to  its  forceful  expression.  The  proj- 
ect of  a  canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  to  be 
built  and  owned  by  a  French  company,  had  already 
aroused  President  Hayes  on  March  8,  1880,  to  re- 
mark: "The  policy  of  this  country  is  a  canal  un- 
der American  control.  The  United  States  cannot 
consent  to  the  surrender  of  this  control  to  any  Euro- 
pean power  or  to  any  combination  of  European 


62  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

powers. "  Blaine  added  that  the  passage  of  hostile 
troops  through  such  a  canal  when  either  the  United 
States  or  Colombia  was  at  war,  as  the  terms  of 
guarantee  of  the  new  canal  allowed,  was  "no  more 
admissible  than  on  the  railroad  lines  joining  the 
Atlantic  and  Pacific  shores  of  the  United  States." 
It  is  characteristic  of  Blaine  that,  when  he  wrote 
this  dispatch,  he  was  apparently  in  complete  igno- 
rance of  the  existence  of  the  Clay  ton-Bui  wer  Treaty, 
in  which  the  United  States  accepted  the  exactly 
opposite  principles  —  had  agreed  to  a  canal  under 
a  joint  international  guarantee  and  open  to  the  use 
of  all  in  time  of  war  as  well  as  of  peace.  Discover- 
ing this  obstacle,  he  set  to  work  to  demolish  it  by 
announcing  to  Great  Britain  that  the  treaty  was 
antiquated,  thirty  years  old,  that  the  development 
of  the  American  Pacific  slope  had  changed  condi- 
tions, and  that,  should  the  treaty  be  observed  and 
such  a  canal  remain  unfortified,  the  superiority  of 
the  British  fleet  would  give  the  nation  complete 
control.  Great  Britain,  however,  could  scarcely  be 
expected  to  regard  a  treaty  as  defunct  from  old 
age  at  thirty  years,  especially  as  she  also  possessed 
a  developing  Pacific  coast.  Moreover,  if  the  treaty 
was  to  British  advantage,  at  least  the  United 
States  had  accepted  it.  Great  Britain,  therefore, 


ELAINE  AND  PAN-AMERICANISM        63 

refused  to  admit  that  the  treaty  was  not  in  full 
force.  Blaine  then  urged  the  building  of  an  Amer- 
ican canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Nicaragua,  in 
defiance  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  —  a  plan 
which  received  the  support  of  even  President 
Arthur,  under  whom  a  treaty  for  the  purpose  was 
negotiated  with  the  Republic  of  Nicaragua.  Before 
this  treaty  was  ratified  by  the  Senate,  however, 
Grover  Cleveland,  who  had  just  become  President, 
withdrew  it.  He  believed  in  the  older  policy,  and 
refused  his  sanction  to  the  new  treaty  on  the 
ground  that  such  a  canal  "must  be  for  the  world's 
benefit,  a  trust  for  mankind,  to  be  removed  from 
the  chance  of  domination  by  any  single  power. " 

The  crowning  glory  of  Blaine's  system,  as  he 
planned  it,  was  the  cooperation  of  the  American 
republics  for  common  purposes.  He  did  not  share 
Seward's  dream  that  they  would  become  incorpo- 
rated States  of  the  Union,  but  he  went  back  to 
Henry  Clay  and  the  Panama  Congress  of  1826 
for  his  ideal.  During  his  first  term  of  office  he 
invited  the  republics  to  send  representatives  to 
Washington  to  discuss  arbitration,  but  his  suc- 
cessor in  office  feared  that  such  a  meeting  of  "a 
partial  group  of  our  friends"  might  offend  Europe, 
which  indeed  was  not  improbably  part  of  Blaine's 


64  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

intention.  On  resuming  office,  Elaine  finally  ar- 
ranged the  meeting  of  a  Pan- American  Congress  in 
the  United  States.  Chosen  to  preside,  he  presented 
an  elaborate  program,  including  a  plan  for  arbitrat- 
ing disputes;  commercial  reciprocity;  the  establish- 
ment of  uniform  weights  and  measures,  of  inter- 
national copyright,  trade-marks  and  patents,  and 
of  common  coinage;  improvement  of  communica- 
tions; and  other  subjects.  At  the  same  time  he 
exerted  himself  to  secure  in  the  McKinley  Tariff 
Bill,  which  was  just  then  under  consideration,  a 
provision  for  reciprocity  of  trade  with  American 
countries.  This  meeting  was  not  a  complete  suc- 
cess, since  Congress  gave  him  only  half  of  what  he 
wanted  by  providing  for  reciprocity  but  making  it 
general  instead  of  purely  American.  Nevertheless 
one  permanent  and  solid  result  was  secured  in  the 
establishment  of  the  Bureau  of  American  Repub- 
lics at  Washington,  which  has  become  a  clearing 
house  of  ideas  and  a  visible  bond  of  common  in- 
terests and  good  feeling. 

Throughout  the  years  of  Blaine's  prominence, 
the  public  took  more  interest  in  his  bellicose  en- 
counters with  Europe,  and  particularly  with  Great 
Britain,  than  in  his  constructive  American  policy; 
and  he  failed  to  secure  for  either  an  assured  popular 


ELAINE  AND  PAN-AMERICANISM        65 

support.  His  attempt  to  widen  the  gulf  between 
Europe  and  America  was  indeed  absurd  at  a  time 
when  the  cable,  the  railroad,  and  the  steamship 
were  rendering  the  world  daily  smaller  and  more 
closely  knit,  and  when  the  spirit  of  democracy, 
rapidly  permeating  western  Europe,  was  breaking 
down  the  distinction  in  political  institutions  which 
had  given  point  to  the  pronouncement  of  1823. 
Nevertheless  Elaine  did  actually  feel  the  changing 
industrial  conditions  at  home  which  were  destroy- 
ing American  separateness,  and  he  made  a  genuine 
attempt  to  find  a  place  for  the  United  States  in  the 
world,  without  the  necessity  of  sharing  the  respon- 
sibilities of  all  the  world,  by  making  real  that  inter- 
est in  its  immediate  neighbors  which  his  country 
had  announced  in  1823.  Even  while  Elaine  was 
working  on  his  plan  of  "America  for  the  Amer- 
icans," events  were  shaping  the  most  important 
extension  of  the  interests  of  the  United  States 
which  had  taken  place  since  1823. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE   UNITED    STATES   AND    THE   PACIFIC 

LONG  before  the  westward  march  of  Americans  had 
brought  their  flag  to  the  Pacific,  that  ocean  was 
familiar  to  their  mariners.  From  Cape  Horn  to 
Canton  and  the  ports  of  India,  there  ploughed  the 
.stately  merchantmen  of  Salem,  Providence,  and 
Newburyport,  exchanging  furs  and  ginseng  for  teas, 
-silks,  the  "Canton  blue"  which  is  today  so  cher- 
ished a  link  with  the  past,  and  for  the  lacquer 
cabinets  and  carved  ivory  which  give  distinction 
to  many  a  New  England  home.  Meanwhile  the 
sturdy  whalers  of  New  Bedford  scoured  the  whole 
ocean  for  sperm  oil  and  whalebone,  and  the  inci- 
dents of  their  self-reliant  three-year  cruises  ac- 
quainted them  with  nearly  every  coral  and  volcanic 
isle.  Early  in  the  century  missionaries  also  began 
to  brave  the  languor  of  these  oases  of  leisure  and 
the  appetite  of  their  cannibalistic  inhabitants. 
The  interest  of  the  Government  was  bound  to 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  PACIFIC     6r 

follow  its  adventurous  citizens.  In  1820  the  United 
States  appointed  a  consular  agent  at  Honolulu;  in 
the  thirties  and  forties  it  entered  into  treaty  rela- 
tions with  Siam,  Borneo,  and  China;  and  owing  to 
circumstances  which  were  by  no  means  accidental 
it  had  the  honor  of  persuading  Japan  to  open  her 
ports  to  the  world.  As  early  as  1797  an  American 
vessel  chartered  by  the  Dutch  had  visited  Nagasaki. 
From  time  to  time  American  sailors  had  been  ship- 
wrecked on  the  shores  of  Japan,  and  the  United 
States  had  more  than  once  picked  up  and  sought  to 
return  Japanese  castaways.  In  1846  an  official  expe- 
dition under  Commodore  Biddle  was  sent  to  estab- 
lish relationships  with  Japan  but  was  unsuccessful. 
In  1853  Commodore  Perry  bore  a  message  from  the 
President  to  the  Mikado  which  demanded  —  though 
the  demand  was  couched  in  courteous  language  — 
"friendship,  commerce,  a  supply  of  coal  and  provi- 
sions, and  protection  for  our  shipwrecked  people.'* 
After  a  long  hesitation  the  Mikado  yielded.  Com- 
modore Perry's  success  was  due  not  solely  to  the 
care  with  which  his  expedition  was  equipped  for  its 
purpose  nor  to  his  diplomatic  skill  but  in  part  to 
the  fact  that  other  countries  were  known  to  be  on 
the  very  point  of  forcing  an  entrance  into  the  seclu- 
sion of  Japan.  Few  Americans  realize  how  close, 


68  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

indeed,  were  the  relations  established  with  Japan 
by  the  United  States.  The  treaty  which  Townsend 
Harris  negotiated  in  1858  stated  that  "The  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  at  the  request  of  the 
Japanese  Government,  will  act  as  a  friendly  medi- 
ator in  such  matters  of  difference  as  may  arise  be- 
tween the  Government  of  Japan  and  any  European 
power."  Through  his  personal  efforts  Harris  may 
almost  be  said  to  have  become  the  chief  adviser  of 
the  Japanese  Government  in  the  perplexities  which 
it  encountered  on  entering  international  society. 

Not  only  did  the  United  States  allow  itself  a 
closer  intimacy  with  this  new  Pacific  power  than 
it  would  have  done  with  a  state  of  Europe,  but  it 
exhibited  a  greater  freedom  in  dealing  with  the 
European  powers  themselves  in  the  Far  East  than 
at  home  or  in  America.  In  1863  the  United  States 
joined  —  in  fact,  in  the  absence  of  a  naval  force  it 
strained  a  point  by  chartering  a  vessel  for  the  pur- 
pose —  with  a  concert  of  powers  to  force  the  open- 
ing of  the  Shimonoseki  Straits;  subsequently  acting 
with  Great  Britain,  France,  and  the  Netherlands, 
the  United  States  secured  an  indemnity  to  pay  the 
cost  of  the  expedition;  and  in  1866  it  united  with  the 
same  powers  to  secure  a  convention  by  which  Japan 
bound  herself  to  establish  certain  tariff  regulations. 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  PACIFIC     69 

Nor  were  the  relations  of  the  United  States  with 
the  Pacific  Ocean  and  its  shores  confined  to  trade 
and  international  obligations.  The  American  flag 
waved  over  more  than  ships  and  a  portion  of  the 
Pacific  coast.  Naval  officers  more  than  once  raised 
it  over  islands  which  they  christened,  and  Congress 
authorized  the  President  to  exercise  temporary  au- 
thority over  islands  from  which  American  citizen* 
were  removing  guano  and  to  prevent  foreign  en- 
croachment while  they  were  so  engaged.  In  the 
eighties,  fifty  such  islands  of  the  Pacific  were  in  the 
possession  of  the  United  States. 

In  1872  an  American  naval  officer  made  an 
agreement  with  the  local  chieftain  of  Tutuila,  one 
of  the  Samoan  Islands,  for  the  use  of  Pago  Pago, 
which  was  the  best  harbor  in  that  part  of  the  ocean. 
The  United  States  drifted  into  more  intimate  re- 
lationship with  the  natives  until  in  1878  it  made  a 
treaty  with  the  Samoan  king  allowing  Americans 
to  use  Pago  Pago  as  a  coaling  station.  In  return 
the  United  States  agreed:  "If  unhappily,  any  dif- 
ferences should  have  arisen,  or  shall  hereafter  arise, 
between  the  Samoan  government  and  any  other 
government  in  amity  with  the  United  States,  the 
government  of  the  latter  will  employ  its  good  offices 
for  the  purpose  of  adjusting  those  differences  upon 


70  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

a  satisfactory  and  solid  foundation."  In  1884 
the  Senate  insisted  on  securing  a  similar  harbor 
concession  from  Hawaii,  and  within  the  next  few 
years  the  American  Navy  began  to  arise  again  from 
its  ashes.  The  obligation  incurred  in  exchange  for 
this  concession,  however,  although  it  resembled 
that  in  the  Japanese  treaty,  was  probably  an  un- 
reflecting act  of  good  nature  for,  if  it  meant  any- 
thing, it  was  an  entangling  engagement  such  as  the 
vast  majority  of  Americans  were  still  determined 
to  avoid. 

The  natives  of  Samoa  did  not  indulge  in  canni- 
balism but  devoted  the  small  energy  the  climate 
gave  them  to  the  social  graces  and  to  pleasant  wars. 
They  were  governed  by  local  kings  and  were  loosely 
united  under  a  chief  king.  At  Apia,  the  capital, 
were  three  hundred  foreigners,  nearly  all  connect- 
ed in  one  way  or  another  with  trade.  This  com- 
merce had  long  been  in  the  hands  of  English  and 
Americans,  but  now  the  aggressive  Germans  were 
rapidly  winning  it  away.  Three  consuls,  repre- 
senting the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  and  Ger- 
many, spent  their  time  in  exaggerating  their  func- 
tions and  in  circumventing  the  plots  of  which  they 
suspected  each  other.  The  stage  was  set  for  comic 
opera,  the  treaty  with  the  United  States  was  part  of 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  PACIFIC     71 

the  plot,  and  several  acts  had  already  been  played,, 
when  Bismarck  suddenly  injected  a  tragic  element^ 

In  1884,  at  the  time  when  the  German  statesman 
began  to  see  the  vision  of  a  Teutonic  world  empire 
and  went  about  seeking  places  in  the  sun,  the 
German  consul  in  Samoa,  by  agreement  with  King 
Malietoa,  raised  the  German  flag  over  the  royal  hut, 
with  a  significance  which  was  all  too  obvious.  In 
1886  the  American  consul  countered  this  move 
by  proclaiming  a  United  States  protectorate.  The 
German  consul  then  first  pressed  home  a  quarrel 
with  the  native  king  at  a  time  opportunely  coin- 
ciding with  the  arrival  of  a  German  warship,  the 
Adler;  he  subsequently  deposed  him  and  put 
up  Tamasese  in  his  stead.  The  apparently  more 
legitimate  successor,  Mataafa,  roused  most  of 
the  population  under  his  leadership.  The  Adler 
steamed  about  the  islands  shelling  Mataafa  vil- 
lages, and  the  American  consul  steamed  after 
him,  putting  his  launch  between  the  Adler  and  the 
shore.  In  the  course  of  these  events,  on  December 
18,  1888,  Mataafa  ambushed  a  German  landing 
party  and  killed  fifty  of  its  members. 

German  public  opinion  thereupon  vociferously 
demanded  a  punishment  which  would  establish  the 
place  of  Germany  as  a  colonial  power  in  the  Pacific. 


72  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Great  Britain,  however,  was  not  disposed  to  give 
her  growing  rival  a  free  hand.  The  United  States 
was  appealed  to  under  the  Treaty  of  1878,  and 
American  sentiment  determined  to  protect  the 
Samoans  in  their  heroic  fight  for  self-government. 
All  three  nations  involved  sent  warships  to  Apia, 
and  through  the  early  spring  of  1889  their  chancel- 
leries and  the  press  were  prepared  to  hear  momen- 
tarily that  some  one's  temper  had  given  way  in  the 
tropic  heat  and  that  blood  had  been  shed  —  with 
what  consequences  on  the  other  side  of  the  globe 
no  man  could  tell. 

Very  different,  however,  was  the  news  that  finally 
limped  in,  for  there  was  no  cable.  On  March  16, 
1889,  a  hurricane  had  swept  the  islands,  wreck- 
ing all  but  one  of  the  warships.  The  common  dis- 
tress had  brought  about  cooperation  among  all 
parties.  Tales  of  mutual  help  and  mutual  praise  of 
natives  and  the  three  nations  filled  the  dispatches. 
The  play  turned  out  to  be  a  comedy  after  all.  Yet 
difficulties  remained  which  could  be  met  only  by 
joint  action.  A  commission  of  the  three  nations 
therefore  was  arranged  to  meet  in  Berlin.  The 
United  States  insisted  on  native  government;  Ger- 
many, on  foreign  control.  Finally  they  agreed  to 
a  compromise  in  the  form  of  a  General  Act,  to 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  PACIFIC     73 

which  Samoa  consented.  The  native  government 
was  retained,  but  the  control  was  given  to 'a  Chief 
Justice  and  a  President  of  the  Municipal  Council 
of  Apia,  who  were  to  be  foreigners  chosen  by  the 
three  powers.  Their  relative  authority  is  indi- 
cated by  the  fact  that  the  king  was  to  receive 
$1800  a  year,  the  Chief  Justice,  $6000,  and  the 
President,  $5000. 

Small  as  was  the  immediate  stake,  this  little  epi- 
sode was  remarkably  significant  of  the  trend  of 
American  development.  Begun  under  Grant  and 
concluded  under  Elaine  and  Harrison,  the  policy 
of  the  United  States  was  the  creation  of  no  one 
mind  or  party  nor  did  it  accord  with  American 
traditions.  Encountering  European  powers  in  the 
Pacific,  with  no  apparent  hesitation  though  with- 
out any  general  intent,  the  United  States  entered 
into  cooperative  agreements  with  them  relating  to 
the  native  governments  which  it  would  never  have 
thought  proper  or  possible  in  other  parts  of  the 
world.  The  United  States  seemed  to  be  evolving 
a  new  policy  for  the  protection  of  its  interests  in 
the  Pacific.  This  first  clash  with  the  rising  colonial 
power  of  Germany  has  an  added  interest  because  it 
revealed  a  fundamental  similarity  in  colonial  policy 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain,  even 


74  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

though  they  were  prone  to  quarrel  when  adjusting 
Anglo-American  relations. 

While  the  Samoan  affair  seemed  an  accidental 
happening,  there  was  taking  shape  in  the  Pacific 
another  episode  which  had  a  longer  history  and  was 
more  significant  of  the  expansion  of  American  inter- 
ests in  that  ocean.  Indeed,  with  the  Pacific  coast 
line  of  the  United  States,  with  the  superb  harbors 
of  San  Francisco,  Portland,  and  Puget  Sound,  and 
with  Alaska  stretching  its  finger  tips  almost  to  Asia, 
even  Elaine  could  not  resist  the  lure  of  the  East, 
though  he  endeavored  to  reconcile  American  tradi- 
tions of  isolation  with  oceanic  expansion.  Of  all  the 
Pacific  archipelagoes,  the  Hawaiian  Islands  lie  near- 
est to  the  shores  of  the  United  States.  Although 
they  had  been  discovered  to  the  European  world  by 
the  great  English  explorer,  Captain  Cook,  their  in- 
tercourse had,  for  geographic  reasons,  always  been 
chiefly  with  the  United  States.  Whalers  continu- 
ally resorted  to  them  for  supplies.  Their  natives 
shipped  on  American  vessels  and  came  in  numbers 
to  California  in  early  gold-mining  days.  Ameri- 
can missionaries  attained  their  most  striking  suc- 
cess in  the  Hawaiian  Islands  and  not  only  converted 
the  majority  of  the  natives  but  assisted  the  succes- 
sive kings  in  their  government.  The  descendants 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  PACIFIC     75 

of  these  missionaries  continued  to  live  on  the  is- 
lands and  became  the  nucleus  of  a  white  population 
which  waxed  rich  and  powerful  by  the  abundant 
production  of  sugar  cane  on  that  volcanic  soil. 

In  view  of  this  tangible  evidence  of  intimacy  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States  with  the  Hawaiian 
Islands,  Webster  in  1842  brought  them  within  the 
scope  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by  declaring  that 
European  powers  must  not  interfere  with  their 
government.  Marcy,  Secretary  of  State,  framed  a 
treaty  of  annexation  in  1853,  but  the  Hawaiian 
Government  withdrew  its  assent.  Twenty  years 
later  Secretary  Fish  wrote:  "There  seems  to 'be 
a  strong  desire  on  the  part  of  many  persons  in 
the  islands,  representing  large  interests  and  great 
wealth,  to  become  annexed  to  the  United  States 
and  while  there  are,  as  I  have  already  said,  many 
and  influential  persons  in  the  country  who  question 
the  policy  of  any  insular  acquisition,  perhaps  even 
any  extension  of  territorial  limits,  there  are  also 
those  of  influence  and  wise  foresight  who  see  a 
future  that  must  extend  the  jurisdiction  and  the 
limits  of  this  nation,  and  that  will  require  a  rest- 
ing spot  in  the  mid-ocean,  between  the  Pacific 
coast  and  the  vast  domains  of  Asia,  which  are  now 
opening  to  commerce  and  Christian  civilization." 


76  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

All  immediate  action,  however,  was  confined  to 
a  specially  intimate  treaty  of  reciprocity  which  was 
signed  in  1875,  and  which  secured  a  substantial 
American  domination  in  commerce.  When  Elaine 
became  Secretary  of  State  in  1881,  he  was,  or  at 
least  he  affected  to  be,  seriously  alarmed  at  the 
possibility  of  foreign  influence  in  Hawaiian  affairs, 
particularly  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain.  The 
native  population  was  declining,  and  should  it 
continue  to  diminish,  he  believed  that  the  United 
States  must  annex  the  islands.  "Throughout  the 
continent,  north  and  south,"  he  wrote,  "wherever 
a  foothold  is  found  for  American  enterprise,  it 
is  quickly  occupied,  and  the  spirit  of  adventure, 
which  seeks  its  outlet,  in  the  mines  of  South  Amer- 
ica and  the  railroads  of  Mexico,  would  not  be  slow 
to  avail  itself  of  openings  of  assured  and  profitable 
enterprise  even  in  mid-ocean."  As  the  feeling 
grew  in  the  United  States  that  these  islands  really 
belonged  to  the  American  continent,  Elaine  even 
invited  Hawaii  to  send  representatives  to  the  Pan- 
American  Congress  of  1889.  When  he  again  be- 
came Secretary  of  State,  he  was  prepared  to 
give  indirect  support  at  least  to  American  inter- 
ests, for  the  new  queen,  Liliuokalani,  was  sup- 
posed to  be  under  British  influence.  On  the 


THE  UNITED  STATES  AND  THE  PACIFIC    77 

arrival  of  a  British  gunboat  in  Honolulu,  J.  L. 
Stevens,  the  American  Minister,  went  so  far  as  to 
write  on  February  8,  1892:  "At  this  time  there 
seems  to  be  no  immediate  prospect  of  its  being  safe 
to  have  the  harbor  of  Honolulu  left  without  an 
American  vessel  of  war. " 

Revolution  was,  indeed,  impending  in  Hawaii. 
On  January  14,  1893,  the  Queen  abolished  the 
later  constitution  under  which  the  Americans  had 
exercised  great  power,  and  in  its  place  she  pro- 
claimed the  restoration  of  the  old  constitution 
which  established  an  absolutism  modified  by  na- 
tive home  rule.  At  two  o'clock  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  16th  of  January,  the  resident  Americans  organ- 
ized a  committee  of  safety;  at  half -past  four  United 
States  marines  landed  at  the  call  of  Stevens.  The 
Queen  was  thereupon  deposed,  a  provisional  gov- 
ernment was  organized,  and  at  its  request  Stevens 
assumed  for  the  United  States  the  "protection" 
of  the  islands.  Without  delay,  John  W.  Foster, 
who  had  just  succeeded  Elaine  as  Secretary  of 
State,  drew  up  a  treaty  of  annexation,  which  he 
immediately  submitted  to  the  Senate. 

On  March  4,  1893,  Cleveland  became  President 
for  the  second  time.  He  at  once  withdrew  the 
treaty  and  appointed  James  H.  Blount  special 


78  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

commissioner  to  investigate  the  facts  of  the  revolt. 
While  the  report  of  Commissioner  Blount  did 
not,  indeed,  convict  Stevens  of  conspiring  to  bring 
about  the  uprising,  it  left  the  impression  that  the 
revolt  would  not  have  taken  place  and  certainly 
could  not  have  succeeded  except  for  the  presence 
of  the  United  States  marines  and  the  support  of 
the  United  States  Minister.  Cleveland  recalled 
Stevens  and  the  marines,  and  requested  the  pro- 
visional government  to  restore  the  Queen.  This 
Sanford  Ballard  Dole,  the  President  of  the  new 
republic,  refused  to  do,  on  the  contention  that 
President  Cleveland  had  no  right  to  interfere  in 
the  domestic  affairs  of  Hawaii.  On  the  legality  or 
propriety  of  Stevens 's  conduct,  opinion  in  Congress 
was  divided;  but  with  regard  to  Dole's  contention, 
both  the  Senate  and  the  House  were  agreed  that  the 
islands  should  maintain  their  own  domestic  govern- 
ment without  interference  from  the  United  States. 
Thus  left  to  themselves,  the  Americans  in  Hawaii 
bided  their  time  until  public  opinion  in  the  United 
States  should  prove  more  favorable  to  annexation. 


CHAPTER  VI 

VENEZUELA 

PROBABLY  no  President  ever  received  so  much  per- 
sonal abuse  in  his  own  day  as  did  Grover  Cleveland. 
In  time,  however,  his  sterling  integrity  and  funda- 
mental courage,  his  firm  grasp  of  the  higher  ad- 
ministrative duties  of  his  office,  won  the  approval 
of  his  countrymen,  and  a  repentant  public  senti- 
ment has  possibly  gone  too  far  in  the  other  di- 
rection of  acclaiming  his  statesmanship.  Unlike 
Blaine,  Cleveland  thought  soundly  and  consist- 
ently; but  he  was  more  obstinate,  his  vision  was 
often  narrower,  and  he  was  notably  lacking  both  in 
constructive  power  and  in  tact,  particularly  in  for- 
eign relations.  In  his  first  Administration,  through 
his  Secretary  of  State,  Thomas  F.  Bayard,  Cleve- 
land had  negotiated  fairly  amicably  with  Great 
Britain,  and  when  he  failed  to  secure  the  Senate's 
assent  to  a  treaty  on  the  irritating  question  of  the 
northeastern  fisheries,  he  arranged  a  modus  vivendi 

79 


80  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

which  served  for  many  years.  In  American  affairs 
he  opposed  not  only  the  annexation  of  Hawaii  but 
also  the  development  of  the  spirit  of  Pan-American- 
ism. He  was,  however,  no  more  disposed  than  was 
Blaine  to  permit  infractions  of  that  negative  side  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  which  forbade  European  in- 
terference in  America.  His  second  Administration 
brought  to  the  forefront  of  world  diplomacy  an  issue 
involving  this  traditional  principle. 

The  only  European  possession  in  South  America 
at  this  time  was  Guiana,  fronting  on  the  Atlantic 
north  of  Brazil  and  divided  among  France,  Holland, 
and  Great  Britain.  Beyond  British  Guiana,  the 
westernmost  division,  lay  Venezuela.  Between  the 
two  stretched  a  vast  tract  of  unoccupied  tropi- 
cal jungle.  Somewhere  there  must  have  been  a 
boundary,  but  where,  no  man  could  tell.  The  ex- 
treme claim  of  Great  Britain  would  have  given  her 
command  of  the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco,  while  that 
of  Venezuela  would  practically  have  eliminated 
British  Guiana.  Efforts  to  settle  this  long-stand- 
ing dispute  were  unavailing.  Venezuela  had  from 
time  to  time  suggested  arbitration  but  wished  to 
throw  the  whole  area  into  court.  Great  Britain 
insisted  upon  reserving  a  minimum  territory  and 
would  submit  to  judicial  decision  only  the  land 


VENEZUELA  81 

west  of  what  was  known  as  the  Schomburgk  line 
of  1840.  As  early  as  1876  Venezuela  appealed  to 
the  United  States,  "the  most  powerful  and  oldest 
of  the  Republics  of  the  new  continent,"  for  its 
"powerful  moral  support  in  disputes  with  Euro- 
pean nations."  Several  times  the  United  States 
proffered  its  good  offices  to  Great  Britain,  but  to 
no  effect.  The  satisfactory  settlement  of  the  ques- 
tion grew  more  difficult  as  time  went  on,  particu- 
larly after  the  discovery  of  gold  in  the  disputed 
region  had  given  a  new  impulse  to  occupation. 

President  Cleveland  took  a  serious  view  of  this 
controversy  because  it  seemed  to  involve  more  than 
a  boundary  dispute.  To  his  mind  it  called  into 
question  the  portion  of  Monroe's  message  which, 
in  1823,  stated  that  "the  American  continents  .  .  . 
are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered  as  subjects  for 
future  colonization  by  any  European  powers."  Ac- 
cording to  this  dictum,  boundaries  existed  between 
all  nations  and  colonies  of  America;  the  problem  was 
merely  to  find  these  boundaries.  If  a  European 
power  refused  to  submit  such  a  question  to  judicial 
decision,  the  inference  must  be  made  that  it  was 
seeking  to  extend  its  boundaries.  In  December, 
1894,  Cleveland  expressed  to  Congress  his  hope  that 
an  arbitration  would  be  arranged  and  instructed  his 


82  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Secretary  of  State  to  present  vigorously  to  Great 
Britain  the  view  of  the  United  States. 

Richard  Olney  of  Boston,  a  lawyer  of  exceptional 
ability  and  of  the  highest  professional  standing,  was 
then  Secretary  of  State.  His  Venezuela  dispatch, 
however,  was  one  of  the  most  undiplomatic  docu- 
ments ever  issued  by  the  Department  of  State. 
He  did  not  confine  himself  to  a  statement  of  his 
case,  wherein  any  amount  of  vigor  would  have  been 
permissible,  but  ran  his  unpracticed  eye  unneces- 
sarily over  the  whole  field  of  American  diplomacy. 
"That  distance  and  three  thousand  miles  of  inter- 
vening ocean  make  any  permanent  political  union 
between  a  European  and  an  American  state  un- 
natural and  inexpedient,"  may  have  been  a  philo- 
sophic axiom  to  many  in  Great  Britain  as  well  as 
in  the  United  States,  but  it  surely  did  not  need 
reiteration  in  this  state  paper,  and  Olney  at  once 
exposed  himself  to  contradiction  by  adding  the 
phrase,  "will  hardly  be  denied."  Entirely  ignor- 
ing the  sensitive  pride  of  the  Spanish  Americans 
and  thinking  only  of  Europe,  he  continued:  "To- 
day the  United  States  is  practically  sovereign  on 
this  continent,  and  its  fiat  is  law  upon  the  subjects 
to  which  it  confines  its  interposition. " 

The  President  himself  did  not  run  into  any  such 


VENEZUELA  83 

uncalled-for  extravagance  of  expression,  but  his 
statement  of  the  American  position  did  not  thereby 
lose  in  vigor.  When  he  had  received  the  reply  of 
the  British  Government  refusing  to  recognize  the 
interest  of  the  United  States  in  the  case,  Cleveland 
addressed  himself,  on  December  17,  1895,  to  Con- 
gress. In  stating  the  position  of  the  Government 
of  the  United  States,  he  declared  that  to  determine 
the  true  boundary  line  was  its  right,  duty,  and 
interest.  He  recommended  that  the  Government 
itself  appoint  a  commission  for  this  purpose,  and 
he  asserted  that  this  line,  when  found,  must  be 
maintained  as  the  lawful  boundary.  Should  Great 
Britain  continue  to  exercise  jurisdiction  beyond  it, 
the  United  States  must  resist  by  every  means  in 
its  power.  "In  making  these  recommendations  I 
am  fully  alive  to  the  responsibility  incurred,  and 
keenly  realize  all  the  consequences  that  may  follow." 
Yet  "there  is  no  calamity  which  a  great  nation  can 
invite  which  equals  that  which  follows  a  supine 
submission  to  wrong  and  injustice  and  the  conse- 
quent loss  of  national  self-respect  and  honor  be- 
neath which  are  shielded  and  defended  a  people's 
safety  and  greatness." 

Perhaps  no  American  document  relating  to  di- 
plomacy ever  before  made  so  great  a  stir  in  the 


84  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

world.  Its  unexpectedness  enhanced  its  effect, 
even  in  the  United  States,  for  the  public  had  not 
been  sufficiently  aware  of  the  shaping  of  this  inter- 
national episode  to  be  psychologically  prepared 
for  the  imminence  of  war.  Unlike  most  Anglo- 
American  diplomacy,  this  had  been  a  long-range 
negotiation,  with  notes  exchanged  between  the  home 
offices  instead  of  personal  conferences.  People 
blenched  at  the  thought  of  war;  stocks  fell;  the 
attention  of  the  whole  world  was  arrested.  The 
innumerable  and  intimate  bonds  of  friendship  and 
interest  which  would  thus  have  to  be  broken  merely 
because  of  an  insignificant  jog  in  a  boundary  re* 
mote  from  both  the  nations  made  war  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  seem  absolutely  in- 
conceivable, until  people  realized  that  neither  coun- 
try could  yield  without  an  admission  of  defeat  both 
galling  to  national  pride  and  involving  fundamental 
principles  of  conduct  and  policy  for  the  future. 

Great  Britain  in  particular  stood  amazed  at 
Cleveland's  position.  The  general  opinion  was 
that  peace  must  be  maintained  and  that  diplomats 
must  find  a  formula  which  would  save  both  peace 
and  appearances.  Yet  before  this  public  opinion 
could  be  diplomatically  formulated,  a  new  episode 
shook  the  British  sense  of  security.  Germany 


VENEZUELA  85 

again  appeared  as  a  menace  and,  as  in  the  case  of 
Samoa,  the  international  situation  thus  produced 
tended  to  develop  a  realization  of  the  kinship  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  the  United  States.  Early 
in  January,  1896,  the  Jameson  raid  into  the  Trans- 
vaal was  defeated,  and  the  Kaiser  immediately  tele- 
graphed his  congratulations  to  President  Kriiger. 
In  view  of  the  possibilities  involved  in  this  South 
African  situation,  British  public  opinion  demanded 
that  her  diplomats  maintain  peace  with  the  United 
States,  with  or  without  the  desired  formula. 

The  British  Government,  however,  was  not  in- 
clined to  act  with  undue  haste.  It  became  ap- 
parent even  to  the  most  panicky  that  war  with  the 
United  States  could  not  come  immediately,  for  the 
American  Commission  of  Inquiry  must  first  report. 
For  a  time  Lord  Salisbury  hoped  that  Congress  would 
not  support  the  President  —  a  contingency  which 
not  infrequently  happened  under  Cleveland's  Ad- 
ministration. On  this  question  of  foreign  relations, 
however,  Congress  stood  squarely  behind  the  Presi- 
dent. Lord  Salisbury  then  toyed  with  the  hope 
that  the  matter  might  be  delayed  until  Cleveland's 
term  expired,  in  the  hope  he  might  have  an  oppor- 
tunity of  dealing  with  a  less  strenuous  successor. 

In  the  summer  of  1896,  John  Hay,  an  intimate 


86  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

friend  of  Major  McKinley,  the  probable  Repub- 
lican candidate  for  the  presidency,  was  in  England, 
where  he  was  a  well-known  figure.  There  he  met 
privately  Arthur  J.  Balfour,  representing  Lord  Salis- 
bury, and  Sir  William  Harcourt,  the  leader  of  the 
Opposition.  Hay  convinced  them  that  a  change 
in  the  Administration  of  his  country  would  involve 
no  retreat  from  the  existing  American  position. 
The  British  Government  thereupon  determined  to 
yield  but  attempted  to  cover  its  retreat  by  merging 
the  question  with  one  of  general  arbitration.  This 
proposal,  however,  was  rejected,  and  Lord  Salis- 
bury then  agreed  to  "an  equitable  settlement"  of 
the  Venezuela  question  by  empowering  the  British 
Ambassador  at  Washington  to  begin  negotiations 
"either  with  the  representative  of  Venezuela  or 
with  the  Government  of  the  United  States  acting 
as  the  friend  of  Venezuela. " 

The  achievement  of  the  Administration  con- 
sisted in  forcing  Great  Britain  to  recognize  the 
interest  of  the  United  States  in  the  dispute  with 
Venezuela,  on  the  ground  that  Venezuela  was  one 
of  the  nations  of  the  Western  Hemisphere.  This 
concession  practically  involved  recognition  of  the 
interest  of  the  United  States  in  case  of  future  dis- 
putes with  other  American  powers.  The  arbitration 


VENEZUELA  87 

treaty  thus  arranged  between  Great  Britain  and 
Venezuela  under  the  auspices  of  the  United  States 
submitted  the  whole  disputed  area  to  judicial  deci- 
sion but  adopted  the  rule  that  fifty  years  of  occupa- 
tion should  give  a  sufficient  title  for  possession .  The 
arbitration  tribunal,  which  met  in  Paris  in  1899,  de- 
cided on  a  division  of  the  disputed  territory  but 
found  that  the  claim  of  Great  Britain  was,  on  the 
whole,  more  nearly  correct  than  that  of  Venezuela. 
Cleveland's  startling  and  unconventional  method 
of  dealing  with  this  controversy  has  been  ex- 
plained by  all  kinds  of  conjectures.  For  example, 
it  has  been  charged  that  his  message  was  the 
product  of  a  fishing  trip  on  which  whisky  flowed 
too  freely;  on  the  other  hand,  it  has  been  asserted 
that  the  message  was  an  astute  political  play  for 
the  thunder  of  patriotic  applause.  More  seriously, 
Cleveland  has  been  charged  by  one  set  of  critics 
with  bluffing,  and  by  another  with  recklessly  run- 
ning the  risk  of  war  on  a  trivial  provocation.  The 
charge  of  bluffing  comes  nearer  the  fact,  for  Presi- 
dent Cleveland  probably  had  never  a  moment's 
doubt  that  the  forces  making  for  peace  between  the 
two  nations  would  be  victorious.  If  he  may  be 
said  to  have  thrown  a  bomb,  he  certainly  had  at- 
tached a  safety  valve  to  it,  for  the  investigation 


88  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

which  he  proposed  could  not  but  give  time  for  the 
passions  produced  by  his  message  to  cool.  It  is 
interesting  to  note  in  passing  that  delay  for  investi- 
gation was  a  device  which  that  other  great  Demo- 
crat, William  Jennings  Bryan,  Cleveland's  greatest 
political  enemy,  sought,  during  his  short  term  as 
Secretary  of  State  under  President  Wilson,  to 
make  universal  in  a  series  of  arbitration  treaties  — 
treaties  which  now  bind  the  United  States  and 
many  other  countries,  how  tightly  no  man  can  tell. 
While,  however,  Cleveland's  action  was  based 
rather  on  a  belief  in  peace  than  on  an  expectation 
of  war,  it  cannot  be  dismissed  as  merely  a  bluff. 
Not  only  was  he  convinced  that  the  principle  in- 
volved was  worth  establishing  whatever  the  cost 
might  be,  but  he  was  certain  that  the  method  he 
employed  was  the  only  one  which  could  succeed, 
for  in  no  other  way  was  it  possible  to  wake  England 
to  a  realization  of  the  fact  that  the  United  States 
was  full-grown  and  imbued  with  a  new  conscious- 
ness of  its  strength.  So  far  was  Cleveland's  mes- 
sage from  provoking  war  that  it  caused  the  people 
of  Great  Britain  vitally  to  realize  for  the  first  time 
the  importance  of  friendship  with  the  United  States. 
It  marks  a  change  in  their  attitude  toward  things 
American  which  found  expression  not  only  in 


VENEZUELA  89 

diplomacy,  but  in  various  other  ways,  and  which 
strikingly  revealed  itself  in  the  international  poli- 
tics of  the  next  few  years.  Not  that  hostility 
was  converted  into  affection,  but  a  former  con- 
descension gave  way  to  an  appreciative  friendliness 
towards  the  people  of  the  United  States. 

The  reaction  in  America  was  somewhat  different* 
Cleveland  had  united  the  country  upon  a  matter 
of  foreign  policy,  not  completely,  it  is  true,  but  to  a 
greater  degree  than  Elaine  had  ever  succeeded  in 
doing.  More  important  than  this  unity  of  feeling 
throughout  the  land,  however,  was  the  develop- 
ment of  a  spirit  of  inquiry  among  the  people.  Sud- 
denly confronted  by  changes  of  policy  that  might 
bring  wealth  or  poverty,  life  or  death,  the  American 
people  began  to  take  the  foreign  relations  of  the 
United  States  more  seriously  than  they  had  since 
the  days  of  the  Napoleonic  wars.  Yet  it  is  not 
surprising  that  when  the  Venezuela  difficulty  had 
been  settled  and  Secretary  Olney  and  Sir  Julian 
Pauncefote,  the  British  Ambassador,  had  con- 
cluded a  general  treaty  of  arbitration,  the  Senate 
should  have  rejected  it,  for  the  lesson  that  caution 
was  necessary  in  international  affairs  had  been 
driven  home.  Time  was  needed  for  the  new 
generation  to  formulate  its  foreign  policy. 


CHAPTER  VII 

THE   OUTBREAK    OF   THE   WAR   WITH    SPAIN 

BEFORE  the  nineteenth  century  ended,  the  Samoan, 
Hawaiian,  and  Venezuelan  episodes  had  done  much 
to  quicken  a  national  consciousness  in  the  people 
of  the  United  States  and  at  the  same  time  to  break 
down  their  sense  of  isolation  from  the  rest  of  the 
world.  Commerce  and  trade  were  also  important 
factors  in  overcoming  this  traditional  isolation. 
Not  only  was  American  trade  growing,  but  it  was 
changing  in  character.  Argentina  was  beginning  to 
compete  with  the  United  States  in  exporting  wheat 
and  meat,  while  American  manufacturers  were 
reaching  the  point  where  they  were  anxious  for  for- 
eign markets  in  which  they  felt  they  could  compete 
with  the  products  of  Great  Britain  and  Germany. 
In  a  thousand  ways  and  without  any  loss  of  vigor 
the  sense  of  American  nationality  was  expressing 
itself.  The  study  of  American  history  was  intro- 
duced into  the  lower  schools,  and  a  new  group  of 

90 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN  91 

historians  began  scientifically  to  investigate  whence 
the  American  people  had  come  and  what  they 
really  were.  In  England,  such  popular  movements 
find  instant  expression  in  literature;  in  the  United 
States  they  take  the  form  of  societies.  Innumer- 
able patriotic  organizations  such  as  the  "Daugh- 
ters of  the  American  Revolution"  and  a  host  of 
others,  sought  to  trace  out  American  genealogy 
and  to  perpetuate  the  memory  of  American  mili- 
tary and  naval  achievements.  Respect  for  the 
American  flag  was  taught  in  schools,  and  the  ques- 
tion was  debated  as  to  whether  its  use  in  comic 
opera  indicated  respect  or  insult.  This  new  na- 
tionalism was  unlike  the  expansionist  movement  of 
the  fifties  in  that  it  laid  no  particular  stress  upon 
the  incorporation  of  the  neighboring  republics  by 
a  process  of  federation.  On  the  whole,  the  people 
had  lost  their  faith  in  the  assimilating  influence 
of  republican  institutions  and  did  not  desire  to 
annex  alien  territory  and  races.  They  were  now 
more  concerned  with  the  consolidation  of  their  own 
country  and  with  its  place  in  the  world.  Nor  were 
they  as  neglectful  as  their  fathers  had  been  of 
the  material  means  by  which  to  accomplish  their 
somewhat  indefinite  purposes. 

The  reconstruction  of  the  American  Navy,  which 


02  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

had  attained  such  magnitude  and  played  so  im- 
portant a  part  in  the  Civil  War  but  which  had  been 
allowed  to  sink  into  the  merest  insignificance,  was 
begun  by  William  E.  Chandler,  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy  under  President  Arthur.  William  C.  Whitney, 
his  successor  under  President  Cleveland,  continued 
the  work  with  energy.  Captain  Alfred  T.  Mahan 
began  in  1883  to  publish  that  series  of  studies  in 
naval  history  which  won  him  world-wide  recogni- 
tion and  did  so  much  to  revolutionize  prevailing  con- 
ceptions of  naval  strategy.  A  Naval  War  College 
was  established  in  1884,  at  Newport,  Rhode  Island, 
where  naval  officers  could  continue  the  studies 
which  they  had  begun  at  Annapolis. 

The  total  neglect  of  the  army  was  not  entirely 
the  result  of  indifference.  The  experience  with 
volunteers  in  the  Civil  War  had  given  almost  uni- 
versal confidence  that  the  American  people  could 
constitute  themselves  an  army  at  will.  The  pres- 
ence of  several  heroes  of  that  war  in  succession  in 
the  position  of  commander-in-chief  of  the  army  had 
served  to  diffuse  a  sense  of  security  among  the 
people.  Here  and  there  military  drill  was  intro- 
duced in  school  and  college,  but  the  regular  army 
attracted  none  of  the  romantic  interest  that  clung 
about  the  navy,  and  the  militia  was  almost  totally 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN  93 

neglected.  Individual  officers,  such  as  young 
Lieutenant  Tasker  Bliss,  began  to  study  the  new 
technique  of  warfare  which  was  to  make  fighting  on 
land  as  different  from  that  of  the  wars  of  Napoleon 
as  naval  warfare  was  different  from  that  of  the 
time  of  Nelson.  Yet  in  spite  of  obviously  chang- 
ing conditions,  no  provision  was  made  for  the  en- 
couragement of  young  army  officers  in  advanced 
and  up-to-date  studies.  While  their  contemporaries 
in  other  professions  were  adding  graduate  training 
to  the  general  education  which  a  college  gave, 
the  graduates  of  West  Point  were  considered  to 
have  made  themselves  in  four  years  sufficiently 
proficient  for  all  the  purposes  of  warfare. 

By  the  middle  nineties  thoughtful  students  of 
contemporary  movements  were  aware  that  a  new 
epoch  in  national  history  was  approaching.  What 
form  this  national  development  would  take  was, 
however,  still  uncertain,  and  some  great  event  was 
obviously  required  to  fix  its  character.  Elaine's  Pan- 
Americanism  had  proved  insufficient  and,  though 
the  baiting  of  Great  Britain  was  welcome  to  a  vo- 
ciferous minority,  the  forces  making  for  peace  were 
stronger  than  those  in  favor  of  war.  Whatever 
differences  there  were  did  not  reach  to  fundamen- 
tals but  were  rather  in  the  nature  of  legal  disputes 


04  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

between  neighbors  whom  a  real  emergency  would 
quickly  bring  to  the  assistance  of  each  other.  A 
crisis  involving  interest,  propinquity,  and  senti- 
ment, was  needed  to  shake  the  nation  into  an 
activity  which  would  clear  its  views. 

At  the  very  time  of  the  Venezuela  difficulty,  such 
a  crisis  was  taking  shape  in  the  Caribbean.  Cuba 
had  always  been  an  object  of  immediate  concern 
to  the  United  States.  The  statesmen  of  the  Jeffer- 
sonian  period  all  looked  to  its  eventually  becoming 
part  of  American  territory.  Three  quarters  of  a  cen- 
tury before,  when  the  revolt  of  the  Spanish  colonies 
had  halted  on  the  shores  of  the  mainland,  leaving 
the  rich  island  of  Cuba  untouched,  John  Quincy 
Adams,  on  April  28,  1823,  in  a  lengthy  and  long- 
considered  dispatch  to  Mr.  Nelson,  the  American 
Minister  to  Spain,  asserted  that  the  United  States 
could  not  consent  to  the  passing  of  Cuba  from  the 
flag  of  Spain  to  that  of  any  other  European  power, 
that  under  existing  conditions  Cuba  was  consid- 
ered safer  in  the  hands  of  Spain  than  in  those  of 
the  revolutionaries,  and  that  the  United  States 
stood  for  the  maintenance  of  the  status  quo,  with 
the  expectation  that  Cuba  would  ultimately  become 
American  territory. 

By  the  late  forties  and  the  fifties,  however,  the 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN  95 

times  had  changed,  and  American  policy  had 
changed  with  them.  It  was  becoming  more  and 
more  evident  that,  although  no  real  revolution  had 
as  yet  broken  out,  the  "Pearl  of  the  Antilles"  was 
bound  to  Spain  by  compulsion  rather  than  by  love. 
In  the  United  States  there  was  a  general  feeling 
that  the  time  had  at  last  come  to  realize  the  vision 
of  Jefferson  and  Adams  and  to  annex  Cuba.  But 
the  complications  of  the  slavery  question  prevented 
immediate  annexation.  As  a  slave  colony  which 
might  become  a  slave  state,  the  South  wanted 
Cuba,  but  the  majority  in  the  North  did  not. 

After  the  Civil  War  in  the  United  States  was 
over,  revolution  at  length  flared  forth  in  1868,  from 
end  to  end  of  the  island.  Sympathy  with  the  Cu- 
bans was  widespread  in  the  United  States.  The 
hand  of  the  Government,  however,  was  stayed 
by  recent  history.  Americans  felt  keenly  the  right 
of  governments  to  exert  their  full  strength  to  put 
down  rebellion,  for  they  themselves  were  prose- 
cuting against  Great  Britain  a  case  based  on  what 
they  contended  was  her  too  lax  enforcement  of  her 
obligations  to  the  American  Government  and  on 
the  assistance  which  she  had  given  to  the  South. 
The  great  issue  determined  the  lesser,  and  for 
ten  years  the  United  States  watched  the  Cuban 


96  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

revolution  without  taking  part  in  it,  but  not,  how- 
ever, without  protest  and  remonstrance.  Claiming 
special  rights  as  a  close  and  necessarily  interested 
neighbor,  the  United  States  constantly  made  sug- 
gestions as  to  the  manner  of  the  contest  and  its 
settlement.  Some  of  these  Spain  grudgingly  al- 
lowed, and  it  was  in  part  by  American  insistence 
that  slavery  was  finally  abolished  in  the  island. 
Further  internal  reform,  however,  was  not  the 
wish  and  was  perhaps  beyond  the  power  of  Spain. 
Although  the  revolution  was  seemingly  brought  to 
a  close  in  1878,  its  embers  continued  to  smolder 
for  nearly  a  score  of  years  until  in  1895  they  again 
burst  into  flame. 

War  in  Cuba  could  not  help  affecting  in  a  very 
intimate  way  the  people  of  the  United  States. 
They  bought  much  the  greater  part  of  the  chief 
Cuban  crops,  sugar  and  tobacco.  American  capi- 
tal had  been  invested  in  the  island,  particularly  in 
plantations.  For  years  Cubans  of  liberal  tendencies 
had  sent  their  sons  to  be  educated  in  the  United 
States,  very  many  of  whom  had  been  natural- 
ized before  returning  home.  Cuba  was  but  ninety 
miles  from  Florida,  and  much  of  our  coastwise 
shipping  passed  in  sight  of  the  island.  The  people 
of  the  United  States  were  aroused  to  sympathy 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN  97 

and  to  a  desire  to  be  of  assistance  when  they  saw 
that  the  Cubans,  so  near  geographically  and  so 
bound  to  them  by  many  commercial  ties,  were  en- 
gaged against  a  foreign  monarchy  in  a  struggle 
for  freedom  and  a  republican  form  of  government. 
Ethan  Allen  headed  a  Cuban  committee  in  New 
York  and  by  his  historic  name  associated  the 
new  revolution  with  the  memory  of  the  American 
struggle  for  freedom.  The  Cuban  flag  was  dis- 
played in  the  United  States,  Cuban  bonds  were 
sold,  and  volunteers  and  arms  were  sent  to  the 
aid  of  the  insurgents. 

Owing  to  the  nature  of  the  country  and  the  char- 
acter of  the  people,  a  Cuban  revolution  had  its 
peculiarities.  The  island  is  a  very  long  and  rugged 
mountain  chain  surrounded  by  fertile,  cultivated 
plains.  The  insurgents  from  their  mountain  ref- 
uges spied  out  the  land,  pounced  upon  unpro- 
tected spots,  burned  crops  and  sugar  mills,  and 
were  off  before  troops  could  arrive.  The  portion 
of  the  population  in  revolt  at  any  particular  time 
was  rarely  large.  Many  were  insurgents  one  week 
and  peaceful  citizens  the  next.  The  fact  that  the 
majority  of  the  population  sympathized  with  the 
insurgents  enabled  the  latter  to  melt  into  the 
landscape  without  leaving  a  sign.  A  provisional 


98  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

government  hurried  on  mule-back  from  place  to 
place.  The  Spanish  Government,  contrary  to  cus- 
tom, acted  at  this  time  with  some  energy:  it  put 
two  hundred  thousand  soldiers  into  the  island;  it 
raised  large  levies  of  loyal  Cubans;  it  was  almost 
always  victorious;  yet  the  revolution  would  not 
down.  Martinez  Campos,  the  "Pacificator"  of  the 
first  revolution,  was  this  time  unable  to  protect 
the  plains.  In  1896  he  was  replaced  by  General 
Weyler,  who  undertook  a  new  system.  He  started 
to  corral  the  insurgents  by  a  chain  of  blockhouses 
and  barbed  wire  fences  from  ocean  to  sea  —  the 
first  completely  guarded  cross-country  line  since 
the  frontier  walls  of  the  Roman  Empire  in  Europe 
and  the  Great  Wall  of  China  in  Asia.  He  then 
proceeded  to  starve  out  the  insurgents  by  destroy- 
ing all  the  food  in  the  areas  to  which  they  were 
confined.  As  the  revolutionists  lived  largely  on 
the  pillage  of  plantations  in  their  neighborhood, 
this  policy  involved  the  destruction  of  the  crops  of 
the  loyal  as  well  as  of  the  disloyal,  of  Americans  as 
well  as  of  Cubans.  The  population  of  the  devas- 
tated plantations  was  gathered  into  reconcentrado 
camps  where,  penned  promiscuously  into  small 
reservations,  they  were  entirely  dependent  upon 
a  Government  which  was  poor  in  supplies  and  as 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN   99 

careless  of  sanitation  as  it  was  of  humanity.  The 
camps  became  pest  holes,  spreading  contagion  to 
all  regions  having  intercourse  with  Cuba,  and 
in  vain  the  interned  victims  were  crying  aloud 
for  succor. 

This  new  policy  of  disregard  for  property  and 
life  deeply  involved  American  interests  and  sensi- 
bilities. The  State  Department  maintained  that 
Spain  was  responsible  for  the  destruction  of  Amer- 
ican property  by  insurgents.  This  Spain  denied, 
for,  while  she  never  officially  recognized  the  insur- 
gents as  belligerents,  the  insurrection  had  passed 
beyond  her  control.  This  was,  indeed,  the  posi- 
tion which  the  Spanish  Treaty  Claims  Commission 
subsequently  took  in  ruling  that  to  establish  a 
claim  it  would  be  necessary  to  show  that  the  de- 
struction of  property  was  the  consequence  of  negli- 
gence upon  the  part  of  Spanish  authorities  or  of 
military  orders.  Of  other  serious  grievances  there 
was  no  doubt.  American  citizens  were  imprisoned, 
interned  in  reconcentrado  camps,  and  otherwise 
maltreated.  The  nationality  of  American  sufferers 
was  in  some  cases  disputed,  and  the  necessity  of 
dealing  with  each  of  these  doubtful  cases  by  the 
slow  and  roundabout  method  of  complaint  to 
Madrid,  which  referred  matters  back  to  Havana, 


100  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

which  reported  to  Madrid,  served  but  to  add  ir- 
ritation to  delay.  American  resentment,  too, 
was  fired  by  the  sufferings  of  the  Cubans  them- 
selves as  much  as  by  the  losses  and  difficulties  of 
American  citizens. 

One  change  of  extreme  importance  had  taken 
place  since  the  Cuban  revolt  of  1868-78.  This  was 
the  development  of  the  modern  American  news- 
paper. It  was  no  longer  possible  for  the  people  at 
large  to  remain  ignorant  of  what  was  taking  place 
at  their  very  doors.  Correspondents  braved  the 
yellow  fever  and  imprisonment  in  order  to  furnish 
the  last  details  of  each  new  horror.  Foremost  in 
this  work  were  William  Randolph  Hearst,  who 
made  new  records  of  sensationalism  in  his  papers, 
particularly  in  the  New  York  Journal,  and  Joseph 
Pulitzer,  proprietor  of  the  New  York  World.  Hearst 
is  reported  to  have  said  that  it  cost  him  three  mil- 
lions to  bring  on  the  Spanish  American  War.  The 
net  result  of  all  this  newspaper  activity  was  that 
it  became  impossible  for  the  American  people  to 
remain  in  happy  ignorance  of  what  was  going 
on  in  the  world.  Their  reaction  to  the  facts  was 
their  own. 

President  Cleveland  modeled  his  policy  upon 
that  of  Grant  and  Grant's  Secretary,  Hamilton 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN    101 

Fish.  He  did  not  recognize  the  independence  of 
the  Cuban  republic,  for  that  would  have  meant 
immediate  war  with  Spain;  nor  did  he  recognize 
even  its  belligerency.  Public  men  in  the  United 
States  were  still  convinced  that  Great  Britain  had 
erred  in  recognizing  the  belligerency  of  the  South- 
ern Confederacy,  and  consistency  of  foreign  policy 
demanded  that  the  Government  should  not  ac- 
cord recognition  to  a  Government  without  a  navy, 
a  capital,  or  fixed  territory.  This  decision  made 
it  particularly  difficult  for  the  President  to  perform 
his  acknowledged  duty  to  Spain,  of  preventing  aid 
being  sent  from  the  United  States  to  the  insurgents. 
He  issued  the  proper  proclamations,  and  American 
officials  were  reasonably  diligent,  it  is  true,  but 
without  any  of  the  special  powers  which  would 
have  resulted  from  a  recognized  state  of  war  they 
were  unable  to  prevent  a  leakage  of  supplies.  As 
a  result  General  Weyler  had  some  ground  for  say- 
ing, though  with  characteristic  Spanish  extrava- 
gance, that  it  was  American  aid  which  gave  life  to 
the  revolt. 

President  Cleveland  energetically  pressed  all 
cases  involving  American  rights;  he  offered  me- 
diation; he  remonstrated  against  the  cruelty  of 
Weyler's  methods ;  he  pointed  out  that  the  United 


102  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

States  could  not  forever  allow  an  island  so  near  and 
so  closely  related  to  be  in  flames  without  interven- 
tion. Spain,  however,  assumed  a  rather  lofty  tone, 
and  Cleveland  was  able  to  accomplish  nothing.  Sen- 
ator Lodge  and  other  Republicans  violently  at- 
tacked his  policy  as  procrastinating,  and  the  na- 
tion as  a  whole  looked  forward  with  interest  to 
the  approaching  change  in  administration. 

William  McKinley,  who  became  President  on 
March  4,  1897,  was  not  actively  interested  in  for- 
eign affairs.  This  he  illustrated  in  a  striking  way 
by  appointing  as  Secretary  of  State  John  Sherman 
of  Ohio,  a  man  of  undoubtedly  high  ability  but  one 
whose  whole  reputation  rested  upon  his  financial 
leadership,  and  who  now,  at  the  age  of  seventy-four, 
was  known  to  be  incapacitated  for  vigorous  action. 
To  the  very  moment  of  crisis,  McKinley  was  op- 
posed to  a  war  with  Spain;  he  was  opposed  to  the 
form  of  the  declaration  of  war  and  he  was  opposed 
to  the  terms  of  peace  which  ended  the  war.  Em- 
phatically not  a  leader,  he  was,  however,  unsur- 
passed in  his  day  as  a  reader  of  public  opinion, 
and  he  believed  his  function  to  be  that  of  interpret- 
ing the  national  mind.  Nor  did  he  yield  his  opin- 
ion in  a  grudging  manner.  He  grasped  broadly 
the  consequences  of  each  new  position  which  the 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN    103 

public  assumed,  and  he  was  a  master  at  securing 
harmonious  cooperation  for  a  desired  end. 

The  platform  of  the  Republican  party  had  de- 
clared: "The  Government  of  Spain  having  lost 
control  of  Cuba,  and  being  unable  to  protect  the 
property  or  lives  of  resident  American  citizens,  or 
to  comply  with  its  treaty  obligations,  we  believe 
that  the  Government  of  the  United  States  should 
actively  use  its  influence  and  good  offices  to  restore 
peace  and  give  independence  to  the  island."  With 
this  mandate,  McKinley  sought  to  free  Cuba, 
absolutely  or  practically,  while  at  the  same  time 
maintaining  peace  with  Spain.  On  June  26,  1897, 
Secretary  Sherman  sent  a  note  to  the  Spanish 
Minister,  protesting  against  the  Spanish  methods 
of  war  and  asserting  that  "the  inclusion  of  a  thou- 
sand or  more  of  our  own  citizens  among  the  victims 
of  this  policy"  gives  "the  President  the  right  of 
specific  remonstrance,  but  in  the  just  fulfillment  of 
his  duty  he  cannot  limit  himself  to  these  formal 
grounds  of  complaint.  He  is  bound  by  the  higher 
obligation  of  his  representative  office  to  protest 
against  the  uncivilized  and  inhuman  conduct  of  the 
campaign  in  the  island  of  Cuba.  He  conceives  that 
he  has  a  right  to  demand  that  a  war,  conducted 
almost  within  sight  of  our  shores  and  grievously 


104  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

affecting  American  citizens  and  their  interests 
throughout  the  length  and  breadth  of  the  land, 
shall  at  least  be  conducted  according  to  the 
military  codes  of  civilization. " 

Negotiations  between  the  United  States  and 
Spain  have  always  been  peculiarly  irritating,  ow- 
ing to  temperamental  differences  between  the  two 
peoples.  McKinley,  however,  had  in  mind  a  pro- 
gram for  which  there  was  some  hope  of  success. 
He  was  willing  to  agree  to  some  form  of  words 
which  would  leave  Spain  in  titular  possession  of 
the  island,  thereby  making  a  concession  to  Spanish 
pride,  for  he  knew  that  Spain  was  always  more 
loath  to  surrender  the  form  than  the  substance. 
This  hope  of  the  President  was  strengthened,  to- 
wards the  end  of  1897,  by  a  dramatic  incident  in 
the  political  life  of  Spain.  On  the  8th  of  August, 
the  Spanish  Prime  Minister,  the  Conservative  An- 
tonio Canovas  del  Castillo,  was  assassinated,  and 
was  succeeded  on  the  4th  of  October  by  the  Liberal, 
Praxedes  Mateo  Sagasta. 

The  new  Spanish  Government  listened  to  Amer- 
ican demands  and  made  large  promises  of  amelio- 
ration of  conditions  in  Cuba.  General  Blanco  was 
-substituted  for  General  Weyler,  whose  cruelty  had 
made  him  known  in  the  American  press  as  "the 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN    105 

Butcher";  it  was  announced  that  the  reconcen- 
trado  camps  would  be  broken  up;  and  the  Queen 
Regent  decreed  the  legislative  autonomy  of  Cuba. 
Arrangements  had  been  made  for  the  handling  of 
minor  disputes  directly  with  the  Governor-General 
of  Cuba  through  the  American  Consul  General  at 
Havana,  General  Fitzhugh  Lee.  On  December  6, 
1897,  McKinley,  in  his  annual  message  to  Congress, 
counseled  patience.  Convinced  of  the  good  inten- 
tions of  the  new  Spanish  Government,  he  sought 
to  induce  American  public  sentiment  to  allow  it 
time  to  act.  He  continued  nevertheless  to  urge 
upon  Spain  the  fact  that  in  order  to  be  effective 
action  must  be  prompt. 

Public  sentiment  against  Spain  grew  every  day 
stronger  in  the  United  States  and  was  given  star- 
tling impulse  in  February,  1898,  by  two  of  those 
critical  incidents  which  are  almost  sure  to  occur 
when  general  causes  are  potent  enough  to  produce 
a  white  heat  of  popular  feeling.  The  Spanish 
Minister  in  the  United  States,  Senor  Dupuy  de 
Lome,  had  aroused  the  suspicion,  during  his  sum- 
mer residence  on  the  north  shore  of  Massachusetts 
Bay,  that  he  was  collecting  information  which 
would  be  useful  to  a  Spanish  fleet  operating  on  that 
coast.  Whether  this  charge  was  true  or  not,  at  any 


106  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

rate  he  wrote  a  letter  to  a  friend,  a  Madrid  editor 
visiting  Havana,  in  which  he  characterized  Me- 
Kinley  as  a  vacillating  and  timeserving  politician. 
Alert  American  newspaper  men,  who  practically 
constituted  a  secret  service  of  some  efficiency,  man- 
aged to  obtain  the  letter.  On  February  9,  1898, 
De  Lome  saw  a  facsimile  of  this  letter  printed  in 
a  newspaper  and  at  once  cabled  his  resignation. 
In  immediately  accepting  De  Lome's  resignation 
Spain  anticipated  an  American  demand  for  his 
recall  and  thus  saved  Spanish  pride,  though  un- 
doubtedly at  the  expense  of  additional  irritation  in 
the  United  States,  where  it  was  thought  that  he 
should  have  been  punished  instead  of  being  allowed 
to  slip  away. 

Infinitely  more  serious  than  this  diplomatic 
faux  pas  was  the  disaster  which  befell  the  United 
States  battleship  Maine.  On  January  24,  1898, 
the  Government  had  announced  its  intention  of 
sending  a  warship  on  a  friendly  visit  to  Havana, 
with  the  desire  of  impressing  the  local  Cuban  au- 
thorities with  the  imminence  of  American  power. 
Not  less  important  was  the  purpose  of  affording 
protection  to  American  citizens  endangered  by  the 
rioting  of  Spaniards,  who  were  angry  because  they 
believed  that  Sagasta  by  his  conciliatory  policy  was 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN    107 

betraying  the  interests  of  Spain.  Accordingly  the 
Maine,  commanded  by  Captain  Sigsbee,  was  dis- 
patched to  Cuba  and  arrived  on  the  25th  of  Jan- 
uary in  the  harbor  of  Havana.  On  the  night  of 
the  15th  of  February,  an  explosion  utterly  wrecked 
the  vessel  and  killed  260  of  the  crew,  besides 
wounding  ninety. 

The  responsibility  for  this  calamity  has  never 
been  positively  determined.  It  may  have  result- 
ed from  an  accidental  internal  explosion,  from  the 
official  action  of  the  Spanish  authorities,  from  the 
unofficial  zeal  of  subordinate  Spanish  officers,  or 
even  —  as  suggested  by  Speaker  Reed  who  was 
an  opponent  of  war  —  by  action  of  the  insur- 
gents themselves  with  the  purpose  of  embroiling 
the  United  States  and  Spain.  The  careful  investi- 
gations which  were  afterwards  made  brought  to 
light  evidence  of  both  internal  and  external  explo- 
sions; it  therefore  seems  probable  that  an  external 
mine  was  the  prime  cause  of  the  disaster  and  that 
the  internal  explosion  followed  as  a  consequence. 
No  direct  evidence  has  been  discovered  which 
would  fix  the  responsibility  for  the  placing  of  the 
mine,  but  it  is  reasonable  to  attribute  it  to  the 
Spanish  hotheads  of  Havana.  It  is  not  impossible 
that  the  insurgents  were  responsible;  but  it  is 


108  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

incredible  that  the  Spanish  Government  planned 
the  explosion. 

The  hasty,  though  perhaps  natural,  conclusion 
to  which  American  public  sentiment  at  once  leaped, 
however,  was  that  the  disaster  was  the  work  of 
Spam,  without  making  any  discrimination  between 
the  Government  itself  and  the  disaffected  factions. 
A  general  sorrow  and  anger  throughout  the  United 
States  reinforced  the  popular  anxiety  for  nation- 
al interests  and  the  humane  regard  for  the  Cu- 
bans. Press  and  public  oratory  demanded  official 
action.  "Remember  the  Maine ! "  was  an  admoni- 
tion which  everywhere  met  the  eye  and  ear.  The 
venerable  and  trusted  Senator  Proctor,  who  visited 
Cuba,  came  back  with  the  report  that  conditions  on 
the  island  were  intolerable.  On  the  9th  of  March, 
"Uncle  Joe"  Cannon,  the  watchdog  of  the  Treas- 
ury, introduced  a  bill  appropriating  fifty  million 
dollars  to  be  used  for  national  defense  at  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  President.  No  doubt  remained  in 
the  public  mind  that  war  would  result  unless  the 
withdrawal  of  Spanish  authority  from  Cuba  could 
be  arranged  peaceably  and  immediately. 

Even  in  this  final  stage  of  the  negotiations  it  is 
sufficiently  obvious  that  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment was  particularly  desirous  of  preserving  peace. 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN    109 

There  is  also  little  doubt  that  the  Spanish  Govern- 
ment in  good  faith  had  the  same  desire.  The  in- 
telligent classes  in  Spain  realized  that  the  days  of 
Spanish  rule  in  Cuba  were  practically  over.  The 
Liberals  believed  that,  under  the  circumstances, 
war  with  the  United  States  would  be  a  misfor- 
tune. Many  of  the  Conservatives,  however,  be- 
lieved that  a  war,  even  if  unsuccessful,  was  the  only 
way  of  saving  the  dynasty,  and  that  the  dynasty 
was  worth  saving.  Public  opinion  in  Spain  was 
therefore  no  less  inflamed  than  in  America,  but 
it  was  less  well-informed.  Cartoons  represented 
the  American  hog,  which  would  readily  fall  be- 
fore the  Spanish  rapier  accustomed  to  its  nobler 
adversary  the  bull.  Spanish  pride,  impervious  to 
facts  and  statistics,  would  brook  no  supine  sub- 
mission on  the  part  of  its  people  to  foreign  de- 
mands. It  was  a  question  how  far  the  Spanish 
Government  could  bring  itself  to  yield  points  in 
season  which  it  fully  realized  must  be  yielded  in 
the  end. 

The  negotiation  waxed  too  hot  for  the  aged  John 
Sherman,  and  was  conducted  by  the  Assistant 
Secretary,  William  Rufus  Day,  a  close  friend  of 
the  President,  but  a  man  comparatively  unknown 
to  the  public.  When  Day  officially  succeeded 


110  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Sherman  (April  26,  1898)  he  had  to  face  as  fierce 
a  light  of  publicity  as  ever  beat  upon  a  public 
man  in  the  United  States.  Successively  in  charge 
of  the  Cuban  negotiations,  Secretary  of  State  from 
April  to  September,  1898,  President  of  the  Paris 
Peace  Commission  in  October,  in  December,  af- 
ter a  career  of  prime  national  importance  for  nine 
months  in  which  he  had  demonstrated  his  high 
competence,  Day  retired  to  the  relative  obscurity 
of  the  United  States  circuit  bench.  Although 
later  raised  to  the  Supreme  Court,  he  has  nev- 
er since  been  a  national  figure.  As  an  example 
of  a  meteoric  career  of  a  man  of  solid  rather 
than  meteoric  qualities,  his  case  is  unparalleled  in 
American  history. 

The  acting  Secretary  of  State  telegraphed  the 
ultimatum  of  the  Government  on  March  27,  1898, 
to  General  Stewart  L.  Woodford,  then  Minister 
to  Spain.  By  the  terms  of  this  document,  in  the 
first  place  there  was  to  be  an  immediate  amnesty 
which  would  last  until  the  1st  of  October  and 
during  which  Spain  would  communicate  with  the 
insurgents  through  the  President  of  the  United 
States;  in  the  second  place,  the  reconcentrado  pol- 
icy was  to  cease  immediately,  and  relief  for  the 
suffering  Cubans  was  to  be  admitted  from  the 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN    111 

United  States.  Then,  if  satisfactory  terms  were  not 
reached  by  the  1st  of  October,  the  President  was 
to  be  recognized  as  arbiter  between  the  Spaniards 
and  the  insurgents. 

On  the  30th  of  March,  Spain  abrogated  the  re- 
concentrado  policy  in  the  "western  provinces  of 
Cuba,"  and  on  the  following  day  offered  to  arbi- 
trate the  questions  arising  out  of  the  sinking  of  the 
Maine.  On  Sunday,  the  3d  of  April,  a  cablegram 
from  General  Woodford  was  received  by  the  State 
Department  indicating  that  Spain  was  seeking  a 
formula  for  an  armistice  that  should  not  too  ob- 
viously appear  to  be  submission  and  suggesting 
that  the  President  ask  the  Pope  to  intervene  and 
that  the  United  States  abstain  from  all  show  oi 
force.  "If  you  can  still  give  me  time  and  reason- 
able liberty  of  action,"  ran  Woodford's  message, 
"I  will  get  you  the  peace  you  desire  so  much  and 
for  which  you  have  labored  so  hard."  To  this 
the  Secretary  of  State  immediately  replied  that 
the  President  would  not  ask  the  intervention  of  the 
Pope,  and  that  the  Government  would  use  the 
fleet  as  it  saw  fit.  "Would  the  peace  you  are  so 
confident  of  securing, "  asked  the  Secretary,  "mean 
the  independence  of  Cuba?  The  President  cannot 
hold  his  message  longer  than  Tuesday. " 


THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

On  Tuesday,  the  5th  of  April,  General  Woodford 
cabled: 

Should  the  Queen  proclaim  the  following  before  twelve 
o'clock  noon  of  Wednesday,  April  6th,  will  you  sustain 
the  Queen,  and  can  you  prevent  hostile  action  by  Con- 
gress? "  At  the  request  of  the  Holy  Father,  in  this  Pas- 
sion Week  and  in  the  name  of  Christ,  I  proclaim  imme- 
diate and  unconditional  suspension  of  hostilities  in  the 
island  of  Cuba.  This  suspension  is  to  become  imme- 
diately effective  as  soon  as  accepted  by  the  insurgents  of 
that  island,  and  is  to  continue  for  the  space  of  six  months 
to  the  5th  day  of  October,  1898.  I  do  this  to  give  time 
for  passions  to  cease,  and  in  the  sincere  hope  and  belief 
that  during  this  suspension  permanent  and  honorable 
peace  may  be  obtained  between  the  insular  government 
of  Cuba  and  those  of  my  subjects  in  that  island  who  are 
now  in  rebellion  against  the  authority  of  Spain.  .  .  . " 
Please  read  this  in  the  light  of  all  my  previous  telegrams 
and  letters.  I  believe  this  means  peace,  which  the  sober 
judgment  of  our  people  will  approve  long  before  next 
November,  and  which  must  be  approved  at  the  bar  of 
final  history. 

To  this  message  the  Secretary  of  State  replied: 

The  President  highly  appreciates  the  Queen's  desire 
for  peace.  He  cannot  assume  to  influence  the  action  of 
the  American  Congress  beyond  a  discharge  of  his  con- 
stitutional duty  in  transmitting  the  whole  matter  to 
them  with  such  recommendations  as  he  deems  necessary 
and  expedient. 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN    113 

On  the  9th  of  April  the  Queen  granted  the  amnesty, 
on  the  formula  of  a  request  by  the  European  powers. 
On  the  next  day,  General  Woodford  cabled  that 
the  United  States  could  obtain  for  Cuba  a  satis- 
factory autonomy,  or  independence,  or  the  cession 
of  the  island. 

It  was  evident  that  there  was  no  difference  of 
opinion  among  those  in  authority  in  the  United 
States  as  to  the  fact  that  Cuba  must  be  severed 
from  Spain.  There  were,  however,  differences  of 
judgment  as  to  which  of  the  three  methods  sug- 
gested by  Woodford  was  preferable,  and  there  was 
a  substantial  disagreement  as  to  the  means  neces- 
sary to  realize  the  aims  of  the  American  Govern- 
ment. General  Woodford  believed  that  Spain 
would  grant  the  demands  of  the  United  States,  if 
she  were  given  time  and  were  not  pressed  to  the 
point  of  endangering  her  dignity.  The  overwhelm- 
ing majority  in  Congress,  and  particularly  the 
leaders  of  the  dominant  Republican  party  with 
the  exception  of  Speaker  Reed,  refused  to  believe 
in  the  sincerity  of  the  Spanish  Government.  The 
Administration  could  not  overlook  the  fact  that 
the  Spanish  Government,  however  sincere  it  might 
be,  might  not  be  able  to  execute  its  promises .  Great 
Britain  had  just  recognized  the  United  States 


114  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

as  intermediary  in  a  dispute  between  herself  and 
one  of  the  American  nations.  Spain,  in  a  dispute 
much  more  serious  to  the  United  States,  refused 
publicly  to  admit  American  intervention,  while  she 
did  recognize  that  of  the  Pope  and  the  European 
powers.  Was  it  then  possible  that  a  Government 
which  was  either  unwilling  or  afraid  openly  to 
acknowledge  American  interest  in  April  would,  by 
October,  yield  to  the  wishes  of  the  Administra- 
tion? Was  it  certain  or  likely  that  if  the  Spanish 
Government  did  so  yield,  it  would  remain  in  power? 
Reluctantly  President  McKinley  decided  that  he 
could  not  announce  to  Congress  that  he  had  se- 
cured the  acceptance  of  the  American  policy.  In 
his  message  to  Congress  on  the  llth  of  April,  he 
reviewed  the  negotiation  and  concluded  by  recom- 
mending forcible  intervention.  On  the  19th  of 
April,  Congress,  by  joint  resolution,  called  upon 
Spain  to  withdraw  from  Cuba  and  authorized  the 
President  to  use  force  to  compel  her  to  do  so.  Con- 
gress, however,  was  not  content  to  leave  the  future 
of  the  island  merely  indefinite,  but  added  that  the 
United  States  did  not  desire  Cuba  and  that  the 
"people  of  the  island  of  Cuba  are,  and  of  right 
ought  to  be,  free  and  independent. "  This  decision 
ruled  out  both  autonomy  and  cession  as  solutions 


OUTBREAK  OF  THE  WAR  WITH  SPAIN    1J5 

of  the  problem.  It  put  an  end  to  the  American 
century-long  dream  of  annexing  Cuba,  unless  the 
people  of  the  island  themselves  desired  such  a  re- 
lation; and  it  practically  determined  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  unstable  Cuban  Government  then  in 
existence.  This  decision  on  the  part  of  Congress, 
however,  reflected  the  deep-seated  conviction  of 
the  American  people  regarding  freedom  and  plainly 
put  the  issue  where  the  popular  majority  wished 
it  to  be  —  upon  a  basis  of  unselfish  sympathy  with 
struggling  neighbors. 

The  resolution  was  signed  by  the  President  on 
the  20th  of  April.  On  the  following  day,  Admiral 
Sampson's  fleet  left  Key  West  with  orders  to  block- 
ade the  coast  of  Cuba,  and,  in  the  absence  of  a 
formal  declaration  of  war,  this  strategic  move  may 
be  considered  as  its  actual  beginning.  On  the  25th 
of  April,  Congress  declared  "that  war  be,  and  the 
same  is  hereby,  declared  to  exist,  and  that  war  has 
existed  since  the  twenty-first  of  April,  Anno  Do- 
mini, eighteen  hundred  and  ninety-eight,  including 
the  said  day,  between  the  United  States  of  America 
and  the  Kingdom  of  Spain. " 


CHAPTER   VIII 

DEWEY   AND   MANILA   BAY 

WAR  had  begun,  but  the  majority  of  the  Amer- 
ican people  had  hardly  considered  seriously  how 
they  were  to  fight.  Fortunately  their  navy  al- 
ready existed,  and  it  was  upon  it  that  they  had  to 
rely  in  the  opening  moments  of  hostility.  Ton  for 
ton,  gun  for  gun,  it  stood  on  fairly  even  terms  with 
that  of  Spain.  Captain,  later  Admiral,  Mahan, 
considered  that  the  loss  of  the  Maine  shifted  a 
slight  paper  advantage  from  the  United  States  to 
Spain.  In  personnel,  however,  the  American  Navy 
soon  proved  its  overwhelming  superiority,  which 
was  due  not  solely  to  innate  ability  but  also  to 
sound  professional  training. 

The  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  John  D.  Long,  had  a 
thorough  appreciation  of  values.  Although  Con- 
gress had  not  provided  for  a  general  staff,  he  him- 
self appointed  a  Naval  War  Board,  which  served 
many  of  the  same  purposes.  Upon  this  Board  he 


DEWEY  AND  MANILA  BAY  117 

appointed  Rear  Admiral  Sicard,  who  but  for  ill 
health  would  have  commanded  the  main  fleet; 
Captain  A.  S.  Crowninshield;  and,  most  important, 
Captain  A.  T.  Mahan,  whose  equal  as  master  of 
the  theory  and  history  of  naval  warfare  no  navy 
of  the  world  could  show.  The  spirit  of  the  fighting 
force  was  speedily  exhibited  by  such  exploits  as 
that  of  Lieutenant  Victor  Blue  in  boldly  plunging 
into  the  Cuban  wilderness  to  obtain  information 
regarding  the  position  of  Admiral  Cervera's  fleet, 
though  in  this  dangerous  sort  of  work  the  individ- 
ual palm  must  be  given  to  Lieutenant  A.  S.  Rowan 
of  the  army,  whose  energy  and  initiative  in  over- 
coming obstacles  are  immortalized  in  Elbert  Hub- 
bard's  Message  to  Garcia,  the  best  American  parable 
of  efficient  service  since  the  days  of  Franklin. 

Efficient,  however,  as  was  the  navy,  it  was  far 
from  being  a  complete  fighting  force.  Its  fighting 
vessels  were  totally  unsupplied  with  that  cloud  of 
servers  —  colliers,  mother  ships,  hospital  ships,  and 
scouts  —  which  we  now  know  must  accompany  a 
fleet.  The  merchant  marine,  then  at  almost  its 
lowest  point,  was  not  in  a  position  entirely  to  fill 
the  need.  The  United  States  had  no  extensive 
store  of  munitions.  Over  all  operations  there  hung 
a  cloud  of  uncertainty.  Except  for  the  short 


118  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

campaign  of  the  Chino- Japanese  War  of  1894, 
modern  implements  of  sea  war  remained  untested. 
Scientific  experiment,  valuable  and  necessary  as 
it  was,  did  not  carry  absolute  conviction  regarding 
efficient  service.  Would  the  weapons  of  offense  or 
defense  prove  most  effective?  Accidents  on  ship- 
board and  even  the  total  destruction  of  vessels  had 
been  common  to  all  navies  during  times  of  peace. 
That  the  Maine  had  not  been  a  victim  of  the  fail- 
ure of  her  own  mechanism  was  not  then  certain. 
Such  misgivings  were  in  the  minds  of  many  officers. 
Indeed,  a  report  of  the  total  disappearance  of  two 
battling  fleets  would  not  have  found  the  watchful 
naval  experts  of  the  world  absolutely  incredulous. 
So  much  the  higher,  therefore,  was  the  heroism 
of  those  who  led  straight  to  battle  that  complex 
and  as  yet  unproved  product  of  the  brain  —  the 
modern  warship. 

While  negotiations  with  Spain  were  in  their  last 
stages,  at  the  orders  of  Secretary  Long  a  swift 
vessel  left  San  Francisco  for  Honolulu.  There  its 
precious  cargo  was  transferred  to  the  warship  Balti- 
more, which  then  made  hurriedly  for  Hongkong. 
It  contained  the  ammunition  which  was  absolutely 
necessary  if  Commodore  George  Dewey,  in  com- 
mand of  the  Asiatic  squadron,  was  to  play  a  part  in 


DEWEY  AND  MANILA  BAY  119 

the  war.  The  position  of  his  squadron,  even  after 
it  received  its  ammunition,  was  indeed  singular. 
After  the  war  began,  it  was  unable  to  obtain  coal 
or  other  supplies  from  any  neutral  port  and  at 
the  same  time  it  was  equally  unable  to  remain  in 
any  such  port  without  being  interned  for  the  dura- 
tion of  the  war.  There  remained  but  one  course 
of  action.  It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the  Span- 
ish empire  stretched  eastward  as  well  as  westward. 
Already  William  Pitt,  when  he  had  foreseen  in 
1760  the  entrance  of  Spain  into  the  war  which  Eng- 
land was  then  waging  with  France,  had  planned 
expeditions  against  both  Cuba  and  the  Philippines. 
Now  in  1898  the  Navy  Department  of  the  United 
States,  anticipating  war,  saw  in  the  proximity  of 
the  American  squadron  to  the  Spanish  islands 
of  the  Philippines  an  opportunity  rather  than  a 
problem.  Commodore  George  Dewey,  the  com- 
mander of  the  Asiatic  squadron,  was  fully  prepared 
to  enter  into  the  plan.  As  early  as  the  seventies, 
when  the  Virginius  affair1  threatened  war  between 


1 A  dispute  between  the  United  States  and  Spain,  arising  out  of  the 
capture  of  the  Virginius,  an  American  vessel  engaged  in  filibustering 
off  the  coast  of  Cuba,  and  the  execution  at  Santiago  of  the  captain 
and  a  number  of  the  crew  and  passengers.  The  vessel  and  the  sur- 
viving passengers  were  finally  restored  by  the  Spanish  authorities,  who 
agreed  to  punish  the  officials  responsible  for  the  illegal  acts. 


120  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Spain  and  the  United  States,  Dewey,  then  a  com- 
mander on  the  west  coast  of  Mexico,  had  proposed, 
in  case  war  were  declared,  that  he  sail  for  the  Philip- 
pines and  capture  Manila.  Now  he  was  prepared 
to  seek  in  the  hostile  ports  of  those  islands  the 
liberty  that  international  law  forbade  him  in  the 
neutral  ports  of  Asia.  How  narrow  a  margin  of 
time  he  had  in  which  to  make  this  bold  stroke  may 
be  realized  from  the  fact  that  the  Baltimore,  his 
second  vessel  in  size,  reached  Hongkong  on  the 
22d  of  April  and  went  into  dry  dock  on  the  23d, 
and  that  on  the  following  day  the  squadron  was 
ordered  either  to  leave  the  port  or  to  intern. 

The  little  armada  of  six  vessels  with  which 
Dewey  started  for  the  Philippines  was  puny  enough 
from  the  standpoint  of  today;  yet  it  was  strong 
enough  to  cope  with  the  larger  but  more  old-fash- 
ioned Spanish  fleet,  or  with  the  harbor  defenses 
unless  these  included  mines  —  of  whose  absence 
Dewey  was  at  the  moment  unaware.  If,  however, 
the  Spanish  commander  could  unite  the  strength  of 
his  vessels  and  that  of  the  coast  defenses,  Dewey 
might  find  it  impossible  to  destroy  the  Spanish  fleet. 
In  that  case,  the  plight  of  the  American  squadron 
would  be  precarious,  if  its  ultimate  self-destruction 
or  internment  did  not  become  necessary. 


DEWEY  AND  MANILA  BAY  121 

Commodore  Dewey  belonged  to  that  school  of 
American  naval  officers  who  combine  the  spirit  of 
Farragut's  "Damn  the  torpedoes"  with  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  the  latest  scientific  devices.  Though 
he  would  take  all  precautions,  he  would  not  allow 
the  unknown  to  hold  him  back.  After  a  brief 
rendezvous  for  tuning  up  at  Mirs  Bay  near  Hong- 
kong on  the  Chinese  coast,  Dewey  steered  straight 
for  Subig  Bay  in  the  Philippines,  where  he  expected 
to  meet  his  opponent.  Finding  the  Bay  empty,  he 
steamed  on  without  pause  and  entered  the  Boca 
Grande,  the  southern  channel  leading  to  Manila 
Bay,  at  midnight  of  the  30th  of  April.  Slowly, 
awaiting  daylight,  but  steadily  he  approached 
Manila.  Coming  within  three  miles  of  the  city,  he 
discovered  the  Spanish  fleet,  half  a  dozen  miles  to 
the  southeast,  at  the  naval  station  of  Cavite. 
Still  without  a  pause,  the  American  squadron 
moved  to  the  attack. 

The  Spanish  Admiral  Montojo  tried,  though  in- 
effectually, to  come  to  close  quarters,  for  his  guns 
were  of  smaller  caliber  than  those  of  the  American 
ships,  but  he  was  forced  to  keep  his  vessels  for  the 
most  part  in  line  between  the  Americans  and  the 
shore.  Commodore  Dewey  sailed  back  and  forth 
five  times,  raking  the  Spanish  ships  and  the  shore 


122  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

batteries  with  his  fire.  Having  guns  of  longer 
range  than  those  of  the  Spaniards,  he  could  have 
kept  out  of  their  fire  and  slowly  hammered  them  to 
pieces;  but  he  preferred  a  closer  position  where  he 
could  use  more  guns  and  therefore  do  quicker  work. 
How  well  he  was  justified  in  taking  this  risk  is 
shown  by  the  fact  that  no  man  was  killed  on  the 
American  fleet  that  day  and  only  a  few  were 
wounded.  After  a  few  hours'  fighting,  with  a 
curious  interval  when  the  Americans  withdrew  and 
breakfasted,  Dewey  completed  the  destruction  or 
capture  of  the  Spanish  fleet,  and  found  himself  the 
victor  with  his  own  ships  uninjured  and  in  full 
fighting  trim.  By  the  3d  of  May,  the  naval  sta- 
tion at  Cavite  and  the  batteries  at  the  entrance 
of  Manila  Bay  were  in  the  hands  of  Commodore 
Dewey,  and  the  Asiatic  squadron  had  wrested  a 
safe  and  commodious  harbor  from  the  enemy. 

Secure  for  the  moment  and  free,  Dewey  found 
himself  in  as  precarious  a  strategic  position  as  has 
ever  confronted  a  naval  officer.  With  his  six  war 
vessels  and  1707  men,  he  was  unsupported  and  at 
least  a  month's  voyage  from  America.  It  was  two 
months,  indeed,  before  any  American  troops  or  ad- 
ditional ships  reached  him.  Meanwhile  the  Span- 
iards held  Manila,  and  a  Spanish  fleet,  formidable 


DEWEY  AND  MANILA  BAY  123 

under  the  circumstances,  began  to  sail  for  the  Phil- 
ippines. Nevertheless  Dewey  proceeded  to  block- 
ade Manila,  which  was  besieged  on  the  land  side 
by  the  Filipino  insurgents  under  Aguinaldo.  This 
siege  was  indeed  an  advantage  to  the  Americans  as 
it  distressed  the  enemy  and  gave  an  opportunity 
to  obtain  supplies  from  the  mainland.  Dewey, 
however,  placed  no  confidence  in  Aguinaldo,  and 
further  was  instructed  by  Secretary  Long  on  the 
26th  of  May  as  follows:  "It  is  desirable,  as  far  as 
possible,  and  consistent  for  your  success  and  safety, 
not  to  have  political  alliances  with  the  insurgents 
or  any  faction  in  the  islands  that  would  incur 
liability  to  maintain  their  cause  in  the  future." 
Meanwhile  foreign  nations  were  rushing  vessels 
to  this  critical  spot  in  the  Pacific.  On  the  17th 
of  June,  Dewey  sent  a  cable,  which  had  to  be  re- 
layed to  Hongkong  by  boat,  reporting  that  there 
were  collected,  in  Manila  Bay,  a  French  and  a 
Japanese  warship,  two  British,  and  three  German. 
Another  German  man-of-war  was  expected,  which 
would  make  the  German  squadron  as  strong  as 
the  American. 

The  presence  of  so  large  a  German  force,  it  was 
felt,  could  hardly  fail  to  have  definite  significance, 
and  therefore  caused  an  anxiety  at  home  which 


124  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

would,  indeed,  have  been  all  the  keener  had  Ad- 
miral Dewey  not  kept  many  of  his  troubles  to  him- 
self. European  sympathy  was  almost  wholly  with 
Spain.  The  French,  for  instance,  had  invested 
heavily  in  Spanish  bonds,  many  of  which  were  se- 
cured on  the  Cuban  revenues.  There  was  also  per- 
haps some  sense  of  solidarity  among  the  Latin  races 
in  Europe  and  a  feeling  that  the  United  States  was 
a  colossus  willfully  exerting  itself  against  a  weak 
antagonist.  It  was  not  likely  that  this  feeling  was 
strong  enough  to  lead  to  action,  but  at  least  during 
that  summer  of  1898  it  was  somewhat  unpleasant 
for  American  tourists  in  Paris,  and  an  untoward 
episode  might  easily  have  brought  unfriendly  senti- 
ment to  a  dangerous  head.  Austria  had  never 
been  very  friendly  to  the  United  States,  particu- 
larly since  the  execution  of  the  Emperor  Maximil- 
ian in  Mexico,  which  his  brother  Francis  Joseph 
believed  the  United  States  could  have  prevented, 
and  was  tied  to  Spain  by  the  fact  that  the  Queen 
Regent  was  an  Austrian  Hapsburg. 

It  was  evident,  moreover,  that  in  Europe  there 
was  a  vague  but  nevertheless  real  dread  of  the 
economic  potentialities  of  the  United  States  —  a 
fear  which  led,  in  the  next  few  years,  to  the  sugges- 
tion that  the  American  invasion  of  trade  should  be 


DEWEY  AND  MANILA  BAY  125 

resisted  by  a  general  European  economic  organiza- 
tion which  would  even  overrule  the  natural  tend- 
ency of  powers  to  group  themselves  into  hostile 
camps.  In  1898  it  seemed  possible  that  the  United 
States  was  consciously  planning  to  become  a  world 
military  power  also,  and  a  feeling,  not  exactly  like 
Elaine's  "America  for  the  Americans"  but  rather 
of  "the  world  for  Europeans,"  gathered  force  to 
meet  any  attempt  at  American  expansion. 

Even  before  war  had  broken  out  between  Spain 
and  the  United  States,  this  sentiment  had  suffi- 
ciently crystallized  to  result  in  a  not  quite  usual 
diplomatic  action.  On  April  6,  1898,  the  repre- 
sentatives of  Great  Britain,  Germany,  France, 
Austro-Hungary,  Russia,  and  Italy,  presented  a 
note  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States  mak- 
ing "a  pressing  appeal  to  the  feelings  of  humanity 
and  moderation  of  the  President  and  of  the  Amer- 
ican people  in  their  differences  with  Spain.  They 
earnestly  hope  that  further  negotiations  will  lead 
to  an  agreement  which,  while  securing  the  mainte- 
nance of  peace,  will  afford  all  necessary  guarantees 
for  the  reestablishment  of  order  in  Cuba." 

Of  all  the  European  powers  none  was  more 
interested  than  Germany  in  the  situation  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere.  There  seems  to  be  no  doubt 


126  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

that  the  Kaiser  made  the  remark  to  an  Englishman 
with  reference  to  the  Spanish  American  War:  "If 
I  had  had  a  larger  fleet  I  would  have  taken  Uncle 
Sam  by  the  scruff  of  his  neck."  Though  the  reason 
for  Germany's  attitude  has  never  been  proven  by 
documents,  circumstantial  evidence  points  con- 
vincingly to  the  explanation.  The  quest  for  a 
colonial  empire,  upon  which  Bismarck  had  em- 
barked rather  reluctantly  and  late,  had  been  taken 
up  with  feverish  zeal  by  William  II,  his  successor 
in  the  direction  of  German  policy.  Not  content 
with  the  commercial  conquests  which  German 
trade  was  making  in  all  countries  of  the  earth, 
the  Kaiser  wanted  a  place  in  the  sun  exclusively 
his  own.  The  world  seemed,  however,  as  firmly 
closed  to  the  late-comer  in  search  of  colonies  as  it 
was  open  to  him  as  the  bearer  of  cheap  and  useful 
goods.  Such  remnants  of  territory  as  lay  on  the 
counter  he  quickly  seized,  but  they  hardly  made 
an  empire. 

It  is  not,  therefore,  a  daring  conjecture  that  the 
Kaiser  was  as  carefully  watching  the  decrepit  em- 
pire of  Spain  as  he  was  the  traditional  sick  man  of 
Europe,  the  empire  of  Turkey.  In  1898  revolu- 
tions were  sapping  both  the  extremities  of  the  Span- 
ish dominions.  The  Kaiser,  while  he  doubtless 


DEWEY  AND  MANILA  BAY  127 

realized  that  Cuba  would  not  fall  to  him,  in  all  proba- 
bility expected  that  he  would  be  able  to  get  the 
Philippines.  Certain  it  is  that  at  the  close  of  the 
Spanish  American  War  he  bought  all  the  remaining 
Spanish  possessions  in  the  Pacific.  If  such  had 
been  his  expectations  with  regard  to  the  Philippines, 
the  news  of  Dewey's  victory  must  have  brought 
him  a  bitter  disappointment,  while  at  the  same 
time  the  careless  and  indiscreet  remark  of  an  Amer- 
ican official  to  certain  Germans  —  "We  don't  want 
the  Philippines;  why  don't  you  take  them?"  —  may 
well  have  given  him  a  feeling  that  perhaps  the 
question  was  still  open. 

Under  such  circumstances,  with  Europe  none  too 
well-disposed  and  the  Kaiser  watching  events  with 
a  jealous  eye,  it  was  very  important  to  the  United 
States  not  to  be  without  a  friend.  In  England 
sympathy  for  America  ran  strong  and  deep.  The 
British  Government  was  somewhat  in  alarm  over 
the  political  solitude  in  which  Great  Britain  found 
herself,  even  though  its  head,  Lord  Salisbury,  de- 
scribed the  position  as  one  of  "splendid  isolation. " 
The  unexpected  reaction  of  friendliness  on  the  part 
of  Great  Britain  which  had  followed  the  Vene- 
zuela affair  continued  to  augment,  and  relations 
between  the  two  countries  were  kept  smooth  by  the 


128  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

new  American  Ambassador,  John  Hay,  whom  Queen 
Victoria  described  as  "the  most  interesting  of  all 
the  ambassadors  I  have  known. "  More  important 
still,  in  Great  Britain  alone  was  there  a  public  who 
appreciated  the  real  sentiment  of  humanity  under- 
lying the  entrance  of  the  United  States  into  the 
war  with  Spain;  and  this  public  actually  had  some 
weight  in  politics.  The  people  of  both  Great  Brit- 
ain and  the  United  States  were  easily  moved  to 
respond  with  money  and  personal  service  to  the  cry 
of  suffering  anywhere  in  the  world.  Just  before 
the  Spanish  American  War,  Gladstone  had  made 
his  last  great  campaign  protesting  against  the  new 
•massacres  in  Armenia;  and  in  the  United  States  the 
Republican  platform  of  1896  had  declared  that 
"the  massacres  in  Armenia  have  aroused  the  deep 
sympathy  and  just  indignation  of  the  American 
people,  and  we  believe  that  the  United  States 
should  exercise  all  the  influence  it  can  properly 
exert  to  bring  these  atrocities  to  an  end." 

John  Hay  wrote  to  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  of  the 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  April  5, 1898, 
as  follows:  "For  the  first  time  in  my  life  I  find 
the  drawing-room  sentiment  altogether  with  us.  If 
we  wanted  it  —  which,  of  course,  we  do  not  —  we 
could  have  the  practical  assistance  of  the  British 


DEWEY  AND  MANILA  BAY  129 

Navy  —  on  the  do  ut  des  principle,  naturally." 
On  the  25th  of  May  he  added:  "It  is  a  moment  of 
immense  importance,  not  only  for  the  present,  but 
for  all  the  future.  It  is  hardly  too  much  to  say 
the  interests  of  civilization  are  bound  up  in  the 
direction  the  relations  of  England  and  America 
are  to  take  in  the  next  few  months. "  Already  on 
the  15th  of  May,  Joseph  Chamberlain,  the  Colonial 
Secretary,  had  said  to  the  Birmingham  Liberal 
Unionists:  "What  is  our  next  duty?  It  is  to  es- 
tablish and  to  maintain  bonds  of  permanent  amity 
with  our  kinsmen  across  the  Atlantic.  There  is  a 
powerful  and  a  generous  nation.  .  .  .  Their 
laws,  their  literature,  their  standpoint  upon  every 
question  are  the  same  as  ours." 

In  Manila  Harbor,  where  Dewey  lay  with  his 
squadron,  these  distant  forces  of  European  colonial 
policy  were  at  work.  The  presence  of  representa- 
tive foreign  warships  to  observe  the  maintenance  of 
the  blockade  was  a  natural  and  usual  naval  cir- 
cumstance. The  arrival  of  two  German  vessels 
therefore  caused  no  remark,  although  they  failed  to 
pay  the  usual  respects  to  the  blockading  squadron. 
On  the  12th  of  May  a  third  arrived  and  created 
some  technical  inconvenience  by  being  commanded 
by  an  officer  who  outranked  Commodore  Dewey. 


130  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

A  German  transport  which  was  in  the  harbor  made 
the  total  number  of  German  personnel  superior  to 
that  of  the  Americans,  and  the  arrival  of  the  Kaiser 
on  the  12th  of  June  gave  the  Germans  distinct 
naval  preponderance. 

The  presence  of  so  powerful  a  squadron  in  itself 
closely  approached  an  international  discourtesy. 
Disregarding  the  laws  of  blockade,  as  Dewey, 
trained  in  the  Civil  War  blockade  of  the  South,  in- 
terpreted them,  the  German  officers  were  actively 
familiar  both  with  the  Spanish  officials  of  Manila 
and  with  the  insurgents.  Finally  they  ensconced 
themselves  in  the  quarantine  station  at  the  entrance 
of  the  Bay,  and  Admiral  Diedrichs  took  up  land 
quarters.  Further,  they  interfered  between  the 
insurgents  and  the  Spaniards  outside  of  Manila 
Bay.  In  the  controversy  between  Diedrichs  and 
Dewey  which  grew  out  of  these  difficulties,  Captain 
Chichester,  commanding  the  British  squadron,  sup- 
ported Dewey 's  course  unqualifiedly  and,  more- 
over, let  it  be  clearly  known  that,  in  the  event  of 
hostilities,  the  British  vessels  would  take  their 
stand  with  the  Americans. 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE   BLOCKADE   OF   CUBA 

WHILE  the  first  victory  of  the  war  was  in  the  Far 
East  and  the  possibility  of  events  of  world-wide 
significance  hung  upon  the  level-headedness  of 
Commodore  Dewey  at  Manila,  it  was  realized  that 
the  war  must  really  be  fought  in  the  West.  Both 
President  McKinley  and  the  Queen  Regent  of 
Spain  had  issued  proclamations  stating  that  they 
would  adhere  to  the  rules  of  the  Declaration  of 
Paris  and  not  resort  to  the  use  of  privateers.  The 
naval  contest,  therefore,  was  confined  to  the  regular 
navies.  Actually  the  American  fleet  was  superior 
in  battleships,  monitors,  and  protected  cruisers; 
the  Spanish  was  the  better  equipped  in  armored 
cruisers,  gunboats,  and  destroyers. 

Both  Spain  and  the  United  States  hastily  pur- 
chased, in  the  last  days  of  peace,  a  few  vessels, 
but  not  enough  seriously  to  affect  their  relative 
strength.  Both  also  drew  upon  their  own  merchant 

131 


132  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

marines.  Spain  added  18  medium-sized  vessels 
to  her  navy;  the  United  States  added  in  all  123, 
most  of  which  were  small  and  used  for  scout- 
ing purposes.  The  largest  and  most  efficient  of 
these  additional  American  ships  were  the  subsi- 
dized St.  Paul,  St.  Louis,  New  York,  and  Paris  of  the 
American  line,  of  which  the  last  two,  renamed  the 
Harvard  and  Yale,  proved  to  be  of  great  service. 
It  was  characteristic  of  American  conditions  that 
28  were  private  yachts,  of  which  the  Mayflower 
was  the  most  notable.  To  man  these  new  ships, 
the  personnel  of  the  American  Navy  was  increased 
from  13,750  to  24,123,  of  whom  a  large  number 
were  men  who  had  received  some  training  in  the 
naval  reserves  of  the  various  States. 

The  first  duty  of  the  navy  was  to  protect  the 
American  coast.  In  1885  the  War  Department 
had  planned  and  Congress  had  sanctioned  a  system 
of  coast  defense.  Up  to  1898,  however,  only  one 
quarter  of  the  sum  considered  necessary  had  been 
appropriated.  Mines  and  torpedoes  were  laid  at 
the  entrances  to  American  harbors  as  soon  as  war 
broke  out,  but  there  was  a  lack  of  high-power  guns. 
Rumors  of  a  projected  raid  by  the  fast  Spanish 
armored  cruisers  kept  the  coast  cities  in  a  state  of 
high  excitement,  and  many  sought,  by  petition  and 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  CUBA  133 

political  pressure,  to  compel  the  Navy  Department 
to  detach  vessels  for  their  defense.  The  Naval  War 
Board,  however,  had  to  remember  that  it  must 
protect  not  only  the  coast  but  commerce  alsb, 
and  that  the  United  States  was  at  war  not  to  de- 
fend herself  but  to  attack.  Cuba  was  the  objective; 
and  Cuba  must  be  cut  off  from  Spain  by  blockade, 
and  the  seas  must  be  made  safe  for  the  passage  of 
the  American  Army.  If  the  navy  were  to  accom- 
plish all  these  purposes,  it  must  destroy  the  Span- 
ish Navy.  To  achieve  this  end,  it  would  have 
to  work  upon  the  principle  of  concentration  and 
not  dispersion. 

For  several  months  before  the  actual  declaration 
of  war  with  Spain,  the  Navy  Department  had  been 
effecting  this  concentration.  On  the  21st  of  April, 
Captain  William  T.  Sampson  was  appointed  to 
command  the  forces  on  the  North  Atlantic  station. 
This  included  practically  the  whole  fleet,  except  the 
Pacific  squadron  under  Dewey,  and  the  Oregon, 
a  new  battleship  of  unusual  design,  which  was  on 
the  Pacific  coast.  On  the  1st  of  March  she  was 
ordered  from  the  Bremerton  Yard,  in  the  State  of 
Washington,  to  San  Francisco,  and  thence  to  re- 
port in  the  Atlantic.  Her  voyage  was  the  longest 
emergency  run  undertaken  up  to  that  time  by  a 


134  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

modern  battleship.  The  outbreak  of  the  war  with 
Spain  meant  the  sealing  of  all  ports  in  which  she 
might  have  been  repaired  in  case  of  emergency. 
Rumors  were  rife  of  Spanish  vessels  ready  to  inter- 
cept her,  and  the  eyes  not  only  of  the  United  States 
but  of  the  world  were  upon  the  Oregon.  A  feeling 
of  relief  and  rejoicing  therefore  passed  through  the 
country  when  this  American  warship  arrived  at 
Key  West  on  the  26th  of  May,  fit  for  immediate 
and  efficient  service. 

The  fleet,  though  concentrated  in  the  Atlantic 
within  the  region  of  immediate  hostility,  was  di- 
vided for  purposes  of  operation  into  a  major  divi- 
sion under  the  immediate  command  of  Admiral 
Sampson  and  a  flying  squadron  under  Commodore 
Schley.1  The  first  undertook  the  enforcement  of 
the  blockade  which  was  declared  on  the  21st  of 
April  against  Cuba,  and  patrolled  the  northern 
coast  from  Gardenas  to  Bahia.  Key  West  was 
soon  filled  with  Spanish  prizes.  On  the  27th  of 
April  a  brush  took  place  between  batteries  at  Ma- 
tanzas  and  some  of  the  American  vessels,  without 

1  A  patrol  squadron  of  cruisers  under  Commodore  Howell  was  also 
established  to  protect  the  coast  from  the  Delaware  capes  to  eastern 
Maine.  "It  can  scarcely  be  supposed,"  writes  Admiral  Chadwick, 
"that  such  action  was  taken  but  in  deference  to  the  unreasoning  fear 
of  dwellers  on  the  coast. " 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  CUBA  135 

loss  of  life  on  either  side,  except  for  a  mule  which 
bids  fair  to  become  immortal  in  history  through  be- 
ing reported  by  the  Spanish  as  their  only  casualty 
and  the  first  of  the  war.  Admiral  Sampson,  fol- 
lowing the  tradition  of  the  American  Navy  of  aim- 
ing at  a  vital  spot,  wished  to  attack  Havana;  and  a 
careful  study  of  its  fortifications  seems  to  show  that 
he  would  have  had  a  good  chance  of  success. 
Chance,  however,  might  have  caused  the  loss  of 
some  of  his  vessels,  and,  with  the  small  margin  of 
naval  superiority  at  its  disposal  the  Naval  War 
Board  was  probably  wise  in  not  allowing  him  to 
take  the  risk. 

It  was,  in  fact,  Spain  which  took  the  initiative 
and  decided  the  matter.  Her  West  India  Squad- 
ron was  weak,  even  on  paper,  and  was  in  a  con- 
dition which  would  have  made  it  madness  to  at- 
tempt to  meet  the  Americans  without  reenforce- 
ment.  She  therefore  decided  to  dispatch  a  fighting 
fleet  from  her  home  forces.  Accordingly  on  the 
29th  of  April,  Admiral  Cervera  left  the  Cape  Verde 
Islands  and  sailed  westward  with  one  fast  sec- 
ond-class battleship,  the  Cristobal  Colon,  three  ar- 
mored cruisers,  and  two  torpedo-boat  destroyers. 
It  was  a  reasonably  powerful  fleet  as  fleets  went  in 
the  Spanish  War,  yet  it  is  difficult  to  see  just  what 


136  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

good  it  could  accomplish  when  it  arrived  on  the 
scene  of  action.  The  naval  superiority  in  the  West 
Indies  would  still  be  in  the  hands  of  the  concen- 
trated American  Navy,  for  the  Spanish  forces 
would  still  be  divided,  only  more  equally,  between 
Spanish  and  Caribbean  waters.  The  American 
vessels,  moreover,  would  be  within  easy  distance 
of  their  home  stations,  which  could  supply  them 
with  every  necessity.  The  islands  belonging  to 
Spain,  on  the  other  hand,  were  ill  equipped  to 
become  the  base  of  naval  operations.  Admiral 
Cervera  realized  to  the  full  the  difficulty  of  the 
situation  and  protested  against  an  expedition  which 
he  feared  would  mean  the  fall  of  Spanish  power, 
but  public  opinion  forced  the  ministry,  and  he  was 
obliged  to  put  to  sea. 

For  nearly  a  month  the  Spanish  fleet  was  lost  to 
sight,  and  dwellers  on  the  American  coast  were  in 
a  panic  of  apprehension.  Cervera  Js  objective  was 
guessed  to  be  everything  from  a  raid  on  Bar  Har- 
bor to  an  attack  on  the  Oregon,  then  on  its  shrouded 
voyage  from  the  Pacific  coast.  Cities  on  the  At- 
lantic seaboard  clamored  for  protection,  and  the 
Spanish  fleet  was  magnified  by  the  mist  of  uncer- 
tainty until  it  became  a  national  terror.  Samp- 
son, rightly  divining  that  Cervera  would  make  for 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  CUBA  137 

San  Juan,  the  capital  and  chief  seaport  of  Porto 
Rico,  detached  from  his  blockading  force  a  fight- 
ing squadron  with  which  he  sailed  east,  but 
not  finding  the  Spanish  fleet  he  turned  back 
to  Key  West.  Schley,  with  the  Flying  Squad- 
ron, was  then  ordered  to  Cienfuegos.  In  the 
meantime  Cervera  was  escaping  detection  by 
the  American  scouts  by  taking  an  extremely 
southerly  course;  and  with  the  information  that 
Sampson  was  off  San  Juan,  the  Spanish  Admiral 
sailed  for  Santiago  de  Cuba,  where  he  arrived  on 
May  19,  1898. 

Though  Cervera  was  safe  in  harbor,  the  maneu- 
ver of  the  American  fleet  cannot  be  called  unsuc- 
cessful. Cervera  would  have  preferred  to  be  at 
San  Juan,  where  there  was  a  navy  yard  and  where 
his  position  would  have  obliged  the  American  fleet 
either  to  split  into  two  divisions  separated  by  eight 
hundred  miles  or  to  leave  him  free  range  of  action. 
Next  to  San  Juan  he  would  have  preferred  Havana 
or  Cienfuegos,  which  were  connected  by  railroad 
and  near  which  lay  the  bulk  of  the  Spanish  Army. 
He  found  himself  instead  at  the  extreme  eastern 
end  of  Cuba  in  a  port  with  no  railroad  connection 
with  Havana,  partly  blocked  by  the  insurgents, 
and  totally  unable  to  supply  him  with  necessities. 


138  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Unless  Cervera  could  leave  Santiago,  his  expedi- 
tion would  obviously  have  been  useless.  Though 
it  was  the  natural  function  of  the  American  fleet  to 
blockade  him,  for  a  week  after  his  arrival  there  was 
an  interesting  game  of  hide  and  seek  between  the 
two  fleets.  The  harbors  of  Cienfuegos  and  of  San- 
tiago are  both  landlocked  by  high  hills,  and  Cer- 
vera had  entered  Santiago  without  being  noticed 
by  the  Americans,  as  that  part  of  the  coast  was 
not  under  blockade.  Schley  thought  Cervera  was 
at  Cienfuegos;  Sampson  was  of  the  opinion  that  he 
was  at  Santiago.  When  it  became  known  that  the 
enemy  had  taken  refuge  in  Santiago,  Schley  began 
the  blockade  on  the  28th  of  May,  but  stated  that  he 
could  not  continue  long  in  position  owing  to  lack 
of  coal.  On  the  1st  of  June  Sampson  arrived  and 
assumed  command  of  the  blockading  squadron. 

With  the  bottling  up  of  Cervera,  the  first  stage 
of  the  war  passed.  The  navy  had  performed  its 
primary  function :  it  had  established  its  superiority 
and  had  obtained  the  control  of  the  seas.  The 
American  coast  was  safe;  American  commerce  was 
safe  except  in  the  vicinity  of  Spain;  and  the  sea  was 
open  for  the  passage  of  an  American  expeditionary 
force.  Nearly  the  whole  island  of  Cuba  was  now 
under  blockade,  and  the  insurgents  were  receiving 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  CUBA  139 

supplies  from  the  United  States.  It  had  been 
proved  that  the  fairly  even  balance  of  the  two 
fleets,  so  anxiously  scanned  when  it  was  reported 
in  the  newspapers  in  April,  was  entirely  deceptive 
when  it  came  to  real  efficiency  in  action.  More- 
over, the  skillful  handling  of  the  fleets  by  the  Naval 
War  Board  as  well  as  by  the  immediate  command- 
ers had  redoubled  the  actual  superiority  of  the 
American  naval  forces. 

A  fleet  in  being,  even  though  inferior  and  immo- 
bilized, still  counts  as  a  factor  in  naval  warfare,  and 
Cervera,  though  immobilized  by  Sampson,  himself 
immobilized  the  greater  number  of  American  ves- 
sels necessary  to  blockade  him.  The  importance 
of  this  fact  was  evident  to  every  one  when,  in 
the  middle  of  June,  the  remainder  of  the  Spanish 
home  fleet,  whipped  hastily  into  a  semblance  of 
fighting  condition,  set  out  eastward  under  Admiral 
Camara  to  contest  the  Philippines  with  Dewey. 
It  was  impossible  for  the  United  States  to  detach  a 
force  sufficient  to  cross  the  Atlantic  and,  without  a 
base,  meet  this  fleet  in  its  home  waters.  Even  if  a 
smaller  squadron  were  dispatched  from  the  Atlan- 
tic round  Cape  Horn,  it  would  arrive  in  the  Philip- 
pines too  late  to  be  of  assistance  to  Dewey.  The 
two  monitors  on  the  Pacific  coast,  the  Monterey 


140  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

and  the  Monadnock,  had  already  been  ordered 
across  the  Pacific,  a  voyage  perilous  for  vessels  of 
their  structure  and  agonizing  to  their  crews;  but 
it  was  doubtful  whether  they  or  Camara  would 
arrive  first  in  the  Philippines. 

The  logic  of  the  situation  demanded  that  the 
main  American  fleet  be  released.  Cervera  must  be 
destroyed  or  held  in  some  other  way  than  at  the 
expense  of  inactivity  on  the  part  of  the  American 
warships.  Santiago  could  not  be  forced  by  the 
navy.  Two  methods  remained.  The  first  and 
simpler  expedient  was  to  make  the  harbor  mouth 
impassable  and  in  this  way  to  bottle  up  the  Spanish 
fleet.  It  was  decided  to  sink  the  collier  Merrimac 
at  a  narrow  point  in  the  channel,  where,  lying  full 
length,  she  would  completely  prevent  egress.  It 
was  a  delicate  task  and  one  of  extraordinary  dan- 
ger. It  was  characteristic  of  the  spirit  of  the  fleet 
that,  as  Admiral  Chad  wick  says,  practically  all 
the  men  were  volunteers.  The  honor  of  the  com- 
mand was  given  to  Lieutenant  Richmond  Pearson 
Hobson,  Assistant  Naval  Constructor,  who  had 
been  in  charge  of  the  preparations.  With  a  crew 
of  six  men  he  entered  the  harbor  mouth  on  the 
night  of  the  3d  of  June.  A  shell  disabled  the 
steering  gear  of  the  Merrimac,  and  the  ship  sank 


THE  BLOCKADE  OF  CUBA  141 

too  far  within  the  harbor  to  block  the  entrance  en- 
tirely. Admiral  Cervera  himself  rescued  the  crew, 
assured  Sampson  of  their  safety  in  an  appreciative 
note;  and  one  of  the  best  designed  and  most  heroic 
episodes  in  our  history  just  missed  success. 

The  failure  of  the  Merrimac  experiment  left  the 
situation  as  it  had  been  and  forced  the  American 
command  to  consider  the  second  method  which 
would  release  the  American  fleet.  This  new  plan 
contemplated  the  reduction  of  Santiago  by  a  com- 
bined military  and  naval  attack.  Cervera's  choice 
of  Santiago  therefore  practically  determined  the 
direction  of  the  first  American  overseas  military 
expedition,  which  had  been  in  preparation  since  the 
war  began. 


CHAPTER  X 

THE   PREPARATION   OF   THE   ARMY 

WHEN  one  compares  the  conditions  under  which 
the  Spanish  American  War  was  fought  with  those 
of  the  Great  War,  he  feels  himself  living  in  a  dif- 
ferent age.  Twenty  years  ago  hysteria  and  sud- 
den panics  swept  the  nation.  Cheers  and  waving 
handkerchiefs  and  laughing  girls  sped  the  troops  on 
their  way.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  the  most  pop- 
ular song  of  the  war  time  was  There'll  be  a  hot  time 
in  the  old  town  to-night9  though  it  may  be  believed 
that  the  energy  and  swing  of  the  music  rather  than 
the  words  made  it  so.  The  atmosphere  of  the  coun- 
try was  one  of  a  great  national  picnic  where  each 
one  was  expected  to  carry  his  own  lunch.  There 
was  apparent  none  of  the  concentration  of  effort 
and  of  the  calm  foresight  so  necessary  for  efficiency 
in  modern  warfare.  For  youth  the  Spanish  Ameri- 
can War  was  a  great  adventure;  for  the  nation  it 
was  a  diversion  sanctioned  by  a  high  purpose. 

142 


THE  PREPARATION  OF  THE  ARMY     143 

This  abandon  was  doubtless  in  part  due  to  a 
comfortable  consciousness  of  the  vast  disparity  in 
resources  between  Spain  and  the  United  States, 
which,  it  was  supposed,  meant  automatically  a 
corresponding  difference  in  fighting  strength.  The 
United  States  did,  indeed,  have  vast  superiorities 
which  rendered  unnecessary  any  worry  over  many 
of  the  essentials  which  gripped  the  popular  mind 
during  the  Great  War.  People  believed  that  the 
country  could  supply  the  munitions  needed,  and 
that  of  facilities  for  transport  it  had  enough.  If 
the  United  States  did  not  have  at  hand  exactly  the 
munitions  needed,  if  the  transportation  system  had 
not  been  built  to  launch  an  army  into  Cuba,  it  was 
popularly  supposed  that  the  wealth  of  the  country 
rendered  such  trifles  negligible,  and  that,  if  in- 
sufficient attention  had  been  given  to  the  study  of 
such  matters  in  the  past,  American  ingenuity 
would  quickly  offset  the  lack  of  skilled  military 
experience.  The  fact  that  American  soldiers  trav- 
eled in  sleeping  cars  while  European  armies  were 
transported  in  freight  cars  blinded  Americans  for 
a  while  to  the  significant  fact  that  there  was  but 
a  single  track  leading  to  Tampa,  the  principal 
point  of  embarkation  for  Cuba;  and  no  one  thought 
of  building  another. 


144  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Nothing  so  strongly  marks  the  amateur  charac- 
ter of  the  conduct  of  the  Spanish  War  as  the  activ- 
ity of  the  American  press.  The  navy  was  dogged 
by  press  dispatch  boats  which  revealed  its  every 
move.  When  Admiral  Sampson  started  upon  his 
cruise  to  San  Juan,  he  requested  the  press  boats 
to  observe  secrecy,  and  Admiral  Chadwick  com- 
ments with  satisfaction  upon  the  fact  that  this 
request  was  observed  "fully  and  honorably  .  „  . 
by  every  person  except  one."  When  Lieutenant 
Whitney  risked  his  life  as  a  spy  in  order  to  investi- 
gate conditions  in  Porto  Rico,  his  plans  and  pur- 
pose were  blazoned  in  the  press.  Incredible  as  it 
may  now  seem,  the  newspaper  men  appear  to  have 
felt  themselves  part  of  the  army.  They  offered 
their  services  as  equals,  and  William  Randolph 
Hearst  even  ordered  one  of  his  staff  to  sink  a  vessel 
in  the  Suez  Canal  to  delay  Camara  on  his  expedi- 
tion against  Dewey.  This  order,  fortunately  for  the 
international  reputation  of  the  United  States,  was 
not  executed.  With  all  their  blare  and  childish  en- 
thusiasm, the  reporters  do  not  seem  to  have  been 
so  successful  in  revealing  to  Americans  the  plans  of 
Spain  as  they  were  in  furnishing  her  with  itemized 
accounts  of  all  the  doings  of  the  American  forces. 

While  the  press  not  only  revealed  but  formulated 


THE  PREPARATION  OF  THE  ARMY     145 

courses  of  action  in  the  case  of  the  army,  the  navy, 
at  least,  was  able  to  follow  its  own  plans.  For  this 
difference  there  were  several  causes,  chief  of  which 
was  the  fact  that  the  navy  was  a  fully  professional 
arm,  ready  for  action  both  in  equipment  and  in 
plans,  and  able  to  take  a  prompt  initiative  in  carry- 
ing out  an  aggressive  campaign.  The  War  Depart- 
ment had  a  more  difficult  task  in  adjusting  itself  to 
the  new  conditions  brought  about  by  the  Spanish 
American  War.  The  army  was  made  up  on  the 
principle  traditionally  held  in  the  United  States 
that  the  available  army  force  in  time  of  peace 
should  be  just  sufficient  for  the  purposes  of  peace, 
and  that  it  should  be  enlarged  in  time  of  war.  To 
allow  a  fair  amount  of  expansion  without  too  much 
disturbance  to  the  organization  in  increasing  to 
war  strength,  the  regular  army  was  overofficered  in 
peace  times.  The  chief  reliance  in  war  was  placed 
upon  the  militia.  The  organization  and  training 
of  this  force  was  left,  however,  under  a  few  very 
general  directions,  to  the  various  States.  As  a  re- 
sult, its  quality  varied  and  it  was  nowhere  highly 
efficient  in  the  military  sense.  Some  regiments,  it 
is  true,  were  impressive  on  parade,  but  almost  none 
of  the  officers  knew  anything  of  actual  modern 
warfare.  There  had  been  no  preliminary  sifting 


146  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

of  ability  in  the  army,  and  it  was  only  as  experi- 
ence gave  the  test  that  the  capable  and  informed 
were  called  into  positions  of  importance.  In  fact, 
the  training  of  the  regular  officers  was  inferior  to 
that  of  the  naval  officers.  West  Point  and  Anna- 
polis were  both  excellent  in  the  quality  of  their 
instruction,  but  what  they  offered  amounted  only 
to  a  college  course,  and  in  the  army  there  was  no 
provision  for  systematic  graduate  study  corre- 
sponding to  the  Naval  War  College  at  Newport. 

These  difficulties  and  deficiencies,  however,  can- 
not fully  explain  the  woeful  inferiority  of  the  army 
to  the  navy  in  preparedness.  Fundamentally  the 
defect  was  at  the  top.  Russell  A.  Alger,  the  Secre- 
tary of  War,  was  a  veteran  of  the  Civil  War  and  a 
silver- voiced  orator,  but  his  book  on  the  Spanish- 
American  War,  which  was  intended  as  a  vindica- 
tion of  his  record,  proves  that  even  eighteen 
months  of  as  grueling  denunciation  as  any  Amer- 
ican official  has  ever  received  could  not  enlighten 
him  as  to  what  were  the  functions  of  his  office. 
Nor  did  he  correct  or  supplement  his  own  incom- 
petence by  seeking  professional  advice.  There 
existed  no  general  staff,  and  it  did  not  occur  to 
him,  as  it  did  to  Secretary  Long,  to  create  one  to 
advise  him  unofficially.  He  was  on  bad  terms 


THE  PREPARATION  OF  THE  ARMY    14? 

with  Major  General  Nelson  A.  Miles,  who  was  the 
general  in  command.  He  discussed  even  the  de- 
tails of  questions  of  army  strategy,  not  only  with 
Miles  but  with  the  President  and  members  of  the 
Cabinet.  One  of  the  most  extraordinary  decisions 
made  during  his  tenure  of  office  was  that  the  act  of 
the  9th  of  March,  appropriating  $50,000,000  "for 
national  defense,"  forbade  money  to  be  spent  or 
even  contracts  to  be  made  by  the  quartermaster,  the 
commissary,  or  the  surgeon  general.  In  his  book 
Secretary  Alger  records  with  pride  the  fact  that  all 
this  money  was  spent  for  coast  defense.  In  view 
of  the  fact  that  the  navy  did  its  task,  this  expendi- 
ture was  absolutely  unnecessary  and  served  merely 
to  solace  coast  cities  and  munition  makers. 

The  regular  army  on  April  1,  1898,  consisted  of 
28,183  officers  and  men.  An  act  of  the  26th  of 
April  authorized  its  increase  to  about  double  that 
size.  As  enlistment  was  fairly  prompt,  by  August 
the  army  consisted  of  56,365  officers  and  men,  the 
number  of  officers  being  but  slightly  increased.  It 
was  decided  not  to  use  the  militia  as  it  was  then  or- 
ganized, but  to  rely  for  numbers  as  usual  chiefly 
upon  a  volunteer  army,  authorized  by  the  Act  of 
the  22d  of  April,  and  by  subsequent  acts  raised  to 
a  total  of  200,000,  with  an  additional  3000  cavalry, 


148  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

3500  engineers,  and  10,000  "immunes, "  or  men  sup- 
posed not  to  be  liable  to  tropical  diseases.  The  war 
seemed  equally  popular  all  over  the  country,  and  the 
million  who  offered  themselves  for  service  were  suffi- 
cient to  allow  due  consideration  for  equitable  state 
quotas  and  for  physical  fitness.  There  were  also 
sufficient  Krag-Jorgensen  rifles  to  arm  the  increased 
regular  army  and  Springfields  for  the  volunteers. 

To  provide  an  adequate  number  of  officers  for  the 
volunteer  army  was  more  difficult.  Even  though 
a  considerable  number  were  transferred  from  the 
regular  to  the  volunteer  army,  they  constituted 
only  a  small  proportion  of  the  whole  number  neces- 
sary. Some  few  of  those  appointed  were  graduates 
of  West  Point,  and  more  had  been  in  the  militia. 
The  great  majority,  however,  had  purely  amateur 
experience,  and  many  not  even  so  much.  Those 
who  did  know  something,  moreover,  did  not  have 
the  same  knowledge  or  experience.  This  raw  ma- 
terial was  given  no  officer  training  whatsoever  but 
was  turned  directly  to  the  task  of  training  the  rank 
and  file.  Nor  were  the  appointments  of  new 
officers  confined  to  the  lower  ranks.  The  country, 
still  mindful  of  its  earlier  wars,  was  charmed  with 
the  sentimental  elevation  of  confederate  generals 
to  the  rank  of  major  general  in  the  new  army, 


THE  PREPARATION  OF  THE  ARMY    149 

though  a  public  better  informed  would  hardly  have 
welcomed  for  service  in  the  tropics  the  selection  of 
men  old  enough  to  be  generals  in  1865  and  then  for 
thirty-three  years  without  military  experience  in  an 
age  of  great  development  in  the  methods  of  warfare. 
The  other  commanding  officers  were  as  old  and 
were  mostly  chosen  by  seniority  in  a  service  retir- 
ing at  sixty-four.  The  unwonted  strain  of  active 
service  naturally  proved  too  great.  At  the  most 
critical  moment  of  the  campaign  in  Cuba,  the  com- 
manding general,  William  R.  Shafter,  had  eaten 
nothing  for  four  days,  and  his  plucky  second  in 
command,  the  wiry  Georgian  cavalry  leader  of 
1864  and  1865,  General  "Joe"  Wheeler,  was  not 
physically  fit  to  succeed  him.  There  is  not  the 
least  doubt  that  the  fighting  spirit  of  the  men  was 
strong  and  did  not  fail,  but  the  defect  in  those 
branches  of  knowledge  which  are  required  to  keep 
an  army  fit  to  fight  is  equally  certain.  The  prima- 
ry cause  for  the  melting  of  the  American  army  by 
disease  must  be  acknowledged  to  be  the  insufficient 
training  of  the  officers. 

This  hit  or  miss  method,  however,  had  its  com- 
pensations, for  it  brought  about  some  appoint- 
ments of  unusual  merit.  Conspicuous  were  those 
of  Colonel  Leonard  Wood  and  Lieutenant  Colonel 


150  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Theodore  Roosevelt.  The  latter  had  resigned  as 
Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  a  position  in 
which  he  had  contributed  a  great  deal  to  the  effi- 
ciency of  that  Department,  in  order  to  take  a  more 
tangible  part  in  the  war.  After  raising  among  his 
friends  and  the  cowboys  of  the  West  a  regiment  of 
"Rough  Riders, "  he  declined  its  command  on  plea 
of  military  inexperience.  Roosevelt  made  one  of 
those  happy  choices  which  are  a  mark  of  his  ad- 
ministrative ability  in  selecting  as  colonel  Leonard 
Wood,  an  army  surgeon  whose  quality  he  knew 
through  common  experiences  in  the  West. 

To  send  into  a  midsummer  tropical  jungle  an 
American  army,  untrained  to  take  care  of  its  health, 
for  the  most  part  clothed  in  the  regulation  army 
woolens,  and  tumbled  together  in  two  months,  was 
an  undertaking  which  could  be  justified  only  on  the 
ground  that  the  national  safety  demanded  imme- 
diate action.  In  1898,  however,  it  seemed  to  be 
universally  taken  for  granted  by  people  and  ad- 
ministration, by  professional  soldier  as  well  as  by 
public  sentiment,  that  the  army  must  invade  Cuba 
without  regard  to  its  fitness  for  such  active  service. 
The  responsibility  for  this  decision  must  rest  upon 
the  na ti  on .  The  experience  of  centuries  had  proved 
conspicuously  that  climate  was  the  strongest  defense 


THE  PREPARATION  OF  THE  ARMY    151 

of  the  Caribbean  islands  against  invasion,  and  it 
was  in  large  measure  the  very  sacrifice  of  so  many 
American  soldiers  that  induced  the  study  of  trop- 
ical diseases.  In  1898  it  could  hardly  be  expected 
that  the  American  command,  inexperienced  and 
eager  for  action,  should  have  recognized  the  mos- 
quito as  the  carrier  of  yellow  fever  and  the  real 
enemy,  or  should  have  realized  the  necessity  of 
protecting  the  soldiers  by  inoculation  against 
typhoid  fever. 

Fixed  as  was  the  determination  to  send  an  army 
into  Cuba  at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  there 
had  been  a  wide  diversity  of  opinion  as  to  what 
should  be  the  particular  objective.  General  Miles 
wavered  between  the  choice  of  the  island  of  Porto 
Rico  and  Puerto  Principe,  a  city  in  the  interior  and 
somewhat  east  of  the  middle  of  Cuba;  the  Depart- 
ment hesitated  between  Tunas  on  the  south  coast  of 
Cuba,  within  touch  of  the  insurgents,  and  Mariel 
on  the  north,  the  seizure  of  which  would  be  the 
first  step  in  a  siege  of  Havana.  The  situation  at 
Santiago,  however,  made  that  city  the  logical  ob- 
jectiveof  the  troops,  and  on  the  3 1st  of  May,  General 
Shafter  was  ordered  to  be  prepared  to  move.  On 
the  7th  of  June  he  was  ordered  to  sail  with  "not 
less  than  10,000  men,"  but  an  alarming,  though 


152  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

unfounded,  rumor  of  a  Spanish  squadron  off  the 
north  coast  of  Cuba  delayed  the  expedition  until 
the  14th.  With  an  army  of  seventeen  thousand  on 
thirty-two  transports,  and  accompanied  by  eighty- 
nine  newspaper  correspondents,  Shafter  arrived  on 
the  20th  of  June  off  Santiago. 

The  Spanish  troops  in  Cuba  —  the  American 
control  of  the  sea  made  it  unnecessary  to  consider 
those  available  in  Spain  —  amounted,  according  to 
returns  in  April,  1898,  to  196,820.  This  formidable 
number,  however,  was  not  available  at  any  one 
strategic  spot  owing  to  the  difficulty  of  transport- 
ing either  troops  or  supplies,  particularly  at  the 
eastern  end  of  the  island,  in  the  neighborhood 
of  Santiago.  It  was  estimated  that  the  number 
of  men  of  use  about  Santiago  was  about  12,000, 
with  5000  approaching  to  assist.  Perhaps  3000 
insurgents  were  at  hand  under  General  Garcia. 
The  number  sent,  then,  was  not  inadequate  to  the 
task.  Equal  numbers  are  not,  indeed,  ordinarily 
considered  sufficient  for  an  offensive  campaign 
against  fortifications,  but  the  American  command- 
ers counted  upon  a  difference  in  morale  between 
the  two  armies,  which  was  justified  by  results.  Be- 
sides the  American  Army  could  be  reinforced  as 
necessity  arose. 


CHAPTER   XI 

THE    CAMPAIGN    OF    SANTIAGO    DE    CUBA 

IN  planning  the  campaign  against  Santiago,  Ad- 
miral Sampson  wished  the  army  immediately  to 
assault  the  defenses  at  the  harbor  mouth  in  order 
to  open  the  way  for  the  navy.  General  Shafter, 
however,  after  conferring  with  General  Garcia,  the 
commander  of  the  insurgents,  decided  to  march 
overland  against  the  city.  The  army  did  not  have 
sufficient  small  vessels  to  effect  a  landing;  but  the 
navy  came  to  its  assistance,  and  on  the  22d  of 
June  the  first  American  troops  began  to  disembark 
at  Daiquiri,  though  it  was  not  until  the  26th  that 
the  entire  expedition  was  on  shore.  On  the  second 
day  Siboney,  which  had  a  better  anchorage  and  was 
some  six  miles  closer  to  Santiago,  was  made  the 
base.  From  Siboney  there  stretched  for  eight  or 
ten  miles  a  rolling  country  covered  with  heavy 
jungle  brush  and  crossed  by  mere  threads  of  roads. 
There  was  indeed  a  railroad,  but  this  followed 

153 


154  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

a  roundabout  route  by  the  coast.  Through  this 
novel  and  extremely  uncomfortable  country,  in- 
fected with  mosquitoes,  the  troops  pressed,  eager 
to  meet  the  enemy. 

The  first  engagement  took  place  at  Las  Guasi- 
mas,  on  the  24th  of  June.  Here  a  force  of  about  a 
thousand  dismounted  cavalry,  partly  regulars  and 
partly  Rough  Riders,  defeated  nearly  twice  their 
number  of  Spaniards.  This  was  the  only  serious 
resistance  which  the  Americans  encountered  until 
they  reached  the  advanced  defenses  of  Santiago. 
The  next  week  they  spent  in  getting  supplies 
ashore,  improving  the  roads,  and  reconnoitering. 
The  newspapers  considered  this  interval  entirely  too 
long !  The  30th  of  June  found  the  Americans  con- 
fronting the  main  body  of  Spaniards  in  position, 
and  on  the  1st  of  July,  the  two  armies  joined  battle. 

Between  the  opposing  forces  was  the  little  river 
San  Juan  and  its  tributaries.  The  Spanish  left 
wing  was  at  El  Caney,  supported  by  a  stone  block- 
house, rifle  pits,  and  barbed  wire,  but  with  no  ar- 
tillery. About  four  miles  away  was  San  Juan  Hill, 
with  more  formidable  works  straddling  the  main 
road  which  led  to  Santiago.  Opposite  El  Caney,  Gen- 
eral Lawton  was  in  command  of  about  seven  thou- 
sand Americans.  The  fight  here  began  at  half -past 


CAMPAIGN  OF  SANTIAGO  DE  CUBA    155 

six  in  the  morning,  but  the  American  artillery  was 
placed  at  too  great  a  distance  to  be  very  effective. 
The  result  was  a  long  and  galling  exchange  of  rifle 
firing,  which  is  apt  to  prove  trying  to  raw  troops. 
The  infantry,  however,  advanced  with  persistency 
and  showed  marked  personal  initiative  as  they 
pushed  forward  under  such  protection  as  the  brush 
and  grass  afforded  until  they  finally  rushed  a  posi- 
tion which  gave  opportunity  to  the  artillery.  After 
this  they  speedily  captured  the  blockhouse. 

The  fight  lasted  over  eight  hours  instead  of  two, 
as  had  been  expected,  and  thus  delayed  General 
Lawton,  who  was  looked  for  at  San  Juan  by  the 
American  left.  The  losses,  too,  were  heavy,  the 
total  casualties  amounting  to  seven  per  cent  of 
the  force  engaged.  The  Americans,  however,  had 
gained  the  position,  and  after  a  battle  which  had 
been  long  and  serious  enough  to  test  thoroughly  the 
quality  of  the  personnel  of  the  army.  Whatever 
deficiencies  the  Americans  may  have  had  in  organ- 
ization, training,  and  military  education,  they 
undoubtedly  possessed  fighting  spirit,  courage,  and 
personal  ingenuity,  and  these  are,  after  all,  the 
qualities  for  which  builders  of  armies  look. 

The  battle  of  El  Caney  was  perhaps  unnecessary, 
for  the  position  lay  outside  the  main  Spanish  line 


156  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

and  would  probably  have  been  abandoned  when 
San  Juan  fell.  For  that  more  critical  movement 
General  Shafter  kept  about  eight  thousand  troops 
and  the  personal  command.  Both  he  and  General 
Wheeler,  however,  were  suffering  from  the  climate 
and  were  unable  to  be  with  the  troops.  The  prob- 
lem of  making  a  concerted  advance  through  the 
thick  underbrush  was  a  difficult  one,  and  the  dispo- 
sition of  the  American  troops  was  at  once  revealed 
by  a  battery  of  artillery  which  used  black  powder, 
and  by  a  captive  balloon  which  was  injudiciously 
towed  about. 

The  right  wing  here,  after  assuming  an  exposed 
position,  was  unable  to  act,  as  Lawton,  by  whom  it 
was  expecting  to  be  reinforced,  was  delayed  at  El 
Caney.  The  advance  regiments  were  under  the 
fire  of  the  artillery,  the  infantry,  and  the  skillful 
sharpshooters  of  an  invisible  enemy  and  were  also 
exposed  to  the  fierce  heat  of  the  sun,  to  which  they 
were  unaccustomed.  The  wounded  were  carried 
back  on  litters,  turned  over  to  the  surgeons,  who 
worked  manfully  with  the  scantiest  of  equipment, 
and  were  then  laid,  often  naked  except  for  their 
bandages,  upon  the  damp  ground.  Regiment 
blocked  regiment  in  the  narrow  road,  and  officers 
carrying  orders  were  again  and  again  struck,  as 


CAMPAIGN  OF  SANTIAGO  DE  CUBA      157 

they  emerged  from  cover,  by  the  sharpshooters'  fire. 
The  want  of  means  of  communication  paralyzed 
the  command,  for  all  the  equipment  of  a  modern 
army  was  lacking:  there  were  no  aeroplanes,  no 
wireless  stations,  no  telephones. 

Throughout  the  morning  the  situation  grew 
worse,  but  the  nerve  of  the  men  did  not  give 
way,  and  American  individual  initiative  rose  to  the 
boiling  point.  Realizing  that  safety  lay  only  in 
advance,  the  officers  on  the  spot  began  to  take 
control.  General  Hawkins,  with  the  Sixth  and 
Sixteenth  Regulars,  advanced  against  the  main 
blockhouse,  which  crested  a  slope  of  two  hundred 
feet,  and  the  men  of  the  Seventy-first  New  York 
Volunteers  joined  promiscuously  in  the  charge. 

To  the  right  rose  Kettle  Hill,  jutting  out  and 
flanking  the  approach  to  the  main  position.  Fac- 
ing it  and  dismounted  were  the  First  and  Ninth 
Regular  Cavalry,  the  latter  a  negro  regiment, 
and  the  Rough  Riders  under  Colonel  Roosevelt. 
The  Tenth  Infantry  was  between  the  two  wings* 
and  divided  in  the  support  of  both.  A  battery 
of  Gatling  guns  was  placed  in  position.  The 
Americans  steadily  advanced  in  an  irregular  line, 
though  kept  in  some  sort  of  formation  by  their 
officers.  Breaking  down  brush  and  barbed  wire 


158  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

and  sheltering  themselves  in  the  high  grass,  the  men 
on  the  right  wing  worked  their  way  up  Kettle  Hill, 
but  before  they  reached  the  rifle  pits  of  the  enemy, 
they  saw  the  Spaniards  retreating  on  the  run.  The 
audacity  of  the  Americans  at  the  critical  moment 
had  insured  the  ultimate  success  of  their  attack  and 
they  found  the  final  capture  of  the  hill  easy. 

The  longer  charge  against  the  center  of  the 
enemy  was  in  the  meantime  being  pressed  home, 
under  the  gallant  leadership  of  General  Hawkins, 
who  at  times  was  far  in  advance  of  his  line.  The 
men  of  the  right  wing  who  looked  down  from  their 
new  position  on  Kettle  Hill,  a  quarter  of  a  mile  dis- 
tant, saw  the  Spaniards  give  way  and  the  American 
center  dash  forward.  In  order  to  support  this 
advance  movement,  the  Gatlings  were  brought  to 
Kettle  Hill,  and  General  S.  S.  Sumner  and  Colonel 
Roosevelt  led  their  men  down  Kettle  and  up  San 
Juan  Hill,  where  they  swept  over  the  northern 
jut  only  a  moment  after  Hawkins  had  carried  the 
main  blockhouse. 

The  San  Juan  position  now  in  the  hands  of  the 
Americans  was  the  key  of  Santiago,  but  that  in- 
trenched city  lay  a  mile  and  a  quarter  distant  and 
had  still  to  be  unlocked  —  a  task  which  presented 
no  little  difficulty.  The  Americans,  it  is  true,  had 


CAMPAIGN  OF  SANTIAGO  DE  CUBA     159 

an  advantageous  position  on  a  hilltop,  but  the 
enemy  had  retired  only  a  quarter  of  a  mile  and  were 
supported  by  the  complete  system  of  fortifications 
which  protected  Santiago.  The  American  losses 
totaled  fifteen  hundred,  a  number  just  about  made 
good  at  this  moment  by  the  arrival  of  General 
Duffield's  brigade,  which  had  followed  the  main 
expedition.  The  number  of  the  Spanish  force, 
which  was  unknown  to  the  Americans,  was  in- 
creased on  the  3d  of  July  by  the  arrival  of  a  relief 
expedition  under  Colonel  Escario,  with  about  four 
thousand  men  whom  the  insurgent  forces  had  failed 
to  meet  and  block,  as  had  been  planned. 

On  the  2d  of  July  there  was  desultory  fighting, 
and  on  the  3d,  General  Shafter  telegraphed  to  the 
Secretary  of  War  that  he  was  considering  the  with- 
drawal of  his  troops  to  a  strong  position,  about  five 
miles  in  the  rear.  The  Secretary  immediately  re- 
plied: "Of  course  you  can  judge  the  situation  bet- 
ter than  we  can  at  this  end  of  the  line.  If,  however, 
you  could  hold  your  present  position,  especially  San 
Juan  Heights,  the  effect  upon  the  country  would 
be  much  better  than  falling  back. " 

The  Spanish  commanders,  however,  did  not 
share  General  Shafter's  view  as  to  the  danger  in- 
volving the  Americans.  Both  Admiral  Cervera 


160  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

and  General  Blanco  considered  that  the  joint  oper- 
ations of  the  American  Army  and  Navy  had  ren- 
dered the  reduction  of  Santiago  only  a  question  of 
time,  but  they  differed  as  to  the  course  to  be  pur- 
sued. In  the  end,  General  Blanco,  who  was  in 
supreme  command,  decided,  after  an  exchange  of 
views  with  the  Spanish  Government  and  a  con- 
sultation with  the  Captain  of  the  German  cruiser 
Geier,  then  at  Havana,  to  order  the  Spanish  squad- 
ron to  attempt  an  escape  from  Santiago  harbor. 
Cervera's  sailors  had  hitherto  been  employed  in 
the  defense  of  the  city,  but  with  the  arrival  of  the 
reinforcements  under  Escario  he  found  it  possible 
to  reman  his  fleet.  AJI  attempt  to  escape  in  the 
dark  seemed  impossible  because  of  the  unremitting 
glare  of  the  searchlights  of  the  American  vessels. 
Cervera  determined  upon  the  desperate  expedient 
of  steaming  out  in  broad  daylight  and  making 
for  Cienfuegos. 

The  blockade  systematically  planned  by  Ad- 
miral Sampson  was  conducted  with  a  high  degree 
of  efficiency.  Each  American  ship  had  its  definite 
place  and  its  particular  duty.  When  vessels  were 
obliged  to  coal  at  Guantanamo,  forty  miles  distant, 
the  next  in  line  covered  the  cruising  interval.  The 
American  combined  squadron  was  about  double 


CAMPAIGN  OF  SANTIAGO  DE  CUBA    161 

Cervera's  in  strength;  his  ships,  however,  were  sup- 
posed to  have  the  advantage  in  speed,  and  it  was 
conceivable  that,  by  turning  sharply  to  the  one  side 
or  the  other,  they  might  elude  the  blockading  force. 
On  the  very  day  that  Cervera  made  his  desperate 
dash  out  of  the  harbor,  as  it  happened,  the  New 
York,  Admiral  Sampson's  flagship,  was  out  of  line, 
taking  the  Admiral  to  a  conference  with  General 
Shafter  at  Siboney,  a  few  miles  to  the  eastward. 
The  absence  of  the  flagship,  however,  in  no  way 
weakened  the  blockade,  for,  if  Cervera  turned  west- 
ward he  would  find  the  squadron  of  Schley  and 
the  other  vessels  designated  to  prevent  his  escape 
in  that  direction,  while  if  he  turned  eastward  he 
would  almost  at  once  be  engaged  with  the  New 
York,  which  would  then  be  in  an  advantageous 
position  ahead  of  the  chase. 

At  half-past  nine  on  the  morning  of  the  3d  of 
July,  the  first  vessel  of  the  Spanish  fleet  emerged 
from  Santiago  Harbor.  By  10:10  A.M.  all  the 
Spanish  ships  were  outside  of  the  harbor  mouth. 
Commodore  Schley,  on  the  Brooklyn,  hoisted  the 
signal  to  "close  up,"  apparently  on  the  under- 
standing that  Sampson's  signal  on  leaving  for 
Siboney  to  "Disregard  motions  of  the  command- 
er-in-chief "  had  delegated  the  command  to  hinu 


162  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Though  this  question  of  command  later  involved 
a  bitter  dispute,  it  was  at  the  time  of  little  moment, 
for  clouds  of  smoke  obscured  the  signals  so  fre- 
quently that  no  complicated  maneuver  could  have 
been  guided  by  them,  and,  as  far  as  concerted  ac- 
tion was  concerned,  the  whole  squadron  was  under 
exactly  similar  contingent  orders  from  Admiral 
Sampson.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  thing  to  do  was 
so  obvious  that  the  subsequent  dispute  really  raged 
on  the  point  of  who  actually  gave  an  order,  the 
sense  of  which  every  one  of  the  commanders  would 
have  executed  without  order.  If,  therefore,  the 
layman  feels  some  annoyance  at  such  a  controversy 
over  naval  red  tape,  he  may  have  the  consolation 
of  knowing  that  all  concerned,  admirals  and  cap- 
tains, did  the  right  and  sensible  thing  at  the  time. 
If  there  be  an  exception,  it  was  the  curious  ma- 
neuver of  Schley,  the  commander  of  the  Brooklyn, 
who  turned  a  complete  circle  away  from  the  enemy 
after  the  battle  had  begun.  This  action  of  his 
was  certainly  not  due  to  a  desire  to  escape,  for  the 
Brooklyn  quickly  turned  again  into  the  fight.  A  con- 
troversy, too,  has  raged  over  this  maneuver.  Was 
it  undertaken  because  the  Brooklyn  was  about  to 
be  rammed  by  the  Vizcaya,  or  because  Schley 
thought  that  his  position  blocked  the  fire  of  the 


CAMPAIGN  OF  SANTIAGO  DE  CUBA     163 

other  American  vessels?  It  is  not  unlikely  that 
the  commander  of  the  Spanish  ship  hoped  to  ram 
the  Brooklyn,  which  was,  because  of  her  speed,  a 
most  redoubtable  foe.  But  unless  this  maneuver 
saved  the  Brooklyn,  it  had  little  result  except  to 
scare  the  Texas,  upon  whom  she  suddenly  bore 
down  out  of  a  dense  cloud  of  smoke. 

Steering  westward,  the  Spanish  ships  attempted 
to  pass  the  battle  line,  but  the  American  vessels  kept 
pace  with  them.  For  a  short  time  the  engagement 
was  very  severe,  for  practically  all  vessels  of  both 
fleets  took  part,  and  the  Spanish  harbor  batteries 
added  their  fire.  At  10:15  A.M.  the  Maria  Teresa, 
Admiral  Cervera's  flagship,  on  fire  and  badly  shat- 
tered by  heavy  shells,  turned  toward  thebeach.  Five 
minutes  later  the  Oquendo,  after  something  of  a  duel 
with  the  Texas,  also  turned  inshore.  The  Brooklyn 
was  in  the  lead  of  the  Americans,  closely  followed 
by  the  Oregon,  which  developed  a  wonderful  burst 
of  speed  in  excess  of  that  called  for  in  her  contract. 
These  two  ships  kept  up  the  chase  of  the  Vizcaya 
and  the  Cristobal  Colon,  while  the  slower  vessels  of 
the  fleet  attended  to  the  two  Spanish  destroyers, 
Furor  and  Pluton.  At  11 :15  A.M.  the  Vizcaya,  rid- 
dled by  fire  from  the  Brooklyn  and  Oregon,  gave  up 
the  fight. 


164  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

By  this  time,  Sampson  in  the  New  York  was  rap- 
idly approaching  the  fight,  and  now  ordered  the 
majority  of  the  vessels  back  to  their  stations.  The 
Colon,  fleeing  westward  and  far  ahead  of  the  Amer- 
ican ships,  was  pursued  by  the  Brooklyn,  the  Oregon, 
the  Texas,  the  New  York,  and  the  armed  yacht 
Vixen.  It  was  a  stern  chase,  although  the  Amer- 
ican vessels  had  some  advantage  by  cutting  across 
a  slight  concave  indentation  of  the  coast,  while  the 
Colon  steamed  close  inshore.  At  1 :15  P.M.  a  shot 
from  the  Oregon  struck  ahead  of  the  Colon,  and  it 
was  evident  that  she  was  covered  by  the  American 
guns.  At  1 :30  P.M.  she  gave  over  her  flight  and 
made  for  shore  some  forty-five  miles  west  of  San- 
tiago. The  victory  was  won.  It  has  often  been 
the  good  fortune  of  Americans  to  secure  their  great- 
est victories  on  patriotic  anniversaries  and  there- 
by to  enhance  the  psychological  effect.  Admiral 
Sampson  was  able  to  announce  to  the  American 
people,  as  a  Fourth  of  July  present,  the  destruction 
of  the  Spanish  fleet  with  the  loss  of  but  one  of  his 
men  and  but  slight  damage  to  his  ships. 

On  the  hills  above  Santiago  the  American  Army 
had  now  only  the  land  forces  of  the  Spaniards  to 
contend  with.  Shafter's  demand  for  unconditional 
surrender  met  with  a  refusal,  and  there  ensued  a 


CAMPAIGN  OF  SANTIAGO  DE  CUBA     165 

week  of  military  quiet.  During  this  time  Gen- 
eral Shafter  conducted  a  correspondence  with  the 
War  Department,  in  judging  which  it  is  charita- 
ble to  remember  that  the  American  commander 
weighed  three  hundred  pounds,  that  he  was  swel- 
tering under  a  hot  sun,  and  that  he  was  sixty- 
three  years  old,  and  sick.  Too  humane  to  bom- 
bard Santiago  while  Hobson  and  his  men  were  still 
in  Spanish  hands,  he  could  not  forgive  Sampson 
for  not  having  forced  the  narrow  and  well-mined 
channel  at  the  risk  of  his  fleet.  The  War  Depart- 
ment, sharing  Shafter 's  indignation,  prepared  to 
attempt  the  entrance  with  one  of  its  own  transports 
protected  by  baled  hay,  as  had  been  done  on  the 
Mississippi  during  the  Civil  War.  Shafter  con- 
tinued to  be  alarmed  at  the  situation.  Without 
reinforcements  he  could  not  attack,  and  he  pro- 
posed to  allow  the  Spaniards  to  evacuate.  The 
War  Department  forbade  this  alternative  and, 
on  the  10th  of  July,  he  began  the  bombardment 
of  Santiago. 

The  Secretary  of  War  then  hit  upon  the  really 
happy  though  quite  unmilitary  device  of  offering, 
in  return  for  unconditional  surrender,  to  transport 
the  Spanish  troops,  at  once  and  without  parole, 
back  to  their  own  country.  Secretary  Alger  was 


166  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

no  unskillful  politician,  and  lie  was  right  in  believ- 
ing that  this  device,  though  unconventional,  would 
make  a  strong  appeal  to  an  army  three  years  away 
from  home  and  with  dwindling  hopes  of  ever  seeing 
Spain  again.  On  the  15th  of  July  a  capitulation 
was  agreed  upon,  and  the  terms  of  surrender  in- 
cluded not  only  the  troops  in  Santiago  but  all  those 
in  that  military  district  —  about  twenty-four  thou- 
sand men,  with  cannon,  rifles,  ammunition,  rations, 
and  other  military  supplies.  Shafter's  recommen- 
dation that  the  troops  be  allowed  to  carry  their 
arms  back  to  Spain  with  them  was  properly  re- 
fused by  the  War  Department.  Arrangements 
were  made  for  Spanish  ships  paid  by  the  United 
States  to  take  the  men  immediately  to  Spain.  This 
extraordinary  operation  was  begun  on  the  8th  of 
August,  while  the  war  was  still  in  progress,  and  was 
accomplished  before  peace  was  established. 

The  Santiago  campaign,  like  the  Mexican  War, 
was  fought  chiefly  by  regulars.  The  Rough  Riders 
and  the  Seventy-first  New  York  Regiment  were 
the  only  volunteer  units  to  take  a  heavy  share. 
Yet  the  absence  of  effective  staff  management  was 
so  marked  that,  as  compared  with  the  professional 
accuracy  shown  by  the  navy,  the  whole  campaign  on 
land  appears  as  an  amateur  undertaking.  But  the 


CAMPAIGN  OF  SANTIAGO  DE  CUBA     167 

individual  character  of  both  volunteers  and  regu- 
lars was  high.  The  American  victory  was  funda- 
mentally due  to  the  fighting  spirit  of  the  men  and  to 
the  individual  initiative  of  the  line  and  field  officers. 
In  the  meantime  the  health  of  the  American 
Army  was  causing  grave  concern  to  its  more  ob- 
servant leaders.  Six  weeks  of  Cuban  climate  had 
taken  out  of  the  army  all  that  exuberant  energy 
which  it  had  brought  with  it  from  the  north.  The 
army  had  accomplished  its  purpose  only  at  the 
complete  sacrifice  of  its  fighting  strength.  Had 
the  Spanish  commander  possessed  more  nerve  and 
held  out  a  little  longer,  he  might  well  have  seen  his 
victorious  enemies  wither  before  his  eyes,  as  the 
British  had  before  Cartagena  in  1741.  On  the  3d 
of  August  a  large  number  of  the  officers  of  the  San- 
tiago army,  including  Generals  Wheeler,  Sumner, 
and  Lawton,  and  Colonel  Roosevelt,  addressed  a 
round  robin  to  General  Shafter  on  the  alarming 
condition  of  the  army.  Its  substance  is  indicated 
in  the  following  sentences:  "This  army  must  be 
moved  at  once  or  it  will  perish.  As  an  army  it  can 
be  safely  moved  now.  Persons  responsible  for  pre- 
venting such  a  move  will  be  responsible  for  the 
unnecessary  loss  of  many  thousands  of  lives."  Al- 
ready on  the  1st  of  August,  General  Shafter  had 


168  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

reported  4255  sick,  of  whom  3164  were  cases  of  yel- 
low fever,  that  deadly  curse  of  Cuba,  which  the 
lack  of  proper  quarantine  had  &o  often  allowed  to 
invade  the  shores  of  the  United  States.  On  the 
3d  of  August,  even  before  General  Shafter  had  re- 
ceived the  round  robin,  the  Secretary  of  War  au- 
thorized the  withdrawal  of  at  least  a  portion  of  the 
army,  which  was  to  be  replaced  by  supposedly  im- 
mune regiments.  By  the  middle  of  August,  the 
soldiers  began  to  arrive  at  Camp  Wikoff  at  Mon- 
tauk  Point,  on  the  eastern  end  of  Long  Island. 
Through  this  camp,  which  had  been  hastily  put 
into  condition  to  receive  them,  there  passed  about 
thirty-five  thousand  soldiers,  of  whom  twenty 
thousand  were  sick.  When  the  public  saw  those 
who  a  few  weeks  before  had  been  healthy  and  rol- 
licking American  boys,  now  mere  skeletons,  borne 
helpless  in  stretchers  and  looking  old  and  shriv- 
eled, a  wave  of  righteous  indignation  against  Secre-- 
tary  Alger  swept  over  the  country,  and  eventually 
accomplished  enough  to  prevent  such  catastrophes 
in  the  future. 

The  distressing  experience  of  the  army  was  too 
real  not  to  have  its  constructive  effect.  Men  like 
William  Crawford  Gorgas  were  inspired  to  study 
the  sanitation  and  the  diseases  of  the  tropics  and 


CAMPAIGN  OF  SANTIAGO  DE  CUBA    169 

have  now  made  it  possible  for  white  men  to  live 
there  safely.  Men  of  affairs  like  Elihu  Root  were 
stimulated  to  give  their  talents  to  army  admin- 
istration. Fortunately  the  boys  were  brought 
north  just  in  time  to  save  their  lives,  and  the  ma- 
jority, after  a  recuperation  of  two  or  three  years, 
regained  their  normal  health. 

The  primary  responsibility  for  this  gamble  with 
death  rested  with  those  who  sent  an  expedition 
from  the  United  States  to  the  tropics  in  midsum- 
mer when  the  measures  necessary  to  safeguard  its 
health  were  not  yet  known.  This  responsibility 
rested  immediately  upon  the  American  people 
themselves,  all  too  eager  for  a  war  for  which  they 
were  not  prepared  and  for  a  speedy  victory  at 
all  costs.  For  this  national  impatience  they  had 
to  pay  dearly.  The  striking  contrast,  however,  be- 
tween the  efficiency  of  the  navy  and  the  lack  of 
preparation  on  the  part  of  the  army  shows  that 
the  people  as  a  whole  would  have  supported  a 
more  thorough  preparation  of  the  army,  had  the 
responsible  officials  possessed  sufficient  courage 
and  intelligence  to  have  demanded  it;  nor  would 
the  people  have  been  unwilling  to  defer  victory 
until  autumn,  had  they  been  honestly  informed  of 
the  danger  of  tropical  disease  into  which  they 


170  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

were  sending  the  flower  of  their  youth.  Such  a 
postponement  would  not  only  have  meant  better 
Weather  but  it  would  have  given  time  to  teach  the 
new  officers  their  duty  in  safeguarding  the  health 
of  their  men  as  far  as  possible,  and  this  precaution 
alone  would  have  saved  many  lives.  Owing  to  the 
greater  practical  experience  of  the  officers  in  the 
regular  regiments,  the  death  rate  among  the  men 
in  their  ranks  fell  far  below  that  among  the  volun- 
teers, even  though  many  of  the  men  with  the  regu- 
lars had  enlisted  after  the  declaration  of  war.  On 
the  other  hand,  speed  as  well  as  sanitation  was  an 
element  in  the  war,  and  the  soldier  who  was  sacri- 
ficed to  lack  of  preparation  may  be  said  to  have 
served  his  country  no  less  than  he  who  died  in 
battle.  Strategy  and  diplomacy  in  this  instance 
were  enormously  facilitated  by  the  immediate  in- 
vasion of  Cuba,  and  perhaps  the  outcome  justi- 
fied the  cost.  The  question  of  relative  values  is  a 
difficult  one. 

No  such  equation  of  values,  however,  can  hold 
the  judgment  in  suspense  in  the  case  of  the  host  of 
secondary  errors  that  grew  out  of  the  indolence  of 
Secretary  Alger  and  his  worship  of  politics.  Prob- 
ably General  Miles  was  mistaken  in  his  charges 
concerning  embalmed  beef,  and  possibly  the  canned 


CAMPAIGN  OF  SANTIAGO  DE  CUBA     171 

beef  was  not  so  bad  as  it  tasted;  but  there  can  be  no 
excuse  for  a  Secretary  of  War  who  did  not  consider 
it  his  business  to  investigate  the  question  of  proper 
rations  for  an  army  in  the  tropics  simply  because 
Congress  had,  years  before,  fixed  a  ration  for  use 
within  the  United  States.  There  was  no  excuse 
for  sending  many  of  the  men  clad  in  heavy  army 
woolens.  There  was  no  excuse  for  not  providing  a 
sufficient  number  of  surgeons  and  abundant  hospi- 
tal service.  There  was  little  excuse  for  the  appoint- 
ment of  General  Shafter,  which  was  made  in  part 
for  political  reasons.  There  was  no  excuse  for 
keeping  at  the  head  of  the  army  administration 
General  Nelson  A.  Miles,  with  whom,  whatever  his 
abilities,  the  Secretary  of  War  was  unable  to  work. 
The  navy  did  not  escape  controversy.  In  fact, 
a  war  fought  under  the  eyes  of  hundreds  of  uncen- 
sored  newspaper  correspondents  unskilled  in  mili- 
tary affairs  could  not  fail  to  supply  a  daily  grist  of 
scandal  to  an  appreciative  public.  The  controversy 
between  Sampson  and  Schley,  however,  grew  out  of 
incompatible  personalities  stirred  to  rivalry  by  in- 
discreet friends  and  a  quarrelsome  public.  Captain 
Sampson  was  chosen  to  command,  and  properly 
so,  because  of  his  recognized  abilities.  Commo- 
dore Schley,  a  genial  and  open-hearted  man,  too 


172  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

much  given  to  impulse,  though  he  outranked  Samp- 
son, was  put  under  his  command.  Sampson  was 
not  gracious  in  his  treatment  of  the  Commodore, 
and  ill  feeling  resulted.  When  the  time  came  to 
promote  both  officers  for  their  good  conduct,  Sec- 
retary Long  by  recommending  that  Sampson  be 
raised  eight  numbers  and  Schley  six,  reversed  their 
relative  positions  as  they  had  been  before  the  war. 
This  recommendation,  in  itself  proper,  was  sus- 
tained by  the  Senate,  and  all  the  vitality  the 
controversy  ever  had  then  disappeared,  though  it 
remains  a  bone  of  contention  to  be  gnawed  by 
biographers  and  historians. 


CHAPTER  XII 

THE   CLOSE   OF   THE   WAR 

WHILE  the  American  people  were  concentrating 
their  attention  upon  the  blockade  of  Santiago  near 
their  own  shores,  the  situation  in  the  distant  is- 
lands of  the  Pacific  was  rapidly  becoming  acute. 
All  through  June,  Dewey  had  been  maintaining 
himself,  with  superb  nerve,  in  Manila  Harbor,  in 
the  midst  of  uncertain  neutrals.  A  couple  of 
unwieldy  United  States  monitors  were  moving 
slowly  to  his  assistance  from  the  one  side,  while  a 
superior  Spanish  fleet  was  approaching  from  the 
other.  On  the  26th  of  June,  the  Spanish  Admiral 
Camara  had  reached  Port  Said,  but  he  was  not  en- 
tirely happy.  Several  of  his  vessels  proved  to  be 
in  that  ineffective  condition  which  was  character- 
istic of  the  Spanish  Navy.  The  Egyptian  author- 
ities refused  him  permission  to  refit  his  ships  or  to 
coal,  and  the  American  consul  had  with  foresight 
bought  up  much  of  the  coal  which  the  Spanish 

173 


174  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Admiral  had  hoped  to  secure  and  take  aboard 
later  from  colliers.  Nevertheless  the  fleet  passed 
through  the  Suez  Canal  and  entered  the  Red  Sea. 

Fully  alive  to  the  danger  of  the  situation,  the 
Naval  War  Board  gave  orders  on  the  29th  of 
June  for  a  squadron  under  Commodore  Watson 
to  start  for  the  Spanish  coast  in  hope  of  drawing 
Camara  back. 

The  alarm  which  had  previously  been  created  on 
the  American  coast  by  the  shrouded  approach  of 
Cervera  naturally  suggested  that  the  Americans 
themselves  might  win  one  of  those  psychological 
victories  now  recognized  as  such  an  important  fac- 
tor in  modern  warfare.  The  chief  purpose  of  fu- 
ture operations  was  to  convince  the  Spanish  people 
that  they  were  defeated,  and  nothing  would  more 
conduce  to  this  result  than  to  bring  war  to  their 
doors.  This  was,  moreover,  an  operation  particu- 
larly suited  to  the  conditions  under  which  the 
United  States  was  waging  war,  for  publicity  was 
here  a  helping  factor.  Admiral  Sampson,  more  in- 
tent on  immediate  business  than  on  psychological 
pressure,  was  not  enthusiastically  in  favor  of  the 
plan.  Nevertheless  preparation  proceeded  with 
that  deliberation  which  in  this  case  was  part  of  the 
game,  and  presently  the  shadow  of  an  impending 


THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  175 

American  attack  hung  heavy  over  the  coasts  of 
Spain.  The  Spanish  Government  at  first  perhaps 
considered  the  order  a  bluff  which  the  United 
States  would  not  dare  to  carry  out  while  Cervera's 
fleet  was  so  near  its  own  shores;  but  with  the  de- 
struction of  Cervera's  ships  the  plan  became  plain- 
ly possible,  and  on  the  8th  of  July  the  Spanish 
Government  ordered  Camara  back  to  parade  his 
vessels  before  the  Spanish  cities  to  assure  them 
of  protection. 

But,  before  Camara  was  called  home,  the  public 
were  watching  his  advance  against  the  little  Ameri- 
can fleet  at  Manila,  with  an  anxiety  perhaps  greater 
than  Dewey's  own.  Nothing  in  modern  war  equals 
in  dramatic  tension  the  deadly,  slow,  inevitable 
approach  of  a  fleet  from  one  side  of  the  world 
against  its  enemy  on  the  other.  Both  beyond  the 
reach  of  friendly  help,  each  all  powerful  until  it 
meets  its  foe,  their  home  countries  have  to  watch 
the  seemingly  never  coming,  but  nevertheless  cer- 
tain, clash,  which  under  modern  conditions  means 
victory  or  destruction.  It  is  the  highest  develop- 
ment of  that  situation  which  has  been  so  exploited 
in  a  myriad  forms  by  the  producers  of  dramas  for 
the  moving  pictures  and  which  nightly  holds  audi- 
ences silent;  but  it  plays  itself  out  in  war,  not  in 


176  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

minutes  but  in  months.  No  one  who  lived  through 
that  period  can  ever  forget  the  progress  of  Camara 
against  Dewey,  or  that  of  Rozhestvensky  with  the 
Russian  fleet,  six  years  later,  against  Togo. 

Meanwhile  another  move  was  made  in  the  Carib- 
bean. General  Miles  had  from  the  first  considered 
Porto  Rico  the  best  immediate  objective:  it  was 
much  nearer  Spain  than  Cuba,  was  more  nearly 
self-sufficing  if  left  alone,  and  less  defensible  if  at- 
tacked. The  War  Department,  on  the  7th  of  June, 
had  authorized  Miles  to  assemble  thirty  thousand 
troops  for  the  invasion  of  Porto  Rico,  and  prepara- 
tions for  this  expedition  were  in  progress  through- 
out the  course  of  the  Santiago  campaign.  Miles 
at  the  time  of  the  surrender  of  Santiago  was  actu- 
ally off  that  city  with  reinforcements,  which  there- 
upon at  once  became  available  as  a  nucleus  to  be 
used  against  Porto  Rico.  On  the  21st  of  July  he 
left  Guantanamo  Bay  and,  taking  the  Spaniards 
as  well  as  the  War  Department  completely  by  sur- 
prise as  to  his  point  of  attack,  he  effected  a  land- 
ing on  the  26th  at  Guanica,  near  the  southwestern 
corner  of  Porto  Rico. 

The  expeditionary  force  to  Porto  Rico,  however, 
consisted  not  of  30,000  men  but  of  only  about  15,- 
000;  and  it  was  not  fully  assembled  on  the  island 


THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  177 

until  the  8th  of  August.  The  total  Spanish  forces 
amounted  to  only  about  10,000,  collected  on  the 
defensible  ground  to  the  north  and  in  the  interior, 
so  that  they  did  not  disturb  the  disembarkation. 
The  American  Army  which  had  been  dispatched 
from  large  Atlantic  ports,  such  as  Charleston  and 
Newport  News,  seems  to  have  been  better  and 
more  systematically  equipped  than  the  troops  sent 
to  Santiago.  The  Americans  occupied  Guanica, 
Ponce,  and  Arroyo  with  little  or  no  opposition,  and 
were  soon  in  possession  of  the  southern  shores  of 
the  island. 

Between  the  American  forces  and  the  main  body 
of  the  enemy  stretched  a  range  of  mountains  run- 
ning east  and  west  through  the  length  of  the  island. 
San  Juan,  the  only  fortress,  which  was  the  main  ob- 
jective of  the  American  Army,  lay  on  the  opposite 
side  of  this  mountain  range,  on  the  northern  coast 
of  the  island.  The  approach  to  the  fortress  lay 
along  a  road  which  crossed  the  hills  and  which  pos- 
sessed natural  advantages  for  defense.  On  the  7th 
of  August  a  forward  movement  was  begun.  While 
General  Wilson's  army  advanced  from  Ponce  along 
the  main  road  toward  San  Juan  and  General  Brooke 
moved  north  from  Arroyo,  General  Schwan  was  to 
clear  the  western  end  of  the  island  and  work  his  way 


178  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

around  to  Arecibo,  toward  which  General  Henry 
was  to  advance  through  the  interior.  The  Ameri- 
can armies  systematically  worked  forward,  with  an 
occasional  skirmish  in  which  they  were  always  vic- 
torious, and  were  received  with  a  warm  welcome  by 
the  teeming  native  population.  On  the  13th  of 
August,  General  Wilson  was  on  the  point  of  clear- 
ing his  first  mountain  range,  General  Schwan  had 
occupied  Mayaguez,  and  General  Henry  had  passed 
through  the  mountains  and  was  marching  down 
the  valley  of  the  Arecibo,  when  orders  arrived  from 
Washington  to  suspend  operations. 

The  center  of  interest,  however,  remained  in  the 
far-away  Philippines.  Dewey,  who  had  suddenly 
burst  upon  the  American  people  as  their  first  hero, 
remained  a  fixed  star  in  their  admiration,  a  posi- 
tion in  which  his  own  good  judgment  and  the  for- 
tunate scarcity  of  newspaper  correspondents  served 
to  maintain  him.  From  him  action  was  expected, 
and  it  had  been  prepared  for.  Even  before  news 
arrived  on  the  7th  of  May  of  Dewey 's  victory  on 
the  1st  of  May,  the  Government  had  anticipated 
such  a  result  and  had  decided  to  send  an  army  to 
support  him.  San  Francisco  was  made  a  rendez- 
vous for  volunteers,  and  on  the  12th  of  May,  Gen- 
eral Wesley  Merritt  was  assigned  to  command  the 


THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  179 

expedition.  Dewey  reported  that  he  could  at  any 
time  command  the  surrender  of  Manila,  but  that 
it  would  be  useless  unless  he  had  troops  to  occupy 
the  city. 

On  the  19th  of  May,  General  Merritt  received  the 
following  orders:  "The  destruction  of  the  Spanish 
fleet  at  Manila,  followed  by  the  taking  of  the  naval 
station  at  Cavite,  the  paroling  of  the  garrisons,  and 
the  acquisition  of  the  control  of  the  bay,  have  ren- 
dered it  necessary,  in  the  further  prosecution  of  the 
measures  adopted  by  this  Government  for  the  pur- 
pose of  bringing  about  an  honorable  and  durable 
peace  with  Spain,  to  send  an  army  of  occupation  to 
the  Philippines  for  the  twofold  purpose  of  complet- 
ing the  reduction  of  the  Spanish  power  in  that 
quarter  and  giving  order  and  security  to  the  islands 
while  in  the  possession  of  the  United  States. " 

On  the  30th  of  June  the  first  military  expedition^ 
after  a  bloodless  capture  of  the  island  of  Guam, 
arrived  in  Manila  Bay.  A  second  contingent  ar» 
rived  on  the  17th  of  July,  and  on  the  25th,  General 
Merritt  himself  with  a  third  force,  which  brought 
the  number  of  Americans  up  to  somewhat  more 
than  10,000.  The  Spaniards  had  about  13,000  men 
guarding  the  rather  antiquated  fortifications  of 
old  Manila  and  a  semicircle  of  blockhouses  and 


180  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

trenches  thrown  about  the  city,  which  contained 
about  350,000  inhabitants. 

It  would  have  been  easy  to  compel  surrender  or 
evacuation  by  the  guns  of  the  fleet,  had  it  not  been 
for  an  additional  element  in  the  situation.  Manila 
was  already  besieged,  or  rather  blockaded,  on  the 
land  side,  by  an  army  of  nearly  ten  thousand 
Philippine  insurgents  under  their  shrewd  leader, 
Emilio  Aguinaldo.  It  does  not  necessarily  follow 
that  those  who  are  fighting  the  same  enemy  are 
fighting  together,  and  in  this  case  the  relations 
between  the  Americans  and  the  insurgents  were 
far  from  intimate,  though  Dewey  had  kept  the  sit- 
uation admirably  in  hand  until  the  arrival  of  the 
American  troops. 

General  Merritt  decided  to  hold  no  direct  com- 
munication with  Aguinaldo  until  the  Americans 
were  in  possession  of  the  city,  but  landed  his 
army  to  the  south  of  Manila  beyond  the  trenches  of 
the  Filipinos.  On  the  30th  of  July,  General  F.  V. 
Greene  made  an  informal  arrangement  with  the 
Filipino  general  for  the  removal  of  the  insurgents 
from  the  trenches  directly  in  front  of  the  American 
forces,  and  immediately  advanced  beyond  their 
original  position.  The  situation  of  Manila  was  in- 
deed desperate  and  clearly  demanded  a  surrender 


THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  181 

to  the  American  forces,  who  might  be  relied  upon 
to  preserve  order  and  protect  property.  The  Bel- 
gian Consul,  M.  Eduard  Andre,  urged  this  course 
upon  the  Spanish  commander.  The  Governor-Gen- 
eral, Fermin  Jaudenes,  exhibited  the  same  spirit 
which  the  Spanish  commanders  revealed  through- 
out the  war :  though  constitutionally  indisposed  to 
take  any  bold  action,  he  nevertheless  considered  it 
a  point  of  honor  not  to  recognize  the  inevitable. 
He  allowed  it  to  be  understood  that  he  could  not 
surrender  except  to  an  assault,  although  well  know- 
ing that  such  a  melee  might  cause  the  city  to  be 
ravaged  by  the  Filipinos.  M.  Andre,  however,  suc- 
ceeded by  the  llth  of  August  in  arranging  a  ver- 
bal understanding  that  the  fleet  should  fire  upon 
the  city  and  that  the  troops  should  attack,  but  that 
the  Spaniards  should  make  no  real  resistance  and 
should  surrender  as  soon  as  they  considered  that 
their  honor  was  saved. 

The  chief  contestants  being  thus  amicably 
agreed  to  a  spectacular  but  bloodless  battle,  the 
main  interest  lay  in  the  future  action  of  the  inter- 
ested and  powerful  spectators  in  the  harbor.  Ad- 
miral Dewey,  though  relieved  by  the  arrival  of 
the  monitor  Monterey  on  the  4th  of  August,  was  by 
no  means  certain  that  the  German  squadron  would 


182  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

stand  by  without  interference  and  see  the  city  bom- 
barded. On  the  9th  of  August  he  gave  notice  of 
the  impending  action  and  ordered  foreign  vessels 
out  of  the  range  of  fire.  On  the  13th  of  August 
Dewey  steamed  into  position  before  the  city.  As 
the  American  vessels  steamed  past  the  British  1m- 
mortalite,  her  guard  paraded  and  her  band  played 
Admiral  Dewey 5s  favorite  march.  Immediately 
afterwards  the  British  commander,  Captain  Chi- 
chester,  moved  his  vessels  toward  the  city  and  took 
a  position  between  our  fleet  and  the  German 
squadron.  The  foreign  vessels  made  no  interfer- 
ence, but  the  Filipinos  were  more  restless.  Eagerly 
watching  the  American  assault,  they  rushed  for- 
ward when  they  saw  it  successful,  and  began  firing 
on  the  Spaniards  just  as  the  latter  hoisted  the  white 
flag.  They  were  quieted,  though  with  difficulty, 
and  by  nightfall  the  city  was  under  the  Stars  and 
Stripes,  with  American  troops  occupying  the  out- 
works facing  the  forces  of  Aguinaldo,  who  were 
neither  friends  nor  foes. 

While  the  dispatch  of  Commodore  Watson's 
fleet  to  Spain  was  still  being  threatened  and  de- 
layed, while  General  Miles  was  rapidly  approach- 
ing the  capital  of  Porto  Rico,  and  on  the  same  day 


THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  183 

that  Admiral  Dewey  and  General  Merritt  cap- 
tured Manila,  Spain  yielded.  On  the  18th  of  July 
Spain  had  taken  the  first  step  toward  peace  by 
asking  for  the  good  offices  of  the  French  Gov- 
ernment. On  the  26th  of  July,  M.  Cambon,  the 
French  Ambassador  at  Washington,  opened  ne- 
gotiations with  the  United  States.  On  the  12th  of 
August,  a  protocol  was  signed,  but,  owing  to  the 
difference  in  time  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  globe, 
to  say  nothing  of  the  absence  of  cable  communica- 
tion, not  in  time  to  prevent  Dewey 's  capture  of 
Manila.  This  protocol  provided  for  the  meeting  of 
peace  commissioners  at  Paris  not  later  than  the  1st 
of  October.  Spain  agreed  immediately  to  evacu- 
ate and  relinquish  all  claim  to  Cuba;  to  cede  to  the 
United  States  ultimately  all  other  islands  in  the 
West  Indies,  and  one  in  the  Ladrones;  and  to  per- 
mit the  United  States  to  "occupy  and  hold  the  city, 
bay,  and  harbor  of  Manila  pending  the  conclusion  of 
a  treaty  of  peace  which  shall  determine  the  control, 
disposition,  and  government  of  the  Philippines." 

President  McKinley  appointed  the  Secretary  of 
State,  William  R.  Day,  as  president  of  the  peace 
commission,  and  summoned  John  Hay  home  from 
England  to  take  his  place.  The  other  commis- 
sioners were  Senators  Cushman  K.  Davis  and 


184  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

"William  P.  Frye,  Republicans,  Senator  George 
Gray,  Democrat,  and  Whitelaw  Reid,  the  editor  of 
the  New  York  Tribune.  The  secretary  of  the  com- 
mission was  the  distinguished  student  of  interna- 
tional law,  John  Bassett  Moore.  On  most  points 
there  was  general  agreement  as  to  what  they  were 
to  do.  Cuba,  of  course,  must  be  free.  It  was, 
moreover,  too  obvious  to  need  much  argument 
that  Spanish  rule  on  the  American  continent  must 
come  altogether  to  an  end.  As  there  was  no  or- 
ganized local  movement  in  Porto  Rico  to  take  over 
the  government,  its  cession  to  the  United  States 
was  universally  recognized  as  inevitable.  Never- 
theless when  the  two  commissions  met  in  Paris, 
there  proved  to  be  two  exciting  subjects  of  contro- 
versy, and  at  moments  it  seemed  possible  that  the 
attempt  to  arrange  a  peace  would  prove  unsuccess- 
ful. However  reassured  the  people  were  by  the  suc- 
cessful termination  of  the  war,  for  those  in  authority 
the  period  of  anxiety  had  not  yet  entirely  passed. 

The  first  of  these  points  was  raised  by  the  Span- 
ish commissioners.  They  maintained  that  the  sepa- 
ration of  Cuba  from  Spain  involved  the  rending  of 
the  Empire,  and  that  Cuba  should  therefore  take 
responsibilities  as  well  as  freedom.  The  specific 
question  was  that  of  debts  contracted  by  Spain,  for 


THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  185 

the  security  of  which  Cuban  revenues  had  been 
pledged.  There  was  a  manifest  lack  of  equity  in 
this  claim,  for  Cuba  had  not  been  party  to  the  con- 
tracting of  the  obligations,  and  the  money  had 
been  spent  in  stifling  her  own  desire  to  be  free 
rather  than  on  the  development  of  her  resources. 
Nevertheless  the  Spanish  commissioners  could  feel 
the  support  of  a  sustaining  public  opinion  about 
them,  for  the  bulk  of  these  obligations  were  held  in 
France  and  investors  were  doubtful  of  the  ability 
of  Spain,  if  bereft  of  her  colonies,  to  carry  her 
enormous  financial  burdens.  The  point,  then,  was 
stoutly  urged,  but  the  American  commissioners  as 
stoutly  defended  the  interests  of  their  clients,  the 
Cubans,  and  held  their  ground.  Thanks  to  their 
efforts,  the  Cuban  republic  was  born  free  of  debt. 

The  other  point  was  raised  by  the  American 
commissioners,  and  was  both  more  important  and 
more  complicated,  for  when  the  negotiation  began 
the  United  States  had  not  fully  decided  what  it 
wanted.  It  was  necessary  first  to  decide  and  then 
to  obtain  the  consent  of  Spain  with  regard  to  the 
great  unsettled  question  of  the  disposition  of  the 
Philippines.  Dewey's  victory  came  as  an  over- 
whelming surprise  to  the  great  majority  of  Amer- 
icans snugly  encased,  as  they  supposed  themselves 


136  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

to  be,  in  a  separate  hemisphere.  Nearly  all  looked 
upon  it  as  a  military  operation  only,  not  likely  to 
lead  to  later  complications.  Many  discerning  in- 
dividuals, however,  both  in  this  country  and  abroad, 
at  once  saw  or  feared  that  occupation  would  lead  to 
annexation.  Carl  Schurz,  as  early  as  the  9th  of 
May,  wrote  McKinley  expressing  the  hope  that  "we 
remain  true  to  our  promise  that  this  is  a  war  of  de- 
liverance and  not  one  of  greedy  ambition,  conquest, 
self-aggrandizement. "  In  August,  Andrew  Carnegie 
wrote  in  The  North  American  Review  an  article  on 
Distant  Possessions — The  Parting  of  the  Ways. 

Sentiment  in  favor  of  retaining  the  islands,  how- 
ever, grew  rapidly  in  volume  and  in  strength.  John 
Hay  wrote  to  Andrew  Carnegie  on  the  22d  of  August : 
"I  am  not  allowed  to  say  in  my  present  fix  (minis- 
terial responsibility)  how  much  I  agree  with  you. 
The  only  question  in  my  mind  is  how  far  it  is 
now  possible  for  us  to  withdraw  from  the  Philip- 
pines. I  am  rather  thankful  it  is  not  given  to  me 
to  solve  that  momentous  question."  On  the  5th 
of  September,  he  wrote  to  John  Bigelow:  "I  fear 
you  are  right  about  the  Philippines,  and  I  hope  the 
Lord  will  be  good  to  us  poor  devils  who  have  to 
take  care  of  them.  I  marvel  at  your  suggesting 
that  we  pay  for  them.  I  should  have  expected  no 


THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  187 

less  of  your  probity;  but  how  many  except  those 
educated  by  you  in  the  school  of  morals  and  diplo- 
macy would  agree  with  you?  Where  did  I  pass 
you  on  the  road  of  life?  You  used  to  be  a  little 
my  senior  [twenty-one  years];  now  you  are  ages 
younger  and  stronger  than  I  am.  And  yet  I  am 
going  to  be  Secretary  of  State  for  a  little  while. " 

Not  all  those  who  advocated  the  retention  of  the 
Philippines  did  so  reluctantly  or  under  the  pressure 
of  a  feeling  of  necessity.  In  the  very  first  settlers 
of  our  country,  the  missionary  impulse  beat  strong. 
John  Winthrop  was  not  less  intent  than  Cromwell 
on  the  conquest  of  all  humanity  by  his  own  ideals; 
only  he  believed  the  most  efficacious  means  to  be 
the  power  of  example  instead  of  force.  Just  now 
there  was  a  renewed  sense  throughout  the  Anglo- 
Saxon  public  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  civilized 
to  promote  the  civilization  of  the  backward,  and 
the  Cromwellian  method  waxed  in  popularity. 
Kipling,  at  the  summit  of  his  influence,  appealed  to 
a  wide  and  powerful  public  in  his  White  Mans 
Burden,  which  appeared  in  1899. 

Take  up  the  White  Man's  burden  — 
Send  forth  the  best  ye  breed  — 
Go  bind  your  sons  to  exile 
To  serve  your  captives'  need; 


188  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

To  wait  in  heavy  harness, 
On  fluttered  folk  and  wild  — 
Your  new  caught,  sullen  peoples, 
Half-devil  and  half-child. 

Take  up  the  White  Man's  burden  — 
And  reap  his  old  reward : 
The  blame  of  those  ye  better, 
The  hate  of  those  ye  guard  — 
The  cry  of  hosts  ye  humour 
(Ah,  slowly!)  towards  the  light:  — 
Why  brought  ye  us  from  bondage, 
Our  loved  Egyptian  night? 

McKinley  asked  those  having  opinions  on  the 
subject  of  this  burden  to  write  to  him,  and  a  strong 
call  for  the  United  States  to  take  up  her  share  in 
the  regeneration  of  mankind  came  from  important 
representatives  of  the  religious  public.  Nor  was 
the  attitude  of  those  different  who  saw  the  possi- 
bilities of  increased  traffic  with  the  East.  The  ex- 
pansion of  the  area  of  home  distribution  seemed 
a  halfway  house  between  the  purely  nationalistic 
policy,  which  was  becoming  a  little  irksome,  and 
the  competition  of  the  open  world. 

It  was  not,  however,  the  urging  of  these  forces 
alone  which  made  the  undecided  feel  that  the  an- 
nexation of  the  Philippines  was  bound  to  come. 
The  situation  itself  seemed  to  offer  no  other 


THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  189 

solution.  Gradually  evidence  as  to  the  local  con- 
ditions reached  America.  The  Administration  was 
anxious  for  the  commissioners  to  have  the  latest 
information,  and,  as  Admiral  Dewey  remained  in- 
dispensable at  Manila,  General  Merritt  was  or- 
dered to  report  at  Paris,  where  he  arrived  on  the 
6th  of  October.  He  was  of  the  opinion  that  the 
Americans  must  remain  in  the  Philippines,  and  his 
reports  were  sustained  by  a  cablegram  from  Dewey 
on  the  14th  of  October  reading:  "Spanish  author- 
ity has  been  completely  destroyed  in  Luzon,  and 
general  anarchy  prevails  without  the  limits  of  the 
city  and  Bay  of  Manila.  Strongly  probable  that 
islands  to  the  south  will  fall  into  the  same  state 
soon. "  The  history  of  the  previous  few  years  and 
existing  conditions  made  it  highly  improbable  that 
Spanish  domination  could  ever  be  restored.  The 
withdrawal  of  the  United  States  would  therefore 
not  mean  the  reestablishment  of  Spanish  rule  but 
no  government  at  all. 

As  to  the  regime  which  would  result  from  our 
withdrawal,  Admiral  Dewey  judged  from  the  con- 
dition of  those  areas  where  Spanish  authority  had 
already  ceased  and  that  of  the  Americans  had  not 
yet  been  established.  "Distressing  reports,"  he 
cabled,  "have  been  received  of  inhuman  cruelty 


190  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

practised  on  religious  and  civil  authorities  in  other 
parts  of  these  islands.  The  natives  appear  un- 
able to  govern. "  It  was  highly  probable,  in  fact, 
that  if  the  United  States  did  not  take  the  is- 
lands, Spain  would  sell  her  vanishing  equity  in 
the  property  to  some  other  power  which  possessed 
the  equipment  necessary  to  conquer  the  Philip- 
pines. To  many  this  eventuality  did  not  seem 
objectionable,  as  is  indicated  by  the  remark,  al- 
ready quoted,  of  an  American  official  to  certain 
Germans:  "We  don't  want  the  Philippines;  why 
don't  you  take  them?"  That  this  attitude  was 
foolishly  Quixotic  is  obvious,  but  more  effective 
in  the  molding  of  public  opinion  was  the  feeling 
that  it  was  cowardly. 

In  such  a  changing  condition  of  public  sentiment, 
McKinley  was  a  better  index  of  what  the  majority 
wanted  than  a  referendum  could  have  been.  In 
August  he  stated:  "I  do  not  want  any  ambigu- 
ity to  be  allowed  to  remain  on  this  point.  The 
negotiators  of  both  countries  are  the  ones  who 
shall  resolve  upon  the  permanent  advantages 
which  we  shall  ask  in  the  archipelago,  and  decide 
upon  the  intervention,  disposition,  and  govern- 
ment of  the  Philippines. "  His  instructions  to  the 
commissioners  actually  went  farther: 


THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  191 

Avowing  unreservedly  the  purpose  which  has  animated 
all  our  effort,  and  still  solicitous  to  adhere  to  it,  we  can- 
not be  unmindful  that,  without  any  desire  or  design  on 
our  part,  the  war  has  brought  us  new  duties  and  respon- 
sibilities which  we  must  meet  and  discharge  as  becomes 
a  great  nation  on  whose  growth  and  career  from  the  be- 
ginning the  Ruler  of  Nations  has  plainly  written  the 
high  command  and  pledge  of  civilization. 

Incidental  to  our  tenure  in  the  Philippines  is  the  com- 
mercial opportunity  to  which  American  statesmanship 
cannot  be  indifferent.  .  .  .  Asking  only  the  open  door 
for  ourselves,  we  are  ready  to  accord  the  open  door 
to  others. 

In  view  of  what  has  been  stated,  the  United  States 
cannot  accept  less  than  the  cession  in  full  rights  and 
sovereignty  of  the  island  of  Luzon. 

>fs      }-'r- 

-  •    »«  V 

The  American  commissioners  were  divided. 
Day  favored  the  limited  terms  of  the  instructions; 
Davis,  Frye,  and  Reid  wished  the  whole  group 
of  the  Philippines;  Gray  emphatically  protested 
against  taking  any  part  of  the  islands.  On  the 
26th  of  October,  Hay  telegraphed  that  the  Presi- 
dent had  decided  that  "the  cession  must  be  of  the 
whole  Archipelago  or  none."  The  Spanish  com- 
missioners objected  strongly  to  this  new  develop- 
ment, and  threatened  to  break  off  the  negotiations 
which  otherwise  were  practically  concluded.  This 
outcome  would  have  put  the  United  States  in  the 


192  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

unfortunate  position  of  continuing  a  war  which  it 
had  begun  in  the  interests  of  Cuba  for  the  quite  dif- 
ferent purpose  of  securing  possession  of  the  Philip- 
pines. The  Spanish  were  probably  not  without 
hopes  that  under  these  changed  conditions  they 
might  be  able  to  bring  tc  their  active  assistance 
that  latent  sympathy  for  them  which  existed  so 
strongly  in  Europe.  Nor  was  the  basis  of  the  claim 
of  the  United  States  entirely  clear.  On  the  3d  of 
November  the  American  commissioners  cabled  to 
the  President  that  they  were  convinced  that  the 
occupation  of  Manila  did  not  constitute  a  conquest 
of  the  islands  as  a  whole. 

By  this  time,  however,  the  President  had  decided 
that  the  United  States  must  have  the  islands.  On 
the  13th  of  November,  Hay  telegraphed  that  the 
United  States  was  entitled  to  an  indemnity  for  the 
cost  of  the  war.  This  argument  was  not  put  for- 
ward because  the  United  States  wished  indemnity 
but  to  give  a  technical  basis  for  the  American  claim 
to  the  Philippines.  In  the  same  cablegram,  Hay 
instructed  the  commissioners  to  offer  Spain  ten 
or  twenty  millions  for  all  the  islands.  Upon  this 
financial  basis  the  treaty  was  finally  concluded;  it 
was  signed  on  December  10,  1898;  and  ratifica- 
tions were  exchanged  on  April  11,  1899. 


THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  193 

The  terms  of  the  treaty  provided,  first,  for  the 
relinquishment  of  sovereignty  over  Cuba  by  Spain. 
The  island  was  to  be  occupied  by  the  United  States, 
in  whose  hands  its  subsequent  disposition  was  left. 
All  other  Spanish  islands  in  the  West  Indies,  to- 
gether with  Guam  in  the  Ladrones,  were  ceded 
to  the  United  States.  The  whole  archipelago  of 
the  Philippines,  with  water  boundaries  carefully 
but  not  quite  accurately  drawn,  was  ceded  to  the 
United  States,  which  by  the  same  article  agreed  to 
pay  Spain  $20,000,000.  All  claims  for  indemnity 
or  damages  between  the  two  nations,  or  either 
nation  and  the  citizens  of  the  other,  were  mutually 
relinquished,  the  United  States  assuming  the  ad- 
judication and  settlement  of  all  claims  of  her  own 
citizens  against  Spain. 

This  treaty,  even  more  than  the  act  of  war, 
marked  a  turning  point  in  the  relation  of  the 
United  States  to  the  outside  world.  So  violent  was 
the  opposition  of  those  who  disapproved,  and  so 
great  the  reluctance  of  even  the  majority  of  those 
who  approved,  to  acknowledge  that  the  United 
States  had  emerged  from  the  isolated  path  which  it 
had  been  treading  since  1823,  that  every  effort  was 
made  to  minimize  the  significance  of  the  beginning 
of  a  new  era  in  American  history.  It  was  argued 

13 


194  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

by  those  delving  into  the  past  that  the  Philippines 
actually  belonged  to  the  Western  Hemisphere  be- 
cause the  famous  demarcation  line  drawn  by  Pope 
Alexander  VI,  in  1493,  ran  to  the  west  of  them;  it 
was,  indeed,  partly  in  consequence  of  that  line  that 
Spain  had  possessed  the  islands.  Before  Spain  lost 
Mexico  her  Philippine  trade  had  actually  passed 
across  the  Pacific,  through  the  Mexican  port  of 
Acapulco,  and  across  the  Atlantic.  Yet  these  in- 
teresting historical  facts  were  scarcely  related  in  the 
mind  of  the  public  to  the  more  immediate  and  tan- 
gible fact  that  the  annexation  of  the  Philippines 
gave  the  United  States  a  far-flung  territory  situated 
just  where  all  the  powerful  nations  of  the  world  were 
then  centering  their  interest. 

In  opposition  to  those  who  disapproved  of  this 
extension  of  territory,  it  was  argued  more  cogently 
that,  in  spite  of  the  prevailing  belief  of  the  thirty 
preceding  years,  the  United  States  had  always  been 
an  expanding  power,  stretching  its  authority  over 
new  areas  with  a  persistency  and  rapidity  hardly 
equaled  by  any  other  nation,  and  that  this  latest 
step  was  but  a  new  stride  in  the  natural  expansion 
of  the  United  States.  But  here  again  the  similar- 
ity between  the  former  and  the  most  recent  steps 
was  more  apparent  than  real.  Louisiana,  Florida, 


THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  195 

Texas,  California,  and  Oregon,  had  all  been  parts 
of  an  obvious  geographical  whole.  Alaska,  indeed, 
was  detached,  but  its  acquisition  had  been  partly 
accidental,  and  it  was  at  least  a  part  of  the  Amer- 
ican continent  and  would,  in  the  opinion  of  many, 
eventually  become  contiguous  by  the  probable  an- 
nexation of  Canada.  Moreover,  none  of  the  areas 
so  far  occupied  by  the  United  States  had  been 
really  populated.  It  had  been  a  logical  expecta- 
tion that  American  people  would  soon  overflow 
these  acquired  lands  and  assimilate  the  inhabitants. 
In  the  case  of  the  Philippines,  on  the  other  hand,  it 
was  fully  recognized  that  Americans  could  at  most 
be  only  a  small  governing  class,  and  that  even 
Porto  Rico,  accessible  as  it  was,  would  prove  too 
thickly  settled  to  give  hopes  of  Americanization. 

The  terms  of  the  treaty  with  Spain,  indeed, 
recognized  these  differences.  In  all  previous  in- 
stances, except  Alaska,  the  added  territory  had 
been  incorporated  into  the  body  of  the  United 
States  with  the  expectation,  now  realized  except  in 
Hawaii,  of  reaching  the  position  of  self-governing 
and  participating  States  of  the  Union.  Even  in 
the  case  of  Alaska  it  had  been  provided  that  all 
inhabitants  remaining  in  residence,  except  uncivi- 
lized Indians,  should  become  citizens  of  the  United 


196  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

States.  In  the  case  of  these  new  annexations  re- 
sulting from  the  war  with  Spain,  provision  was 
made  only  for  the  religious  freedom  of  the  inhabi- 
tants. "  The  civil  rights  and  political  status  of  the 
native  inhabitants  of  the  territories  hereby  ceded 
to  the  United  States  shall  be  determined  by  the 
Congress."  There  could  therefore  be  no  doubt 
that  for  the  first  time  the  United  States  had  ac- 
quired colonies  and  that  the  question  whether  they 
should  develop  into  integral  parts  of  the  country  or 
into  dependencies  of  an  imperialistic  republic  was 
left  to  the  future  to  decide. 

It  was  but  natural  that  such  striking  events  and 
important  decisions  should  loom  large  as  factors  in 
the  following  presidential  campaign.  The  Repub- 
licans endorsed  the  Administration,  emphatically 
stated  that  the  independence  and  self-government 
of  Cuba  must  be  secured,  and,  with  reference  to  the 
other  islands,  declared  that  "the  largest  measure 
of  self-government  consistent  with  their  welfare 
and  our  duties  shall  be  secured  to  them  by  law." 
The  Democrats  asserted  that  "no  nation  can  long 
endure  half  republic  and  half  empire, "  and  favored 
"an  immediate  declaration  of  the  Nation's  purpose 
to  give  the  Filipinos,  first,  a  stable  form  of  govern- 
ment; second,  independence;  and  third,  protection 


THE  CLOSE  OF  THE  WAR  197 

from  outside  interference  such  as  has  been  given 
for  nearly  a  century  to  the  republics  of  Central  and 
South  America. "  The  Democrats  were  at  a  dis- 
advantage owing  to  the  fact  that,  since  so  much 
had  been  irrevocably  accomplished,  they  could  not 
raise  the  whole  issue  of  colonial  expansion  but  only 
advocate  a  different  policy  for  the  handling  of  what 
seemed  to  most  people  to  be  details.  The  distrust 
which  their  financial  program  of  1896  had  excited, 
moreover,  still  hung  over  them  and  repelled  many 
voters  who  might  have  supported  them  on  ques- 
tions of  foreign  and  colonial  policies.  Nevertheless 
the  reelection  of  President  McKinley  by  a  greatly 
increased  majority  must  be  taken  as  indicating  that 
the  American  people  generally  approved  of  his 
policies  and  accepted  the  momentous  changes  which 
had  been  brought  about  by  the  successful  conclusion 
of  the  war  with  Spain. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

A   PEACE   WHICH   MEANT   WAR 

IN  a  large  way,  ever  since  the  Spanish  War,  the 
United  States  has  been  adjusting  its  policy  to  the 
world  conditions  of  which  that  struggle  first  made 
the  people  aware.  The  period  between  1898  and 
1917  will  doubtless  be  regarded  by  the  historian 
a  hundred  years  from  now  as  a  time  of  transition 
similar  to  that  between  1815  and  1829.  In  that  ear- 
lier period  John  Marshall  and  John  Quincy  Adams 
did  much  by  their  wisdom  and  judgment  to  preserve 
what  was  of  value  in  the  old  regime  for  use  in  the  new. 
In  the  later  period  John  Hay  performed,  though  far 
less  completely,  a  somewhat  similar  function. 

John  Hay  had  an  acquaintance  with  the  best 
traditions  of  American  statesmanship  which  falls  to 
the  lot  of  few  men.  He  was  private  secretary  to 
Lincoln  during  the  Civil  War,  he  had  as  his  most 
intimate  friend  in  later  life  Henry  Adams,  the  his- 
torian, who  lived  immersed  in  the  memories  and 

198 


A  PEACE  WHICH  MEANT  WAR         199 

traditions  of  a  family  which  has  taken  a  distin- 
guished part  in  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  from  its  beginning.  Possessed  of  an  ample 
fortune,  Hay  had  lived  much  abroad  and  in  the 
society  of  the  men  who  governed  Europe.  He  was 
experienced  in  newspaper  work  and  in  diplomacy, 
and  he  came  to  be  Secretary  of  State  fresh  from  a 
residence  in  England  where  as  Ambassador  he  had 
enjoyed  wide  popularity.  With  a  lively  wit  and  an 
engaging  charm  of  manner,  he  combined  a  knowl- 
edge of  international  law  and  of  history  which  few 
of  our  Secretaries  have  possessed.  Moreover  he 
knew  men  and  how  to  handle  them.  Until  the 
death  of  McKinley  in  1901  he  was  left  almost  free 
in  the  administration  of  his  office.  He  once  said 
that  the  President  spoke  to  him  of  his  office  scarce- 
ly once  a  month.  In  the  years  from  1901  to  1905 
he  worked  under  very  different  conditions,  for 
President  Roosevelt  discussed  affairs  of  state  with 
him  daily  and  took  some  matters  entirely  into  his 
own  hands. 

Hay  found  somewhat  better  instruments  to  work 
with  than  most  Americans  were  inclined  to  believe 
probable.  It  is  true  that  the  American  diplomatic 
service  abroad  has  not  always  reflected  credit  upon 
the  country.  It  has  contained  extremely  able  and 


200  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

distinguished  men  but  also  many  who  have  been 
stupid,  ignorant,  and  ill-mannered.  The  State 
Department  in  Washington,  however,  has  almost 
escaped  the  vicissitudes  of  politics  and  has  been 
graced  by  the  long  and  disinterested  service  of 
competent  officials.  From  1897  to  1913,  more- 
over, the  service  abroad  was  built  up  on  the  basis 
of  continuity  and  promotion. 

One  sign  of  a  new  epoch  was  the  changed  at- 
titude of  the  American  public  toward  annexation. 
While  the  war  was  in  progress  the  United  States 
yielded  to  the  desires  of  Hawaii,  and  annexed  the 
islands  as  a  part  of  the  United  States,  with  the  hope 
of  their  eventual  statehood.  In  1899  the  United 
States  consented  to  change  the  cumbrous  and  un- 
successful arrangement  by  which,  in  partnership 
with  Great  Britain  and  Germany,  it  had  supervised 
the  native  government  of  Samoa.  No  longer  un- 
willing to  acquire  distant  territories,  the  United 
States  took  in  full  possession  the  island  of  Tutuila, 
with  its  harbor  of  Pago-Pago,  and  consented  to 
Germany's  taking  the  remainder  of  the  islands, 
while  Great  Britain  received  compensation  else- 
where. In  1900  the  Government  paid  over  to 
Spain  $100,000  for  Sibutu  and  Cagayan  Sulu, 
two  islands  really  belonging  to  the  Philippines  but 


A  PEACE  WHICH  MEANT  WAR         201 

overlooked  in  the  treaty.  Proud  of  the  navy  and 
with  a  new  recognition  of  its  necessities,  the  United 
States  sought  naval  stations  in  those  areas  where 
the  fleet  might  have  to  operate.  In  the  Pacific  the 
Government  obtained  Midway  and  Wake  islands 
in  1900.  In  the  West  Indies,  the  harbor  of  Guan- 
tanamo  was  secured  from  Cuba,  and  in  1903  a 
treaty  was  made  with  Denmark  for  the  purchase 
of  her  islands  —  which,  however,  finally  became 
American  possessions  only  in  1917. 

By  her  policy  toward  Cuba,  the  United  States 
gave  the  world  a  striking  example  of  observing  the 
plighted  word  even  when  contrary  to  the  national 
interest.  For  a  century  the  United  States  had 
expected  to  acquire  the  "Pearl  of  the  Antilles." 
Spain  in  the  treaty  of  peace  refused  to  recognize 
the  Cuban  Government  and  relinquished  the  island 
into  the  hands  of  the  United  States.  The  with- 
drawal of  the  Spanish  troops  left  the  Cuban  Gov- 
ernment utterly  unable  to  govern,  and  the  United 
States  was  forced  to  occupy  the  island.  Neverthe- 
less the  Government  had  begun  the  war  with  a 
recognition  of  Cuban  independence  and  to  that 
declaration  it  adhered.  The  country  gave  the  best 
of  its  talent  to  make  the  islands  self-governing 
as  quickly  as  possible.  Harvard  University  invited 


202  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Cuban  teachers  to  be  its  guests  at  a  summer  session. 
American  medical  men  labored  with  a  martyr's 
devotion  to  stamp  out  disease.  General  Wood,  as 
military  governor,  established  order  and  justice 
and  presided  over  the  evolution  of  a  convention 
assembled  to  draft  a  constitution  for  the  people  of 
Cuba  and  to  determine  the  relations  of  the  United 
States  and  Cuba.  These  relations,  indeed,  were 
already  under  consideration  at  Washington  and 
were  subsequently  embodied  in  the  Platt  Amend- 
ment.1 This  measure  directed  the  President  to 
leave  the  control  of  Cuba  to  the  people  of  the  is- 
land as  soon  as  they  should  agree  to  its  terms.  It 
also  required  that  the  Government  of  Cuba  should 
never  allow  a  foreign  power  to  impair  its  independ- 
ence; that  it  would  contract  no  debt  for  which  it 
could  not  provide  a  sinking  fund  from  the  ordinary 
revenue;  that  it  would  grant  to  the  United  States 
"lands  necessary  for  coaling  or  naval  stations"; 
that  it  would  provide  for  the  sanitation  of  its  cities; 
and  that  the  United  States  should  have  the  right 
to  intervene,  "for  the  preservation  of  Cuban  inde- 
pendence, the  maintenance  of  a  government  ade- 
quate for  the  protection  of  life,  property,  and 
individual  liberty,  and  for  discharging"  certain 

1  An  amendment  to  the  Army  Appropriation  Bill  of  March  2,  1901. 


A  PEACE  WHICH  MEANT  WAR         203 

obligations  with  respect  to  Spanish  subjects  which 
the  United  States  had  assumed  in  the  treaty  signed 
at  Paris.  After  some  hesitation  the  convention 
added  these  provisions  to  the  new  constitution  of 
Cuba.  On  May  20, 1902,  the  American  troops  with- 
drew, leaving  Cuba  in  better  condition  than  she  had 
ever  been  before.  Subsequently  the  United  States 
was  forced  to  intervene  to  preserve  order,  but, 
though  the  temptation  was  strong  to  remain,  the 
American  troops  again  withdrew  after  they  had 
done  their  constructive  work.  The  voluntary  en- 
trance of  Cuba  into  the  Great  War  in  cooperation 
with  the  United  States  was  a  tribute  to  the  gen- 
erosity and  honesty  of  the  American  people. 

Porto  Rico  presented  a  problem  different  from 
that  which  the  United  States  had  to  solve  in  Cuba. 
There  existed  no  native  organization  which  could 
supply  even  the  basis  for  the  formation  of  a  gov- 
ernment. The  people  seemed,  indeed,  to  have  no 
desire  for  independence,  and  public  sentiment  in 
the  United  States  generally  favored  the  permanent 
possession  of  the  island.  After  a  period  of  rule 
entirely  at  the  discretion  of  the  President,  Congress 
established  in  1900  a  form  of  government  based  on 
that  of  the  American  territories.  Porto  Rico  re- 
mained, however,  unincorporated  into  the  Union, 


204  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

and  it  was  long  doubtful  whether  it  would  remain  a 
dependency  or  would  ultimately  attain  statehood. 
In  1917,  however,  the  degree  of  self-government  was 
increased,  and  the  inhabitants  were  made  Ameri- 
can citizens.  It  now  seems  probable  that  the  is- 
land will  ultimately  become  a  State  of  the  Union. 
Meanwhile  on  the  other  side  of  the  world  the 
United  States  had  a  more  unpleasant  task.  The 
revolted  Filipinos,  unlike  the  Cubans,  had  not 
declared  themselves  for  independence  but  for  re- 
dress of  grievances.  The  United  States  had  assisted 
Aguinaldo,  at  the  moment  in  exile,  to  return  to  the 
islands  after  the  Battle  of  Manila  Bay  but  had 
not  officially  recognized  him  as  having  authority. 
When  he  saw  Spanish  power  disappearing  under 
American  blows,  he  declared  himself  in  favor  of 
the  abolition  of  all  foreign  rule.  This  declaration, 
of  course,  in  no  way  bound  the  United  States,  to 
whom  the  treaty  with  Spain,  the  only  recognized 
sovereign,  ceded  the  island  absolutely.  There  was 
no  flaw  in  the  title  of  the  United  States,  and  there 
were  no  obligations,  save  those  of  humanity,  to  bind 
the  Americans  in  their  treatment  of  the  natives. 
Nevertheless,  the  great  majority  of  Americans 
would  doubtless  have  gladly  favored  a  policy 
similar  to  that  pursued  in  the  case  of  Cuba,  had 


A  PEACE  WHICH  MEANT  WAR         205 

it  seemed  in  any  way  practicable.  Unfortunately, 
however,  the  Filipinos  did  not  constitute  a  nation 
but  only  a  congeries  of  peoples  and  tribes  of  differ- 
ing race  and  origin,  whom  nearly  four  centuries 
of  Spanish  rule  had  not  been  able  to  make  live 
at  peace  with  one  another.  Some  were  Christians, 
some  Mohammedans,  some  heathen  savages ;  some 
wore  European  clothes,  some  none  at  all.  The 
particular  tribe  which  formed  the  chief  support  of 
Aguinaldo,  the  Tagalogs,  comprised  less  than  one 
half  of  the  population  of  the  island  of  Luzon. 
The  United  States  had  taken  the  islands  largely 
because  it  did  not  see  any  one  else  to  whom  it 
could  properly  shift  the  burden.  The  shoulders 
of  the  Tagalogs  did  not  seem  broad  enough  for 
the  responsibility. 

The  United  States  prepared,  therefore,  to  carry 
on  the  task  which  it  had  assumed,  while  Aguinaldo, 
with  his  army  circling  Manila,  prepared  to  dispute 
its  title.  On  February  4,  1899,  actual  hostilities 
broke  out.  By  this  time  Aguinaldo  had  a  capital 
at  Malolos,  thirty  miles  north  of  Manila,  a  govern- 
ment, thirty  or  forty  thousand  troops,  and  an  in- 
fluence which  he  was  extending  throughout  the 
islands  by  means  of  secret  organizations  and  super- 
stitious appeals.  This  seemed  a  puny  strength  to 


206  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

put  forth  against  the  United  States  but  va- 
rious circumstances  combined  to  make  the  con- 
test less  unequal  than  it  seemed,  and  the  outcome 
was  probably  more  in  doubt  than  that  in  the  war 
with  Spain. 

TheUnited  States  had  at  the  moment  but  fourteen 
thousand  men  in  the  islands,  under  the  command  of 
General  Otis.  Some  of  these  were  volunteers  who 
had  been  organized  to  fight  Spain  and  who  could  not 
be  held  after  the  ratification  of  peace.  Congress 
had,  indeed,  provided  for  an  increase  in  the  regular 
army,  but  not  sufficient  to  provide  the  "40,000  ef- 
fectives for  the  field,"  whom  Otis  had  requested  in 
August,  1899.  There  were,  of  course,  plenty  of  men 
available  in  America  for  service  in  the  Philippines, 
and  finally  twelve  regiments  of  volunteers  were 
raised,  two  of  which  were  composed  of  negroes.  Agui- 
naldo's  strength  lay  in  the  configuration  of  the 
country,  in  its  climate,  which  for  four  centuries  had 
prevented  a  complete  conquest  by  the  Spaniards, 
and  in  the  uncertainty  which  he  knew  existed  as  to 
how  far  the  American  people  would  support  a  war 
waged  apparently  for  conquest,  against  the  wishes 
of  the  Filipinos.  On  the  other  hand,  the  chief  ad- 
vantages of  the  American  forces  lay  in  Aguinaldo's 
lack  of  arms  and  in  the  power  of  the  Americar 


A  PEACE  WHICH  MEANT  WAR         207 

Navy,  which  confined  the  fighting  for  the  most  part 
to  Luzon. 

In  March,  General  MacArthur  began  to  move  to 
the  north,  and  oil  the  last  day  of  that  month  he 
entered  Malolos.  On  the  23d  of  April  he  pushed 
farther  northward  toward  Calumpit,  where  the  Fili- 
pino generalissimo,  Luna,  had  prepared  a  position 
which  he  declared  to  be  impregnable.  This  brief 
campaign  added  a  new  favorite  to  the  American 
roll  of  honor,  for  it  was  here  that  Colonel  Funston, 
at  the  head  of  his  gallant  Kansans,  crossed  the 
rivers  Bag-bag  and  Rio  Grande,  under  circum- 
stances that  gave  the  individual  American  soldier 
a  prestige  in  the  eyes  of  the  Filipinos  and  a  reputa- 
tion which  often  ran  far  ahead  of  the  army. 

General  Luna  had  torn  up  the  ties  and  rails  of 
the  steel  railroad  bridge  over  the  Bag-bag,  and  had 
let  down  the  span  next  the  far  bank.  Thus  cut  off 
from  attack  by  a  deep  river  two  hundred  feet  wide, 
the  Filipino  commander  had  entrenched  his  forces  on 
the  farther  side.  Shielded  by  fields  of  young  corn 
and  bamboo  thickets,  the  Americans  approached 
the  bank  of  the  river.  A  naval  gun  on  an  armored 
train  bombarded  the  Filipinos  but  could  not  silence 
their  trenches.  It  was  therefore  necessary  to  cross 
on  the  bridge,  and  under  fire.  General  Wheaton 


208  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

ordered  Colonel  Funston  to  seize  the  bridge.  With 
about  ten  men  Funston  rushed  the  nearer  end  which 
stood  in  the  open.  Working  themselves  along  the 
girders,  the  men  finally  reached  the  broken  span. 
Beyond  that,  swimming  was  the  only  method  of 
reaching  the  goal.  Leaving  their  guns  behind  them, 
Colonel  Funston  and  three  others  swung  themselves 
off  the  bridge  and  into  the  stream.  Quite  unarmed, 
the  four  landed  and  rushed  the  nearest  trenches. 
Fortunately  these  had  been  abandoned  under  Amer- 
ican fire,  and  rifles  and  cartridges  had  been  left  be- 
hind. Thus  this  aquatic  charge  by  unarmed  men 
secured  the  bridge  and  enabled  the  American  troops 
to  cross. 

Not  far  beyond  was  the  Rio  Grande,  four  hundred 
feet  broad  and  crossed  by  another  railroad  bridge 
that  must  be  taken.  Here  again  the  task  was 
entrusted  to  Colonel  Funston  and  the  Twentieth 
Kansas.  This  time  they  found  an  old  raft.  Two  pri- 
vates stripped  and  swam  across  with  a  rope.  Land- 
ing unarmed  on  the  enemy's  side  of  the  river,  they 
fastened  their  rope  to  a  part  of  the  very  trench 
works  of  the  Filipinos.  With  this  connection  es- 
tablished, Colonel  Funston  improvised  a  ferry  and 
was  soon  on  the  enemy's  side  with  supports.  A 
stiff,  unequal  fight  remained,  as  the  ferry  carried 


A  PEACE  WHICH  MEANT  WAR         209 

but  six  men  on  each  trip.  The  bank  was  soon 
won,  however,  and  the  safe  crossing  of  the  army 
was  assured.  Such  acts  gave  the  natives  a  respect 
for  Americans  as  fighting  men,  which  caused  it  to 
be  more  and  more  difficult  for  the  Filipino  com- 
manders to  bring  their  forces  to  battle  in  the  open. 

General  Lawton  in  the  meantime  was  conduct- 
ing a  brilliant  movement  to  the  eastward.  After 
breaking  the  enemy  forces,  he  returned  to  Manila 
and  then  marched  southward  into  the  Tagalog  coun- 
try, where  on  the  13th  of  June,  at  Zapoti  Bridge,  he 
won  the  most  stoutly  contested  battle  of  the  insur- 
rection. The  successful  conclusion  of  these  opera- 
tions brought  the  most  civilized  part  of  the  island 
under  American  control. 

The  fighting  now  became  scattered  and  assumed 
gradually  a  guerrilla  character.  The  abler  com- 
manders of  the  American  forces  found  their  way  to 
the  top,  and  the  troops,  with  their  natural  adapta- 
bility, constantly  devised  new  methods  of  meet- 
ing new  situations.  A  war  of  strangely  combined 
mountain  and  sea  fighting,  involving  cavalry  and 
infantry  and  artillery,  spread  over  the  islands  in 
widening  circles  and  met  with  lessening  resistance. 
An  indication  of  the  new  character  of  the  war  was 
given  by  the  change  of  the  military  organization, 


210  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

in  April,  1900,  from  one  of  divisions  and  brigades, 
to  a  geographical  basis.  Each  commander  was  now 
given  charge  of  a  certain  area  and  used  his  men  to 
reduce  this  district  to  order. 

The  insurgents  fought  in  small  groups  and  gener- 
ally under  local  chieftains.  Their  advantage  lay 
in  their  thorough  knowledge  of  the  country  and  in 
the  sympathy  of  a  part  of  the  population  and  the 
fear  of  another  part,  for  outlaws  living  in  conceal- 
ment and  moving  in  the  dark  can  often  inspire  a 
terror  which  regular  troops  under  discipline  fail  to 
engender.  The  Americans  could  not  trust  the  na- 
tives, as  it  was  impossible  to  tell  the  truthful  from 
the  treacherous.  Nevertheless  it  was  a  kind  of 
fighting  which  gave  unusual  scope  for  that  Amer- 
ican individualism,  so  strongly  represented  in  the 
army,  to  which  the  romance  of  precisely  this  sort  of 
thing  had  drawn  just  the  class  of  men  best  fitted 
for  the  work.  Scouting,  counter  scouting,  surprise 
attacks,  and  ambuscades  formed  the  daily  news 
transmitted  from  the  front  —  affairs  not  of  regi- 
ments and  companies  but  of  squads  and  individ- 
uals. When  face  to  face,  however,  the  Filipinos 
seldom  stood  their  ground,  and  the  American 
ingenuity  and  eager  willingness  to  attempt  any 
new  thing  gradually  got  the  better  of  the  local 


A  PEACE  WHICH  MEANT  WAR 

knowledge  and  unscrupulousness  as  to  the  laws  of 
war  which  had  at  first  given  the  natives  an  advan- 
tage. Funston,  now  Brigadier  General,  and  his 
"suicide  squad"  continued  to  play  an  active 
part,  but  a  similar  spirit  of  daring  and  ingenuity 
pervaded  the  whole  army. 

Broken  as  were  the  Filipino  field  forces  and 
widening  as  was  the  area  of  peace,  the  result  of 
the  island  campaign  was  still  uncertain.  It  rested 
upon  two  unknown  quantities.  The  first  was  the 
nature  of  the  Filipinos.  Would  they  remain  ir- 
reconcilable, ever  ready  to  take  advantage  of  a  mo- 
ment of  weakness?  If  such  were  to  be  the  case, 
we  could  look  for  no  real  conquest,  but  only  a  for- 
cible occupation,  which  the  people  of  the  United 
States  would  never  consent  to  maintain.  The 
second  unknown  quantity  was  the  American  people 
themselves.  Would  they  sustain  the  occupation 
sufficiently  long  to  give  a  reasonable  test  of  the 
possibilities  of  success? 

Two  events  brought  these  uncertainties  to  an 
end.  In  the  first  place,  William  Jennings  Bryan 
was  defeated  for  the  presidency  in  November,  1900, 
and  President  McKinley  was  given  four  more  years 
in  which  to  complete  the  experiment.  In  the  second 
place,  on  March  23, 1901,  Aguinaldo,  who  had  been 


THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

long  in  concealment,  was  captured.  Though  there 
had  long  been  no  possibility  of  really  commanding 
the  insurgent  forces  as  a  whole,  Aguinaldo  had  re- 
mained the  center  of  revolt  and  occasionally  showed 
his  hand,  as  in  the  attempt  to  negotiate  a  peace  on 
the  basis  of  independence.  In  February  an  inter- 
cepted letter  had  given  a  clue  to  his  hiding  place. 
Funston,  in  spite  of  his  new  rank,  determined  per- 
sonally to  undertake  the  capture.  The  signature  of 
Lacuna,  one  of  the  insurgent  leaders,  was  forged  and 
letters  were  sent  to  Aguinaldo  informing  him  of  the 
capture  of  five  Americans,  who  were  being  sent  to 
headquarters.  Among  the  five  was  Funston  him- 
self. The  "insurgent "  guard,  clad  in  captured  uni- 
forms, consisted  for  the  most  part  of  Macabebes, 
hereditary  enemies  of  the  Tagalogs  —  for  the  Amer- 
icans had  now  learned  the  Roman  trick  of  using 
one  people  against  another.  The  ruse  succeeded 
perfectly.  The  guard  and  its  supposed  prisoners 
were  joyfully  received  by  Aguinaldo,  but  the  tables 
were  quickly  turned  and  Aguinaldo 's  capture  was 
promptly  effected. 

On  the  19th  of  April,  Aguinaldo  wrote:  "After 
mature  deliberation,  I  resolutely  proclaim  to  the 
world  that  I  cannot  refuse  to  heed  the  voice  of  a 
people  longing  for  peace,  nor  the  lamentations  of 


A  PEACE  WHICH  MEANT  WAR         213 

thousands  of  families  yearning  to  see  their  dear 
ones  enjoying  the  liberty  and  promised  generosity 
of  the  great  American  nation.  By  acknowledg- 
ing and  accepting  the  sovereignty  of  the  United 
States  throughout  the  Philippine  Archipelago,  as 
I  now  do,  and  without  any  reservation  what- 
soever, I  believe  that  I  am  serving  thee,  my 
beloved  country." 

On  the  19th  of  May,  General  Wheaton,  Chief  of 
Staff  in  the  Philippines,  sent  the  following  dispatch 
to  Washington :  "Lacuna  having  surrendered  with 
all  his  officers  and  men  today,  I  report  that  all  in- 
surrectionary leaders  in  this  department  have  been 
captured  or  have  surrendered.  This  is  the  termi- 
nation of  the  state  of  war  in  this  department  so  far 
as  armed  resistance  to  the  authority  of  the  United 
States  is  concerned." 

There  was  subsequent  fighting  with  other  tribes 
and  in  other  islands,  particularly  with  the  Moros 
of  the  Sulu  group,  but  by  the  time  Aguinaldo 
had  accepted  American  rule,  the  uncertainty  of  the 
American  people  had  been  resolved,  and  the  execu- 
tion of  the  treaty  with  Spain  had  been  actually 
accomplished.  As  seventy  thousand  troops  were 
no  longer  needed  in  the  islands,  the  volunteers  and 
many  of  the  regulars  were  sent  home,  and  there 


214  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

began  an  era  of  peace  such  as  the  Philippines  had 
never  before  known. 

During  the  suppression  of  the  insurrection  the 
American  Army  had  resorted  to  severe  measures, 
though  they  by  no  means  went  to  the  extremes 
that  were  reported  in  the  press.  It  was  realized, 
however,  that  the  establishment  of  a  permanent 
peace  must  rest  upon  an  appeal  to  the  good  will 
and  self-interest  of  the  natives.  The  treatment  of 
the  conquered  territories,  therefore,  was  a  matter 
of  the  highest  concern  not  only  with  reference  to 
the  public  opinion  at  home  but  to  the  lasting 
success  of  the  military  operations  which  had  just 
been  concluded. 

There  was  as  yet  no  law  in  the  United  States  re- 
lating to  the  government  of  dependencies.  The 
entire  control  of  the  islands  therefore  rested,  in  the 
first  instance,  with  the  President  and  was  vested  by 
him,  subject  to  instructions,  in  the  Military  Gov- 
ernor. The  army  fortunately  reflected  fully  the 
democratic  tendencies  of  the  United  States  as  a 
whole.  In  June,  1899,  General  Lawton  encouraged 
and  assisted  the  natives  in  setting  up  in  their  vil- 
lages governing  bodies  of  their  own  selection.  In 
August,  he  issued  a  general  order,  based  upon  a 
law  of  the  islands,  providing  for  a  general  system  of 


A  PEACE  WHICH  MEANT  WAR         215 

local  government  into  which  there  was  introduced 
for  the  first  time  the  element  of  really  popular  elec- 
tion. In  1900,  a  new  code  of  criminal  procedure, 
largely  the  work  of  Enoch  Herbert  Crowder,  at 
that  time  Military  Secretary,  was  promulgated, 
which  surrounded  the  accused  with  practically  all 
the  safeguards  to  which  the  Anglo-Saxon  is  ac- 
customed except  jury  trial,  for  which  the  people 
were  unprepared. 

To  advise  with  regard  to  a  permanent  system  of 
government  for  the  Philippines  President  McKin- 
ley  appointed  in  January,  1899,  a  commission  con- 
sisting of  Jacob  G.  Schurman,  President  of  Cornell 
University,  Dean  C.  Worcester,  who  had  long  been 
engaged  in  scientific  research  in  the  Philippines, 
Colonel  Charles  Denby,  for  many  years  previously 
minister  to  China,  Admiral  Dewey,  and  General 
E.  S.  Otis.  Largely  upon  their  recommendation, 
the  President  appointed  a  second  commission, 
headed  by  Judge  William  Howard  Taft  to  carry  on 
the  work  of  organizing  civil  government  which  had 
already  begun  under  military  direction  and  grad- 
ually to  take  over  the  legislative  power.  The  Mili- 
tary Governor  was  to  continue  to  exercise  execu- 
tive power.  In  1901 ,  Congress  at  length  took  action, 
vesting  all  military,  civil,  and  judicial  powers  in 


216  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

such  persons  as  the  President  might  appoint  to 
govern  the  islands.  McKinley  immediately  ap- 
pointed Judge  Taft  to  the  new  governorship  thus 
authorized.  In  1901  in  the  "Insular  Cases"  the 
Supreme  Court  also  gave  its  sanction  to  what  had 
been  done.  In  legislation  for  the  territories,  it 
held  that  Congress  was  not  bound  by  all  the  re- 
strictions of  the  Constitution,  as,  for  instance, 
that  requiring  jury  trial;  that  Porto  Rico  and  the 
Philippines  were  neither  foreign  countries  nor  com- 
pletely parts  of  the  United  States,  though  Congress 
was  at  liberty  to  incorporate  them  into  the  Union. 
There  was,  however,  no  disposition  to  incorporate 
the  Philippines  into  the  United  States,  but  there 
has  always  been  a  widespread  sentiment  that  the 
islands  should  ultimately  be  given  their  independ- 
ence, and  this  sentiment  has  largely  governed  the 
American  attitude  toward  them.  A  native  Legisla- 
ture was  established  in  1907  under  Governor  Taft,1 
and  under  the  Wilson  Administration  the  process 
toward  independence  has  been  accelerated,  and 

1  By  the  Act  of  July  1,  1902,  the  Legislature  was  to  consist  of  two 
houses,  the  Commission  acting  as  an  upper  house  and  an  elective 
assembly  constituting  a  lower  house.  The  Legislature  at  its  first 
session  was  to  elect  two  delegates  who  were  to  sit,  without  the  right 
to  vote,  in  the  House  of  Representatives  at  Washington.  An  Act  of 
August  29,  1916,  substituted  an  elective  Senate  for  the  Philippin« 
Commission  as  the  upper  house  of  the  Legislature. 


A  PEACE  WHICH  MEANT  WAR         217 

dates  begin  to  be  considered.  The  process  of  prep- 
aration for  independence  has  been  threefold :  the  de- 
velopment of  the  physical  well-being  of  the  islands, 
the  education  of  the  islanders,  and  the  gradual  in- 
troduction of  the  latter  into  responsible  positions 
of  government.  With  little  of  the  encouragement 
which  might  have  come  from  appreciative  interest 
at  home,  thousands  of  Americans  have  now  labored 
in  the  Philippines  for  almost  twenty  years,  but  with, 
little  disposition  to  settle  there  permanently.  Their 
efforts  to  develop  the  Filipinos  have  achieved  re- 
markable success.  It  has  of  late  been  found  pos- 
sible to  turn  over  such  a  large  proportion  of  the 
governmental  work  to  the  natives  that  the  number 
of  Americans  in  the  islands  is  steadily  diminishing. 
The  outbreak  of  the  war  with  Germany  found  the 
natives  loyal  to  American  interests  and  even  saw  a 
son  of  Aguinaldo  taking  service  under  the  Stars  and 
Stripes.  Such  a  tribute,  like  the  services  of  Gen- 
erals Smuts  and  Botha  to  Great  Britain,  compen- 
sates for  the  friction  and  noise  with  which  democ- 
racy works  and  is  the  kind  of  triumph  which  carries 
reassurance  of  its  ultimate  efficiency  and  justice. 


CHAPTER  XIV 

THE   OPEN   DOOR 

THE  United  States  arrived  in  the  Orient  at  a  mo- 
ment of  high  excitement.  Russia  was  consolidat- 
ing the  advance  of  two  centuries  by  the  building  of 
the  trans-Siberian  railroad,  and  was  looking  eagerly 
for  a  port  in  the  sun,  to  supplement  winter-bound 
Vladivostok.  Great  Britain  still  regarded  Russia 
as  the  great  enemy  and,  pursuing  her  policy  of 
placing  buffer  states  between  her  territories  and  her 
enemies,  was  keenly  interested  in  preventing  any 
encroachment  southward  which  might  bring  the 
Russian  bear  nearer  India.  France,  Russia's  ally, 
possessed  Indo-China,  which  was  growing  at  the 
expense  of  Siam  and  which  might  grow  north- 
wards into  China.  Germany  saw  in  eastern  Asia 
the  richest  prize  remaining  in  the  world  not  yet 
possessed  by  her  rivals,  and  it  was  for  this  that 
she  was  seeking  power  in  the  Pacific.  Having 
missed  the  Philippines,  she  quickly  secured  Samoa 

218 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  219 

and  purchased  from  Spain  the  Caroline  Islands,  east 
of  the  Philippines,  and  all  that  the  United  States 
had  not  taken  of  Spain's  empire  in  the  Pacific. 

These  latent  rivalries  had  been  brought  into 
the  open  by  the  Chino-Japanese  War  of  1894-1895, 
which  showed  the  powerlessness  of  China.  The 
western  world  was,  indeed,  divided  in  opinion  as  to 
whether  this  colossus  of  the  East  was  essentially 
rotten,  old,  decrepit,  and  ready  to  disintegrate,  or 
was  merely  weak  because  of  arrested  development, 
which  education  and  training  could  correct.  At 
any  rate,  China  was  regarded  as  sick  and  therefore 
became  for  the  moment  even  more  interesting  than 
Turkey,  the  traditional  sick  man  of  Europe.  If 
China  were  to  die,  her  estate  would  be  divided.  If 
she  were  really  to  revitalize  her  vast  bulk  by  adapt- 
ing her  millions  to  modern  ways,  she  had  but  to 
stretch  herself  and  the  toilfully  acquired  Asiatic 
possessions  of  the  European  powers  would  shiver 
to  pieces;  and  if  she  awoke  angry,  Europe  herself 
might  well  tremble.  The  really  wise  saw  that  the 
important  thing  was  to  determine  the  kind  of  edu- 
cation which  China  should  receive,  and  in  solv- 
ing this  problem  the  palm  of  wisdom  must  be 
given  to  the  missionaries  who  represented  the  great 
Christian  societies  ot  Europe  and  America.  To 


220  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

small-minded  statesmen  it  seemed  that  the  situation 
called  for  conquest.  No  nation  was  willing  to  be 
late  at  the  division,  if  division  it  was  to  be;  while 
if  China  was  to  awake,  the  European  powers  felt 
that  she  should  awake  shackled.  By  no  one  was 
this  latter  view  so  clearly  held  as  by  the  Kaiser. 
With  his  accustomed  versatility,  he  designed  a 
cartoon  showing  the  European  powers,  armed 
and  with  Germania  in  the  forefront,  confronting  the 
yellow  peril.  On  sending  his  troops  to  China  in 
1900,  he  told  them  to  imitate  the  methods  of  the 
Huns,  in  order  to  strike  lasting  terror  to  the  hearts 
of  the  yellow  race.  By  such  means  he  sought  to 
direct  attention  to  the  menace  of  the  Barbarian, 
when  he  was  himself  first  stating  that  doctrine  of 
Teutonic  frightf ulness  which  has  proved,  in  our  day 
at  least,  to  be  the  real  world  peril. 

It  was  Japan  who  had  exposed  the  weakness  of 
the  giant,  but  her  victory  had  been  so  easy  that 
her  own  strength  was  as  yet  untested.  Japan  had 
come  of  age  in  1894  when,  following  the  example  of 
Great  Britain,  the  various  powers  had  released  her 
from  the  obligation  of  exterritoriality  imposed  upon 
her  by  treaties  when  their  subjects  were  unwill- 
ing to  trust  themselves  to  her  courts.  It  was  still 
uncertain,  however,  whether  the  assumption  of 


THE  OPEN  DOOR 

European  methods  by  Japan  was  real,  and  her  posi- 
tion as  a  great  power  was  not  yet  established.  In 
the  very  moment  of  her  triumph  over  China  she 
was  forced  to  submit  to  the  humiliation  of  having 
the  terms  of  peace  supervised  by  a  concert  of  pow- 
ers and  of  having  many  of  the  spoils  of  her  victory 
torn  from  her. 

The  chief  fruits  that  remained  to  Japan  from 
her  brilliant  military  victory  were  Formosa  and 
the  recognition  of  the  separation  of  Korea  from 
China.  These  acquisitions  gave  her  an  opportun- 
ity to  show  her  capacity  for  real  expansion,  but 
whether  she  would  be  able  to  hold  her  prize  was 
yet  to  be  proven.  The  European  states,  however, 
claimed  that  by  the  Japanese  victories  the  balance 
of  power  in  the  Orient  had  been  upset  and  that  it 
must  be  adjusted.  The  obvious  method  was  for 
each  power  to  demand  something  for  itself.  In 
1898  Germany  secured  a  lease  of  Kiao-chau  Bay 
across  the  Yellow  Sea  from  Korea,  which  she  at  once 
fortified  and  where  she  proceeded  to  develop  a  port 
with  the  hope  of  commanding  the  trade  of  all  that 
part  of  China.  Russia  in  the  same  way  secured, 
somewhat  farther  to  the  north,  Port  Arthur  and 
Talien-wan,  and  proceeded  to  build  Dalny  as  the 
commercial  outlet  of  her  growing  railroad.  Great 


THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Britain  immediately  occupied  Wei-hai-wei,  which 
was  midway  between  the  German  and  Russian  bases 
and  commanded  from  the  south  the  entrance  to 
Pekin,  and  also,  much  farther  to  the  south,  Mirs 
Bay,  which  gave  security  to  her  commercial  center 
at  Hong-kong.  France  took  Kwang-chau,  still  far- 
ther to  the  south,  and  Italy  received  Sanmen,  some- 
what to  the  south  of  the  Yangtsze-kiang.  From 
these  ports  each  power  hoped  to  extend  a  sphere  of 
influence.  It  was  axiomatic  that  such  a  sphere 
would  be  most  rapidly  developed  and  most  solidly 
held  if  special  tariff  regulations  were  devised  to 
throw  the  trade  into  the  hands  of  the  merchants 
of  the  nation  holding  the  port.  The  next  step, 
therefore,  in  establishing  the  solidity  of  an  Asi- 
atic base,  would  be  the  formulation  of  special 
tariffs.  The  result  would  be  the  practical  division 
of  China  into  districts  having  different  and  opposed 
commercial  interests. 

The  United  States  did  not  arrive  in  this  energetic 
company  as  an  entire  stranger.  With  both  China 
and  Japan  her  relations  had  long  been  intimate  and 
friendly.  American  merchants  had  traded  ginseng 
and  furs  for  China  silks  and  teas  ever  since  the 
United  States  had  been  a  nation.  In  1786  the 
Government  had  appointed  a  commercial  agent  at 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  223 

Canton  and  in  1844  had  made  one  of  the  first  com- 
mercial treaties  with  China.  In  1854  the  United 
States  had  been  the  point  of  the  foreign  wedge  that 
opened  Japan  to  western  civilization  and  inaugu- 
rated that  amazing  period  of  national  reorganiza- 
tion and  assimilation  which  has  given  the  Japanese 
Empire  her  place  in  the  world  today.  American 
missionaries  had  labored  long  and  disinterestedly 
for  the  moral  regeneration  of  both  China  and  Japan 
with  results  which  are  now  universally  recognized 
as  beneficial,  though  in  1900  there  was  still  among 
the  Chinese  much  of  that  friction  which  is  the  in- 
evitable reaction  from  an  attempt  to  change  the 
fundamentals  of  an  ancient  faith  and  long-standing 
habits.  American  merchants,  it  is  true,  had  been  of 
all  classes,  but  at  any  rate  there  had  always  been  a 
sufficient  leaven  of  those  of  the  highest  type  to 
insure  a  reasonable  reputation. 

The  conduct  of  the  American  Government  in  the 
Far  East  had  been  most  honorable  and  friendly. 
The  treaty  with  Japan  in  1858  contained  the  clause: 
"The  President  of  the  United  States,  at  the  request 
of  the  Japanese  Government,  will  act  as  a  friendly 
mediator  in  such  matters  of  difference  as  may  arise 
between  the  Government  of  Japan  and  any  Euro- 
pean power."  Under  Seward  the  United  States 


S24  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

did,  indeed,  work  in  concert  with  European  powers 
to  force  the  opening  of  the  Shimonoseki  Straits  in 
1864,  and  a  revision  of  the  tariff  in  1866.  Sub- 
sequently, however,  the  United  States  cooperated 
with  Japan  in  her  effort  to  free  herself  from  certain 
disadvantageous  features  of  early  treaties.  In  1883 
the  United  States  returned  the  indemnity  received 
at  the  time  of  the  Shimonoseki  affair  —  an  example 
of  international  equity  almost  unique  at  the  time 
but  subsequently  paralleled  in  American  relations 
with  China.  The  one  serious  difficulty  existing  in 
the  relationships  of  the  United  States  with  both 
China  and  Japan  resulted  from  an  unwillingness  to 
receive  their  natives  as  immigrants  when  people  of 
nearly  every  other  country  were  admitted.  The 
American  attitude  had  already  been  expressed  in 
the  Chinese  Exclusion  Act.  As  yet  the  chief  diffi- 
culty was  with  that  nation,  but  it  was  inevitable  that 
such  distinctions  would  prove  particularly  galling 
to  the  rising  spirit  of  the  Japanese. 

John  Hay  was  keenly  aware  of  the  possibili- 
ties involved  in  these  Far  Eastern  events.  Of  pro- 
found moment  under  any  circumstances,  they  were 
doubly  so  now  that  the  United  States  was  terri- 
torially involved.  To  take  a  slice  of  this  Eastern 
area  was  a  course  quite  open  to  the  United  States 


THE  OPEN  DOOR 

and  one  which  some  of  the  powers  at  least  would 
have  welcomed.  Hay,  however,  wrote  to  Paul 
Dana  on  March  16,  1899,  as  follows:  "We  are,  of 
course,  opposed  to  the  dismemberment  of  that  em- 
pire [China],  and  we  do  not  think  that  the  public 
opinion  of  the  United  States  would  justify  this 
Government  in  taking  part  in  the  great  game  of 
spoliation  now  going  on."  He  felt  also  that  the 
United  States  should  not  tie  its  hands  by  "formal 
alliances  with  other  Powers  interested, "  nor  was 
he  prepared  "to  assure  China  that  we  would  join 
her  in  repelling  that  demand  by  armed  force. " 

It  remained,  then,  for  the  Secretary  of  State  to 
find  a  lever  for  peaceful  interference  on  the  part  of 
his  country  and  a  plan  for  future  operations.  The 
first  he  found  in  the  commercial  interest  of  the 
United  States.  Since  the  Government  refrained 
from  pressing  for  special  favors  in  any  single  part 
of  the  Chinese  Empire,  it  could  demand  that  Amer- 
ican interests  be  not  infringed  anywhere.  The 
Secretary  of  State  realized  that  in  a  democracy 
statesmen  cannot  overlook  the  necessity  of  con- 
densing their  policies  into  popular  catchwords  or 
slogans.  Today  such  phrases  represent  in  large 
measure  the  power  referred  to  in  the  old  saying: 
"Let  me  make  the  songs  of  a  nation,  and  I  care  not 
15 


226  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

who  makes  its  laws."  The  single  phrase,  "scrap 
of  paper, "  probably  cost  Germany  more  than  any 
one  of  her  atrocious  deeds  in  the  Great  War.  Hay's 
policy  with  regard  to  China  had  the  advantage  of 
two  such  phrases.  The  "golden  rule,"  however, 
proved  less  lasting  than  the  "open  door,"  which 
was  coined  apparently  in  the  instructions  to  the 
Paris  Peace  Commission.  This  phrase  expressed 
just  what  the  United  States  meant.  The  precise 
plan  of  the  American  Government  was  outlined 
and  its  execution  undertaken  in  a  circular  note  of 
September  6, 1899,  which  the  Secretary  of  State  ad- 
dressed to  London,  Berlin,  and  St.  Petersburg.  In 
this  he  asked  the  powers  to  agree  to  respect  all 
existing  open  ports  and  established  interests  with- 
in their  respective  spheres,  to  enforce  the  Chinese 
tariff  and  no  other,  and  to  refrain  from  all  discrim- 
ination in  port  and  railroad  charges.  To  make 
such  a  proposal  to  the  European  powers  required 
courage.  In  its  essential  elements  the  situation  in 
the  Far  East  was  not  unlike  the  internal  economic 
condition  prevailing  at  the  same  time  in  the 
United  States.  In  this  country  great  transporta- 
tion monopolies  had  been  built  up,  having  an  enor- 
mous capitalization,  and  many  of  them  were  de- 
pendent for  their  profits  on  the  advantage  of  price 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  227 

fixing  that  monopoly  may  be  expected  to  bring. 
Then  state  and  nation  stepped  in  and  asserted  their 
right  to  fix  prices  in  the  interest  of  the  consumer. 
The  consequent  political  struggles  illustrate  the 
difficulties  besetting  the  Secretary  of  State  in  his 
somewhat  similar  attempt  to  take  the  chief  fruits 
from  the  powers  which  had  just  acquired  Chinese 
territory  —  an  undertaking  in  which  he  had  none 
of  the  support  of  legal  powers  effective  in  the 
United  States. 

That  Hay  so  promptly  succeeded  in  putting  at 
least  a  toe  in  the  door  which  he  wished  to  open  was 
due  to  a  number  of  circumstances.  Great  Britain, 
devoted  to  the  principle  of  free  trade,  heartily  ap- 
proved of  his  proposal  and  at  once  accepted  its 
terms.  The  other  powers  expressed  their  sym- 
pathy with  the  ideas  of  the  note,  but,  in  the  case  of 
Russia  at  least,  without  the  faintest  intention  of  pay- 
ing any  heed  to  it.  Hay  promptly  notified  each 
power  of  the  others'  approval  and  stated  that,  with 
this  unanimous  consent,  he  would  regard  its  accept- 
ance of  the  proposals  as  "final  and  definitive.'* 

The  force  which  Hay  had  used  was  the  moral 
influence  of  world  opinion.  None  of  the  powers 
dared,  with  its  hands  fresh  filled  with  Chinese 
plunder,  openly  to  assert  that  it  had  taken  the 


228  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

spoils  for  selfish  reasons  alone  —  at  least,  after  an- 
other power  had  denied  such  purpose,  Hay  saw 
and  capitalized  the  force  of  conventional  morality 
which,  however  superficial  in  many  cases,  had  in- 
fluenced the  European  powers,  particularly  since 
the  time  of  the  Holy  Alliance.  Accustomed  to 
clothe  their  actions  in  the  garb  of  humanitarianism, 
they  were  not,  when  caught  thus  red-handed,  pre- 
pared to  be  a  mark  of  scorn  for  the  rest  of  the 
world.  The  cult  of  unabashed  might  was  still  a 
closet  philosophy  which  even  Germany,  its  chief 
devotee,  was  not  yet  ready  to  avow  to  the  world. 
Of  course  Hay  knew  that  the  battle  was  not  won, 
for  the  bandits  still  held  the  booty.  He  was  too 
wise  to  attempt  to  wrench  it  from  them,  for  that 
indeed  would  have  meant  battle  for  which  the 
United  States  was  not  prepared  in  military  strength 
or  popular  intention.  He  had  merely  pledged  these 
countries  to  use  their  acquisitions  for  the  general 
good.  Though  the  promises  meant  little  in  them- 
selves, to  have  exacted  them  was  an  initial  step 
toward  victory. 

In  the  meantime  the  penetration  of  foreign  influ- 
ences into  China  was  producing  a  reaction.  A 
wave  of  protest  against  the  "foreign  devils"  swept 
through  the  population  and  acquired  intensity 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  229 

from  the  acts  of  fanatic  religious  leaders.  That 
strange  character,  the  Dowager  Empress,  yielded 
to  the  "Boxers,"  who  obtained  possession  of  Pekin, 
cut  off  the  foreigners  from  the  outside  world,  and 
besieged  them  in  the  legations.  That  some  such 
movement  was  inevitable  must  have  been  apparent 
to  many  European  statesmen,  and  that  it  would 
give  them  occasion,  by  interference  and  punish- 
ment, to  solidify  their  "spheres  of  influence"  must 
have  occurred  to  them.  The  "open  door"  was  in 
as  immediate  peril  as  were  the  diplomats  in  Pekin. 
Secretary  Hay  did  not,  however,  yield  to  these 
altered  circumstances.  Instead,  he  built  upon  the 
leadership  which  he  had  assumed.  He  promptly 
accepted  the  international  responsibility  which  the 
emergency  called  for.  The  United  States  at  once 
agreed  to  take  its  share,  in  cooperation  with  the 
Great  Powers,  in  whatever  measures  should  be 
judged  necessary.  The  first  obvious  measure  was 
to  relieve  the  foreign  ministers  who  were  besieged  in 
Pekin.  American  assistance  was  active  and  imme- 
diate. By  the  efforts  of  the  American  Government, 
communication  with  the  legations  was  opened;  the 
American  naval  forces  were  soon  at  Tientsin,  the 
port  of  Pekin;  and  five  or  six  thousand  troops 
were  has tily  sen t  from  the  Philippines .  The  United 


230  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

States  therefore  bore  its  full  proportion  of  the  task. 
The  largest  contingent  of  the  land  forces  was,  in- 
deed, from  Germany,  and  the  command  of  the  whole 
undertaking  was  by  agreement  given  to  the  Ger- 
man commander,  Graf  von  Waldersee.  Owing, 
however,  to  his  remoteness  from  the  scene  of  ac- 
tion, he  did  not  arrive  until  after  Pekin  had  been 
reached  and  the  relief  of  the  legations,  which  was 
the  first  if  not  the  main  object  of  the  expedition, 
had  been  accomplished.  After  this,  the  resistance  of 
the  Chinese  greatly  decreased  and  the  country  was 
practically  at  the  mercy  of  the  concert  of  powers. 
By  thus  bearing  its  share  in  the  responsibilities 
of  the  situation,  the  United  States  had  won  a  vote 
in  determining  the  result.  Secretary  Hay,  how- 
ever, had  not  waited  for  the  military  outcome,  and 
he  aimed  not  at  a  vote  in  the  concert  of  powers  but 
at  its  leadership.  While  the  international  expedi- 
tion was  gathering  its  forces,  he  announced  in  a 
circular  note  that  "the  policy  of  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  is  to  seek  a  solution  which  may 
bring  about  permanent  safety  and  peace  to  China, 
preserve  Chinese  territorial  and  administrative  en- 
tity, protect  all  rights  guaranteed  to  friendly  pow- 
ers by  treaty  and  international  law,  and  safeguard 
for  the  world  the  principle  of  equal  and  impartial 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  231 

trade  with  all  parts  of  the  Chinese  Empire."  To  this 
position  he  requested  the  powers  to  assent. 

Again  Hay  had  hit  upon  a  formula  which  n< 
self-respecting  power  could  deny.  Receiving  from 
practically  all  a  statement  of  their  purpose  to 
preserve  the  "integrity"  of  China  and  the  "Open 
Door"  just  when  they  were  launching  the  greatest 
military  movement  ever  undertaken  in  the  Far 
East  by  the  western  world,  he  made  it  impossible 
to  turn  punishment  into  destruction  and  partition. 
The  legations  were  saved  and  so  was  China.  After 
complicated  negotiations  an  agreement  was  reached 
which  exacted  heavy  pecuniary  penalties,  and  in 
the  case  of  Germany,  whose  minister  had  been  as- 
sassinated, a  conspicuous  and  what  was  intended 
to  be  an  enduring  record  of  the  crime  and  its  punish- 
ment. China,  however,  remained  a  nation  —  with 
its  door  open. 

Once  more  in  1904  the  fate  of  China,  and  in  fact 
that  of  the  whole  Far  East,  was  thrown  into  the 
ring.  Japan  and  Russia  entered  into  a  war  which 
had  practically  no  cause  except  the  collision  of  their 
advancing  interests  in  Chinese  territory.  Every 
land  battle  of  the  war,  except  those  of  the  Sagha- 
lien  campaign,  was  fought  in  China,  Chinese  ports 
were  blockaded,  Chinese  waters  were  filled  with 


THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

•enemy  mines  and  torpedoes,  and  the  prize  was 
Chinese  territory  or  territory  recently  taken  from 
her.  To  deny  these  facts  was  impossible;  to  ad- 
mit them  seemed  to  involve  the  disintegration  of 
the  empire.  Here  again  Secretary  Hay,  devising 
SL  middle  course,  gained  by  his  promptness  of  ac- 
tion the  prestige  of  having  been  the  first  to  speak. 
On  February  8,  1904,  he  asked  Germany,  Great 
Britain,  and  France  to  join  with  the  United  States 
in  requesting  Japan  and  Russia  to  recognize  the 
neutrality  of  China,  and  to  localize  hostilities  with- 
in fixed  limits.  On  January  10, 1905,  remembering 
how  the  victory  of  Japan  in  1894  had  brought  com- 
pensatory grants  to  all  the  powers,  he  sent  out  a 
circular  note  expressing  the  hope  on  the  part  of  the 
American  Government  that  the  war  would  not 
result  in  any  "concession  of  Chinese  territory  to 
neutral  powers."  Accustomed  now  to  these  invi- 
tations which  decency  forbade  them  to  refuse,  all 
the  powers  assented  to  this  suggestion.  The  re- 
sults of  the  war,  therefore,  were  confined  to  Man- 
churia, and  Japan  promised  that  her  occupation 
of  that  province  should  be  temporary  and  that  com- 
mercial opportunity  therein  should  be  the  same 
for  all.  The  culmination  of  American  prestige 
came  with  President  Roosevelt's  offer  of  the  good 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  233 

offices  of  the  United  States,  on  June  8,  1905.  As 
a  result,  peace  negotiations  were  concluded  in  the 
Treaty  of  Portsmouth  (New  Hampshire)  in  1905. 
For  this  conspicuous  service  to  the  cause  of  peace 
President  Roosevelt  was  awarded  the  Nobel  prize. 
Secretary  Hay  had  therefore,  in  the  seven  years 
following  the  real  arrival  of  the  United  States  in 
the  Far  East,  evolved  a  policy  which  was  clear  and 
definite,  and  one  which  appealed  to  the  American 
people.  While  it  constituted  a  variation  from  the 
precise  methods  laid  down  by  President  Monroe  in 
1823,  in  that  it  involved  concerted  and  equal  co- 
operation with  the  great  powers  of  the  world,  Hay's 
policy  rested  upon  the  same  fundamental  bases :  a  be- 
lief in  the  fundamental  right  of  nations  to  determine 
their  own  government,  and  the  reduction  to  a  mini- 
mum of  intervention  by  foreign  powers.  To  have 
refused  to  recognize  intervention  at  all  would  have 
been,  under  the  circumstances,  to  abandon  China 
to  her  fate.  In  protecting  its  own  right  to  trade 
with  her,  the  United  States  protected  the  integrity 
of  China.  Hay  had,  moreover,  so  ably  conducted 
the  actual  negotiations  that  the  United  States  en- 
joyed for  the  moment  the  leadership  in  the  concert 
of  powers  and  exercised  an  authority  more  in  accord 
with  her  potential  than  with  her  actual  strength. 


234  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Secretary  Hay's  death  in  1905  brought  American 
leadership  to  an  end,  for,  though  his  policies  con- 
tinued to  be  avowed  by  all  concerned,  their  appli- 
cation was  thereafter  restricted.  The  integrity  of 
Chinese  territory  was  threatened,  though  not  ac- 
tually violated,  by  the  action  of  Great  Britain  in 
Tibet  and  of  Japan  in  Manchuria.  Japan,  recog- 
nized as  a  major  power  since  her  war  with  Rus- 
sia, seemed  in  the  opinion  of  many  to  leave  but  a 
crack  of  the  door  open  in  Manchuria,  and  her  rela- 
tionship with  the  United  States  grew  difficult  as 
she  resented  more  and  more  certain  discrimina- 
tions against  her  citizens  which  she  professed  to 
find  in  the  laws  of  some  of  the  American  States, 
particularly  in  those  of  California. 

In  1908  Elihu  Root,  who  succeeded  Hay  as  Sec- 
retary of  State,  effected  an  understanding  with 
Japan.  Adopting  a  method  which  has  become  rather 
habitual  in  the  relationship  between  the  United 
States  and  Japan,  Root  and  the  Japanese  ambas- 
sador exchanged  notes.  In  these  they  both  pointed 
out  that  their  object  was  the  peaceful  develop- 
ment of  their  commerce  in  the  Pacific;  that  "the 
policy  of  both  governments,  uninfluenced  by  any 
aggressive  tendencies,  is  directed  to  the  main- 
tenance of  the  existing  status  quo  in  the  region 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  235 

above  mentioned,  and  to  the  defense  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  equal  opportunity  for  commerce  and  indus- 
try in  China";  that  they  both  stood  for  the  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  of  China;  and  that,  should 
any  event  threaten  the  stability  of  existing  condi- 
tions, "it  remained  for  the  two  governments  to 
communicate  with  each  other  in  order  to  arrive  at 
an  understanding  as  to  what  measures  they  may 
consider  it  useful  to  take. " 

The  immigration  problem  between  Japan  and 
the  United  States  was  even  more  serious  than  that 
of  the  open  door  and  the  integrity  of  China.  The 
teeming  population  of  Japan  was  swarming  be- 
yond her  island  empire,  and  Korea  and  Manchuria 
did  not  seem  to  offer  sufficient  opportunity.  The 
number  of  Japanese  immigrants  to  this  country, 
which  before  the  Spanish  War  had  never  reached 
2000  in  any  one  year,  now  rose  rapidly  until  in 
1907  it  reached  30,226.  American  sentiment,  which 
had  been  favorable  to  Japan  during  her  war  with 
Russia,  began  to  change.  The  public  and  particu- 
larly the  laboring  classes  in  the  West,  where  most 
of  the  Japanese  remained,  objected  to  this  increas- 
ing immigration,  while  a  number  of  leaders  of 
American  opinion  devoted  themselves  to  convert- 
ing the  public  to  a  belief  that  the  military  ambitions 


236  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

of  Japan  included  the  Philippines  and  possibly 
Hawaii,  where  the  Japanese  were  a  formidable  ele- 
ment in  the  population.  As  a  consequence  there 
arose  a  strong  demand  that  the  principles  of  the 
Chinese  Exclusion  Act  be  applied  to  the  Japanese. 
The  situation  was  made  more  definite  by  the  fact 
that  the  board  of  education  in  San  Francisco  ruled 
in  1906  that  orientals  should  receive  instruction  in 
special  schools.  The  Japanese  promptly  protested, 
and  their  demand  for  their  rights  under  the  treaty 
of  1894  was  supported  by  the  Tokio  Government. 
The  international  consequences  of  thus  discriminat- 
ing against  the  natives  of  so  rising  and  self-confident 
a  country  as  Japan,  and  one  conscious  of  its  military 
strength,  were  bound  to  be  very  different  from  the 
difficulties  encountered  in  the  case  of  China.  The 
United  States  confronted  a  serious  situation,  but  for- 
tunately did  not  confront  it  alone.  Australia  and 
British  Columbia,  similarly  threatened  by  Japanese 
immigration,  were  equally  opposed  to  it. 

Out  of  deference  to  Great  Britain,  with  which  she 
had  been  allied  since  1902,  Japan  consented  that 
her  immigrants  should  not  force  their  way  into  un- 
willing communities.  This  position  facilitated  an 
arrangement  between  the  United  States  and  Japan, 
and  an  informal  agreement  was  made  in  1907.  The 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  237 

schools  of  San  Francisco  were  to  be  open  to  orien- 
tal children  not  over  sixteen  years  of  age,  while 
Japan  was  to  withhold  passports  from  laborers  who 
planned  to  emigrate  to  the  United  States.  This 
plan  has  worked  with  reasonable  success,  but  minor 
issues  have  kept  alive  in  both  countries  the  bad 
feeling  on  the  subject.  Certain  States,  particu- 
larly California,  have  passed  laws,  especially  with 
regard  to  the  ownership  and  leasing  of  farm  lands, 
apparently  intended  to  discriminate  against  Japa- 
nese who  were  already  residents.  These  laws  Japan 
has  held  to  be  violations  of  her  treaty  provision  for 
consideration  on  the  "most  favored  nation"  basis, 
and  she  has  felt  them  to  be  opposed  in  spirit  to  the 
"gentlemen's  agreement"  of  1907.  The  inability 
of  the  Federal  Government  to  control  the  policy 
of  individual  States  is  not  accepted  by  foreign 
countries  as  releasing  the  United  States  from  in- 
ternational obligations,  so  that,  although  friendly 
agreements  between  the  two  countries  were  reached 
on  the  major  points,  cause  for  popular  irritation 
still  remained. 

Philander  C.  Knox,  who  succeeded  Root  as 
Secretary  of  State,  devoted  his  attention  rather  to 
the  fostering  of  American  interests  in  China  than 
to  the  development  of  the  general  policies  of  his 


238  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Department.  While  he  refrained  from  asking  for 
an  American  sphere  of  influence,  he  insisted  that 
American  capitalists  obtain  their  fair  share  of  the 
concessions  for  railroad  building,  mining,  and  other 
enterprises  which  the  Chinese  Government  thought 
it  necessary  to  give  in  order  to  secure  capital  for 
her  schemes  of  modernization.  As  these  conces- 
sions were  supposed  to  carry  political  influence  in 
the  areas  to  which  they  applied,  there  was  active 
rivalry  for  them,  and  Russia  and  Japan,  which 
had  no  surplus  capital,  even  borrowed  in  order  to  se- 
cure a  share.  This  situation  led  to  a  tangled  web 
of  intrigue,  perhaps  inevitable  but  decidedly  con- 
trary to  the  usual  American  diplomatic  habits; 
and  at  this  game  the  United  States  did  not  prove 
particularly  successful.  In  1911  there  broke  out  in 
China  a  republican  revolution  which  was  speedily 
successful.  The  new  Government,  as  yet  unrecog- 
nized, needed  money,  and  the  United  States  se- 
cured a  share  in  a  six-power  syndicate  which  was 
organized  to  float  a  national  loan.  The  conditions 
upon  which  this  syndicate  insisted,  however,  were 
as  much  political  as  they  were  pecuniary,  and  the 
new  Government  refused  to  accept  them. 

On  the  accession  of  President  Wilson,  the  United 
States  promptly  led  the  way  in  recognizing  the  new 


THE  OPEN  DOOR  239 

republic  in  China.  On  March  18,  1913,  the  Presi- 
dent announced:  "The  conditions  of  the  loan  seem 
to  us  to  touch  nearly  the  administrative  independ- 
ence of  China  itself;  and  this  administration  does 
not  feel  that  it  ought,  even  by  implication,  to  be  a 
party  to  those  conditions. "  The  former  American 
policy  of  non-interference  was  therefore  renewed, 
but  it  still  remained  uncertain  whether  the  en- 
trance of  the  United  States  into  Far  Eastern  politics 
would  do  more  than  serve  to  delay  the  European 
dominance  which  seemed  to  be  impending  in  1898,, 


CHAPTER  XV 

THE    PANAMA    CANAL 

WHILE  American  troops  were  threading  the  moun- 
tain passes  and  the  morasses  of  the  Philippines, 
scaling  the  walls  of  Pekin,  and  sunning  themselves 
in  the  delectable  pleasances  of  the  Forbidden  City, 
and  while  American  Secretaries  of  State  were  pen- 
ning dispatches  which  determined  the  fate  of  coun- 
tries on  the  opposite  side  of  the  globe,  the  old 
diplomatic  problems  nearer  home  still  persisted. 
The  Spanish  War,  however,  had  so  thoroughly 
changed  the  relationship  of  the  United  States  to 
the  rest  of  the  world  that  the  conditions  under 
which  even  these  old  problems  were  to  be  adjusted 
or  solved  gave  them  entirely  new  aspects.  The 
American  people  gradually  but  effectually  began 
to  take  foreign  affairs  more  seriously.  As  time 
went  on,  the  Government  made  improvements  in 
the  consular  and  diplomatic  services.  Politicians 
found  that  their  irresponsible  threatenings  of  other 

240 


THE  PANAMA  CANAL  241 

countries  had  ceased  to  be  politically  profitable  when 
public  opinion  realized  what  was  at  stake.  Other 
countries,  moreover,  began  to  take  the  United  States 
more  seriously.  The  open  hostility  which  they  had 
shown  on  the  first  entrance  of  this  nation  into  world 
politics  changed,  on  second  thought,  to  a  desire  on 
their  part  to  placate  and  perhaps  to  win  the  support 
of  this  new  and  formidable  power. 

The  attitude  of  Germany  in  particular  was  con- 
spicuous. The  Kaiser  sent  his  brother,  Prince 
Henry,  to  visit  the  United  States.  He  presented 
the  nation  with  a  statue  of  Frederick  the  Great  and 
Harvard  with  a  Germanic  museum;  he  ordered 
a  Herreshoff  yacht,  and  asked  the  President's 
daughter,  Alice  Roosevelt,  to  christen  it;  he  es- 
tablished exchange  professorships  in  the  universi- 
ties; and  he  began  a  campaign  aimed  apparently 
at  securing  for  Germany  the  support  of  the  entire 
American  people,  or,  failing  that,  at  organizing  for 
German  purposes  the  German-born  element  within 
the  United  States.  France  sought  to  revive  the 
memory  of  her  friendship  for  the  United  States 
during  the  Revolution  by  presenting  the  nation 
with  a  statue  of  Rochambeau,  and  she  also  estab- 
lished exchange  professorships.  In  England,  Cecil 
Rhodes,  with  his  great  dream  of  drawing  together 

16 


242  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

all  portions  of  the  British  race,  devoted  his  fortune 
to  making  Oxford  the  mold  where  all  its  leaders  of 
thought  and  action  should  be  shaped;  and  Jo- 
seph Chamberlain  and  other  English  leaders  talked 
freely  and  enthusiastically  of  an  alliance  between 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  as  the  surest 
foundation  for  world  peace. 

It  need  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  these 
international  amenities  meant  that  the  United 
States  was  to  be  allowed  to  have  its  own  way 
in  the  world.  The  friendliness  of  Great  Britain 
was  indeed  sincere.  Engaged  between  1899  and 
1902  in  the  Boer  War,  she  appreciated  ever  more 
strongly  the  need  for  the  friendship  of  the  United 
States,  and  she  looked  with  cordial  approbation 
upon  the  development  of  Secretary  Hay's  policy 
in  China.  The  British,  however,  like  the  Amer- 
icans, are  legalistically  inclined,  and  disputes  be- 
tween the  two  nations  are  likely  to  be  maintained 
to  the  limit  of  the  law.  The  advantage  of  this 
legal  mindedness  is  that  there  has  always  been  a 
disposition  in  both  peoples  to  submit  to  judicial 
award  when  ordinary  negotiations  have  reached  a 
deadlock.  But  the  real  affection  for  each  other 
which  underlay  the  eternal  bickerings  of  the  two 
nations  had  as  yet  not  revealed  itself  to  the 


THE  PANAMA  CANAL  243 

American  consciousness.  As  most  of  the  disputes 
of  the  United  States  had  been  with  Great  Britain, 
Americans  were  always  on  the  alert  to  maintain  all 
their  claims  and  were  suspicious  of  "British  gold." 
It  was,  therefore,  in  an  atmosphere  by  no  means 
conducive  to  yielding  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States,  though  it  was  one  not  antagonistic  to  good 
feeling,  that  the  representatives  of  the  two  countries 
met.  John  Hay  and  Sir  Julian  Pauncefote,  whose 
long  quiet  service  in  this  country  had  made  him  the 
first  popular  British  ambassador,  now  set  about 
clearing  up  the  problems  confronting  the  two  peo- 
ples. The  first  question  which  pressed  for  settle- 
ment was  one  of  boundary.  It  had  already  taken 
ninety  years  to  draw  the  line  from  the  Atlantic  to 
the  Pacific,  and  now  the  purchase  of  Alaska  by  the 
United  States  had  added  new  uncertainties  to  the 
international  boundary.  The  claims  of  both  na- 
tions were  based  on  a  treaty  of  1825  between  Great 
Britain  and  Russia.  Like  most  attempts  to  define 
boundaries  running  through  unexplored  territo- 
ries, the  treaty  terms  admitted  of  two  interpreta- 
tions. The  boundary  line  from  Portland  Channel 
to  Mount  St.  Elias  was  stipulated  to  run  every- 
where a  distance  of  ten  marine  leagues  from  the  coast 
and  to  follow  its  sinuosities.  This  particular  coast, 


244  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

however,  is  bitten  into  by  long  fiords  stretching 
far  into  the  country.  Great  Britain  held  that  these 
were  not  part  of  the  sea  in  the  sense  of  the  treaty 
and  that  the  line  should  cut  across  them  ten  marine 
leagues  from  the  outer  coast  line.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  United  States  held  that  the  line  should  be  drawn 
ten  marine  leagues  from  the  heads  of  these  inlets. 

The  discovery  of  gold  on  the  Yukon  in  1897 
made  this  boundary  question  of  practical  moment. 
Action  now  became  an  immediate  necessity.  In 
1899  the  two  countries  agreed  upon  a  modus  vi~ 
vendi  and  in  1903  arranged  an  arbitration.  The 
arbitrating  board  consisted  of  three  members  from 
each  of  the  two  nations.  The  United  States  ap- 
pointed Senator  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  ex-Senator 
George  Turner,  and  Elihu  Root,  then  Secretary 
of  War.  Great  Britain  appointed  two  Canadians, 
Louis  A .  Jette  and  A .  B .  Ay les worth ,  and  Lord  Al ver- 
stone,  Chief  Justice  of  England .  Their  decision  was 
in  accordance  with  the  principle  for  which  the  United 
States  had  contended,  though  not  following  the 
actual  line  which  it  had  sketched.  It  gave  the 
Americans,  however,  full  control  of  the  coast  and 
its  harbors,  and  the  settlement  provided  a  mutually 
accepted  boundary  on  every  frontier. 

With  the  discovery  of  gold  in  the  far  North, 


THE  PANAMA  CANAL  245 

Alaska  began  a  period  of  development  which  is 
rapidly  making  that  territory  an  important  eco- 
nomic factor  in  American  life.  Today  the  time 
when  this  vast  northern  coast  was  valuable  only  as 
the  breeding  ground  for  the  fur  seal  seems  long 
past.  Nevertheless  the  fur  seal  continued  to  be 
sought,  and  for  years  the  international  difficulty 
of  protecting  the  fisheries  remained.  Finally,  in 
1911,  the  United  States  entered  into  a  joint  agree- 
ment with  Great  Britain,  Japan,  and  Russia,  which 
is  actually  serving  as  a  sort  of  international  game 
law.  The  problems  of  Alaska  that  remain  are 
therefore  those  of  internal  development. 

Diplomacy,  however,  is  not  concerned  solely  with 
sensational  episodes.  American  ministers  and  the 
State  Department  are  engaged  for  the  most  part  in 
the  humdrum  adjustment  of  minor  differences  which 
never  find  their  way  into  the  newspapers.  Probably 
more  such  cases  arise  with  Great  Britain,  in  behalf 
of  Canada,  than  with  any  other  section  of  the  globe, 
On  the  American  continent  rivers  flow  from  one 
country  into  the  other;  railroads  carry  goods  across 
the  border  and  back  again;  citizens  labor  now  in  one 
country,  now  in  the  other;  corporations  do  business 
in  both.  All  these  ties  not  only  bind  but  chafe  and 
give  rise  to  constant  negotiation.  More  and  more 


246  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Great  Britain  has  left  the  handling  of  such  mat- 
ters to  the  Canadian  authorities,  and,  while  there 
can  be  no  interchange  of  ministers,  there  is  an 
enormous  transaction  of  business  between  Ottawa 
and  Washington. 

While  there  has  of  late  years  been  little  talk  of 
annexation,  there  have  been  many  in  both  coun- 
tries who  have  desired  to  reduce  the  significance  of 
the  boundary  to  a  minimum.  This  feeling  led  iu 
1911  to  the  formulation  of  a  reciprocity  agreement, 
which  Canada,  however,  was  unwilling  to  accept. 
Yet,  if  tariff  restrictions  were  not  removed,  other 
international  barriers  were  as  far  as  possible  done 
away  with.  In  1898  a  commission  was  appointed 
to  agree  upon  all  points  of  difference.  Working 
slowly  but  steadily,  the  commissioners  settled  one 
question  after  another,  until  practically  all  prob- 
lems were  put  upon  a  permanent  working  basis. 
Perhaps  the  most  interesting  of  the  results  of  this 
activity  was  the  appointment  in  1908  of  a  perma- 
nent International  Fisheries  Commission,  which 
still  regulates  that  vexing  question. 

Another  source  of  international  complication 
arose  out  of  the  Atlantic  fisheries  off  Newfound- 
land, which  is  not  part  of  Canada.  It  is  off  these 
shores  that  the  most  important  deep-sea  fishing 


THE  PANAMA  CANAL  247 

takes  place.  This  fishery  was  one  of  the  earliest 
American  sources  of  wealth,  and  for  nearly  two 
centuries  formed  a  sort  of  keystone  of  the  whole 
commercial  life  of  the  United  States.  When  in 
1783  Great  Britain  recognized  American  independ- 
ence, she  recognized  also  that  American  fishermen 
had  certain  rights  off  these  coasts.  These  rights, 
however,  were  not  sufficient  for  the  conduct  of 
the  fisheries,  and  so  in  addition  certain  "liberties" 
were  granted,  which  allowed  American  fishers  to 
land  for  the  purpose  of  drying  fish  and  of  doing 
other  things  not  generally  permitted  to  foreigners. 
These  concessions  in  fact  amounted  to  a  joint  par- 
ticipation with  the  British.  The  rights  were  per- 
manent, but  the  privileges  were  regarded  as  having 
lapsed  after  the  War  of  1812.  In  1818  they  were 
partially  renewed,  certain  limited  privileges  being 
conceded.  Ever  since  that  date  the  problem  of 
securing  the  additional  privileges  desired  has  been 
a  subject  for  discussion  between  Great  Britain  and 
the  United  States.  Between  1854  and  1866  the 
American  Government  secured  them  by  reciprocity ; 
between  1872  and  1884  it  bought  them;  after  1888 
it  enjoyed  them  by  a  temporary  modus  vivendi 
arranged  under  President  Cleveland. 

In  1902  Hay  arranged  with  Sir  Robert  Bond, 


248  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Prime  Minister  of  Newfoundland,  a  new  reci- 
procity agreement.  This,  however,  the  Senate 
rejected,  and  the  Cleveland  agreement  continued. 
Newfoundland,  angry  at  the  rejection  of  the  pro- 
posed treaty,  put  every  obstacle  possible  in  the  way 
of  American  fishermen  and  used  methods  which 
the  Americans  claimed  to  be  contrary  to  the  treaty 
terms.  After  long  continued  and  rather  acrimo- 
nious discussions,  the  matter  was  finally  referred  in 
1909  to  the  Hague  Court.  As  in  the  Bering  Sea  case, 
the  court  was  asked  not  only  to  judge  the  facts  but 
also  to  draw  up  an  agreement  for  the  future.  Its 
decision,  on  the  whole,  favored  Newfoundland,  but 
this  fact  is  of  little  moment  compared  with  the  like- 
lihood that  a  dispute  almost  a  century  and  a  half 
old  has  at  last  been  permanently  settled. 

None  of  these  international  disputes  and  settle- 
ments to  the  north,  however,  excited  anything  like 
the  popular  interest  aroused  by  one  which  occurred 
in  the  south.  The  Spanish  War  made  it  abun- 
dantly evident  that  an  isthmian  canal  between 
the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific  must  be  built.  The 
arguments  of  naval  strategy  which  Captain  Mahan 
had  long  been  urging  had  received  striking  demon- 
stration in  the  long  and  roundabout  voyage  which 
the  Oregon  was  obliged  to  take.  The  pressure  of 


THE  PANAMA  CANAL  249 

railroad  rates  on  the  trade  of  the  country  caused 
wide  commercial  support  for  a  project  expected 
to  establish  a  water  competition  that  would  pull 
them  down.  The  American  people  determined  to 
dig  a  canal. 

The  first  obstacle  to  such  a  project  lay  in  the 
Clay  ton-Bui  wer  Treaty  with  Great  Britain.  That 
obstacle  Blaine  had  attempted  in  vain  to  remove; 
in  fact  his  bungling  diplomacy  had  riveted  it  yet 
more  closely  by  making  Great  Britain  maintain  it 
as  a  point  of  honor.  To  this  subject  Hay  now  de- 
voted himself,  and  as  he  encountered  no  serious 
difficulties,  a  treaty  was  drawn  up  in  1900  prac- 
tically as  he  wished  it.  It  was  not,  however,  pop- 
ular in  the  United  States.  Hay  preferred  and 
arranged  for  a  canal  neutralized  by  international 
guarantee,  on  the  same  basis  as  the  Suez  Canal; 
but  American  public  sentiment  had  come  to  insist 
on  a  canal  controlled  absolutely  by  the  United 
States.  The  treaty  was  therefore  rejected  by  the 
Senate,  or  rather  was  so  amended  as  to  prove 
unacceptable  to  Great  Britain. 

Hay  believed  that  he  had  obtained  what  was 
most  desirable  as  well  as  all  that  was  possible,  that 
the  majority  of  the  American  people  approved,  and 
that  he  was  beaten  only  because  a  treaty  must  be 


250  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

approved  by  two-thirds  of  the  Senate.  He  there- 
fore resigned.  President  McKinley,  however,  re- 
fused to  accept  his  resignation,  and  he  and  Lord 
Pauncefote  were  soon  at  work  again  on  the  subject. 
In  1901  a  new  treaty  was  presented  to  the  Sen- 
ate. This  began  by  abrogating  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty  entirely  and  with  it  brushing  away  all  re- 
strictions upon  the  activity  of  the  United  States 
in  Central  America.  It  specifically  permitted  the 
United  States  to  "mam tain  such  military  police 
along  the  canal  as  may  be  necessary  to  protect  it 
against  lawlessness  and  disorder. "  By  interpret- 
ing this  clause  as  allowing  complete  fortification, 
the  United  States  has  made  itself  the  guardian  of 
the  canal.  In  return  for  the  release  from  former 
obligations  which  Great  Britain  thus  allowed,  the 
United  States  agreed  that  any  canal  constructed 
should  be  regulated  by  certain  rules  which  were 
stated  in  the  treaty  and  which  made  it  "free  and 
open  to  the  vessels  of  commerce  and  of  war  of  all 
nations  observing  these  Rules,  on  terms  of  entire 
equality,"  in  time  of  war  as  well  as  of  peace.  This 
time  the  treaty  proved  satisfactory  and  was  ac- 
cepted by  the  Senate.  Thus  one  more  source  of 
trouble  was  done  away  with,  and  the  first  obstacle 
in  the  way  of  the  canal  was  removed. 


THE  PANAMA  CANAL 

The  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  was,  however,  only 
a  bit  of  the  tangled  jungle  which  must  be  cleared 
before  the  first  American  shovel  could  begin  its 
work.  For  over  twenty  years  a  contest  had  been 
waged  between  experts  in  the  United  States  as  to 
the  relative  merits  of  the  Panama  and  the  Nicara- 
gua routes.  The  latter  was  the  more  popular,  per- 
haps because  it  seemed  at  one  time  that  Panama 
was  preempted  by  De  Lesseps'  French  company. 
This  contest  as  to  the  better  route  led  to  the  pas- 
sage of  a  law,  in  1902,  which  authorized  the  Presi- 
dent to  acquire  the  rights  and  property  needed  to 
construct  a  canal  by  the  Panama  route,  on  condi- 
tion that  he  could  make  satisfactory  arrangements 
"within  a  reasonable  time  and  upon  reasonable 
terms."  Otherwise,  Nicaragua  was  to  be  chosen. 
Theodore  Roosevelt  was  now  President  and,  though 
at  one  time  not  favoring  Panama,  he  decided  that 
there  the  canal  should  be  constructed  and  with  his 
accustomed  vigor  set  himself  to  the  task. 

The  first  difficulty  presented  by  this  route  was 
the  prior  right  which  the  French  company  still  re- 
tained, although  it  had  little,  if  any,  hope  of  carry- 
ing on  the  construction  itself.  It  possessed  not 
only  rights  but  also  much  equipment  on  the  spot, 
and  it  had  actually  begun  excavation  at  certain 


252  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

points.  The  purchase  of  all  its  properties  complete 
for  $40,000,000  was,  therefore,  not  a  bad  invest- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  Government.  By  this 
purchase  the  United  States  was  brought  directly 
into  relation  with  Colombia,  through  one  of  whose 
federal  states,  Panama,  the  canal  was  to  be  cut. 

While  the  French  purchase  had  removed  one 
obstacle,  the  De  Lesseps  charter  alone  would  not 
suffice  for  the  construction  of  the  canal,  for  the 
American  Government  had  definite  ideas  as  to  the 
conditions  necessary  for  the  success  of  the  work. 
The  Government  required  a  zone  which  should  be 
under  its  complete  control,  for  not  otherwise  could 
satisfactory  sanitary  regulations  be  enforced.  It  in- 
sisted also  on  receiving  the  right  to  fortify  the  canal. 
It  must  have  these  and  other  privileges  on  a  long 
time  grant.  For  them,  it  was  willing  to  pay  gener- 
ously. Negotiations  would  be  affected,  one  could 
not  say  how,  by  the  Treaty  of  1846  with  Colombia,1 
by  which  the  United  States  had  received  the  right 
of  free  use  of  the  isthmus,  with  the  right  of  main- 
taining the  neutrality  of  the  district  and  in  re- 
turn had  guaranteed  to  Colombia  sovereignty  over 
the  isthmus. 

Hay  took  up  the  negotiations  with  the  Colombian 

1  Then  known  as  the  Republic  of  New  Granada. 


THE  PANAMA  CANAL  253 

charge  d'affaires,  Dr.  Herran,  and  arranged  a  treaty, 
which  gave  the  United  States  a  strip  of  land  six 
miles  wide  across  the  isthmus,  on  a  ninety -nine 
year  lease,  for  which  it  should  pay  ten  million  dol- 
lars and,  after  a  period  of  nine  years  for  construc- 
tion, a  quarter  of  a  million  a  year.  This  treaty, 
after  months  of  debate  in  press  and  Congress,  was 
rejected  by  the  Colombian  Senate  on  August  12, 
1903,  though  the  people  of  Panama,  nervously 
anxious  lest  this  opportunity  to  sit  on  the  bank 
of  the  world's  great  highway  should  slip  into  the 
hands  of  their  rivals  of  Nicaragua,  had  urged 
earnestly  the  acceptance  of  the  terms.  The 
majority  of  the  Colombians  probably  expected  to 
grant  the  American  requests  in  time  but  were  de- 
termined to  force  the  last  penny  from  the  United 
States.  As  Hay  wrote:  "The  Isthmus  is  looked 
upon  as  a  financial  cow  to  be  milked  for  the  benefit 
of  the  country  at  large.  This  difficulty  might  be 
overcome  by  diplomacy  and  money. " 

President  Roosevelt  at  this  point  took  the  nego- 
tiations into  his  own  hands.  Knowing  that  the 
price  offered  was  more  than  just,  he  decided  to 
depend  no  longer  on  bartering.  He  ordered  the 
American  minister  to  leave  Colombia,  and  he  pre- 
pared a  message  to  Congress  proposing  that  the 


254  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Americans  proceed  to  dig  the  canal  under  author- 
ity which  he  claimed  to  find  in  the  Treaty  of  1846. 
It  was,  however,  doubtful  if  Congress  would  find 
it  there,  particularly  as  so  many  Congressmen 
preferred  the  Nicaragua  route.  The  President 
therefore  listened  with  pleased  attention  to  the 
rumors  of  a  revolution  planned  to  separate  Panama 
from  Colombia.  Most  picturesquely  this  informa- 
tion was  brought  by  M.  Philippe  Bunau-Varilla, 
a  former  engineer  of  the  De  Lesseps  company, 
who  glowed  with  the  excitement  of  coming  events. 
Roosevelt,  however,  relied  more  upon  the  informa- 
tion furnished  by  two  American  officers,  who  re- 
ported "that  various  revolutionary  movements 
were  being  inaugurated. " 

On  October  10,  1903,  the  President  wrote  to  Dr. 
Albert  Shaw,  of  the  Review  of  Reviews: 

I  enclose  you,  purely  for  your  own  information,  a  copy 
of  a  letter  of  September  5th,  from  our  minister  to  Colom- 
bia. I  think  it  might  interest  you  to  see  that  there  was 
absolutely  not  the  slightest  chance  of  securing  by  treaty 
any  more  than  we  endeavored  to  secure.  The  alterna- 
tives were  to  go  to  Nicaragua  against  the  advice  of  the 
great  majority  of  competent  engineers  —  some  of  the 
most  competent  saying  that  we  had  better  have  no 
canal  at  this  time  than  go  there  —  or  else  to  take  the 
territory  by  force  without  any  attempt  at  getting  a 


THE  PANAMA  CANAL  255 

treaty.  I  cast  aside  the  proposition  made  at  the  time 
to  foment  the  secession  of  Panama.  Whatever  other 
governments  can  do,  the  United  States  cannot  go  into 
the  securing,  by  such  underhand  means,  the  cession. 
Privately,  I  freely  say  to  you  that  I  should  be  delighted 
if  Panama  were  an  independent  state;  or  if  it  made  itself 
so  at  this  moment;  but  for  me  to  say  so  publicly  would 
amount  to  an  instigation  of  a  revolt,  and  therefore  I 
cannot  say  it. 

Nothing,  however,  prevented  the  President  from 
keeping  an  attentive  eye  on  the  situation.  On 
the  16th  of  October  he  directed  the  Navy  Depart- 
ment to  send  ships  to  the  Isthmus  to  protect  Amer- 
ican interests  in  case  of  a  revolutionary  outbreak. 
On  the  2d  of  November,  he  ordered  the  squadron 
to  "maintain  free  and  uninterrupted  transit.  .  .  . 
Prevent  the  landing  of  any  armed  force  with  hos- 
tile intent,  either  government  or  insurgent,  at  any 
point  within  fifty  miles  of  Panama."  At  3 :40  P.M., 
on  the  3d  of  November,  the  acting  Secretary  of 
State  telegraphed  to  the  Isthmus  for  confirma- 
tion of  a  report  to  the  effect  that  an  uprising  was 
in  progress.  A  reply  dated  8:15  P.M.  stated  that 
there  had  been  none  as  yet,  but  that  it  was  ru- 
mored one  would  take  place  during  the  night.  On 
the  4th  of  November  independence  was  proclaimed. 
The  only  fatality  was  a  Chinaman  killed  in  the  City 


256  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

of  Panama  by  a  shell  from  the  Colombian  gunboat 
Bogota.  Its  commander  was  warned  not  to  fire 
again.  On  the  6th  of  November,  Secretary  Hay 
instructed  our  consul  to  recognize  the  new  repub- 
lic, and  on  the  13th  of  November,  President  Roose- 
velt received  Bunau-Varilla  as  its  representative 
at  Washington. 

This  prompt  recognition  of  a  new  state,  without 
waiting  to  allow  the  parent  Government  time  to 
assert  itself,  was  contrary  to  American  practice. 
The  United  States  had  regarded  as  a  most  un- 
friendly act  Great  Britain's  mere  recognition  of 
the  belligerency  of  the  Southern  Confederacy.  The 
right  of  the  United  States  to  preserve  the  neutrality 
of  the  isthmus,  as  provided  by  the  Treaty  of  1846, 
certainly  did  not  involve  the  right  to  intervene  be- 
tween the  Government  and  revolutionists.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  guarantee  of  possession  which  the 
United  States  had  given  to  Colombia  did  involve 
supporting  her  Government  to  a  reasonable  extent; 
yet  there  could  be  little  doubt  that  it  was  the 
presence  of  American  ships  which  had  made  the 
revolution  successful. 

The  possible  implications  of  these  glaring  facts 
were  cleverly  met  by  President  Roosevelt  in  his 
message  to  Congress  and  by  the  Secretary  of  State 


THE  PANAMA  CANAL  257 

in  the  correspondence  growing  out  of  the  affair. 
The  Government  really  relied  for  its  justifica- 
tion, however,  not  upon  these  technical  pleas  but 
upon  the  broad  grounds  of  equity.  America  has 
learned  in  the  last  few  years  how  important  it  is 
for  its  safety  that  "scraps  of  paper"  be  held  sacred 
and  how  dangerous  is  the  doctrine  of  necessity. 
Nevertheless  it  is  well  to  observe  that  if  the  United 
States  did,  in  the  case  of  Panama,  depart  somewhat 
from  that  strict  observance  of  obligations  which  it 
has  been  accustomed  to  maintain,  it  did  not  seek 
any  object  which  was  not  just  as  useful  to  the 
world  at  large  as  to  itself,  that  the  situation  had 
been  created  not  by  a  conflict  of  opposing  inter- 
ests but  by  what  the  Government  had  good  rea- 
son to  believe  was  the  bad  faith  of  Colombia,  and 
that  the  separation  of  Panama  was  the  act  of  its 
own  people,  justly  incensed  at  the  disregard  of 
their  interests  by  their  compatriots.  This  revo- 
lution created  no  tyrannized  subject  population 
but  rather  liberated  from  a  galling  bond  a  people 
who  had,  in  fact,  long  desired  separation. 

With   the   new   republic   negotiation   went   on 

pleasantly  and  rapidly,  and  as  early  as  November 

18,  1903,  a  convention   was  drawn  up,  in  which 

the  United  States  guaranteed  the  independence  of 

17 


258  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

> 

Panama  and  in  return  received  in  perpetuity  a 
grant  of  a  zone  ten  miles  wide  within  which  to 
construct  a  canal  from  ocean  to  ocean. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

PROBLEMS    OF   THE    CARIBBEAN 

As  the  acquisition  of  the  Philippines  made  all 
Far  Eastern  questions  of  importance  to  the  United 
States,  so  the  investment  of  American  millions  in 
a  canal  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  increased 
popular  interest  in  the  problems  of  the  Caribbean. 
That  fascinating  sheet  of  water,  about  six  hundred 
miles  from  north  to  south  by  about  fifteen  hun- 
dred from  east  to  west,  is  ringed  around  by  the  pos- 
sessions of  many  powers.  In  1898  its  mainland 
shores  were  occupied  by  Mexico,  British  Honduras, 
Guatemala,  Honduras,  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica,  Co- 
lombia, and  Venezuela;  its  islands  were  possessed 
by  the  negro  states  of  Hayti  and  the  Dominican 
Republic,  and  by  Spain,  France,  Great  Britain, 
Holland,  and  Denmark.  In  the  Caribbean  had 
been  fought  some  of  the  greatest  and  most  signifi- 
cant naval  battles  of  the  eighteenth  century  and, 
when  the  canal  was  opened,  across  its  waters  would 

259 


260  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

plough  a  great  share  of  the  commerce  of  the  world. 
As  owner  of  the  canal  and  professed  guardian  of  its 
use,  the  United  States  was  bound  to  consider  its 
own  strategic  relation  to  this  sea  into  which  the 
canal  opened. 

Gradually  the  situation  which  existed  in  1898 
has  changed.  Spain  has  been  removed  from  the 
Caribbean.  Of  her  former  possessions  the  United 
States  holds  Porto  Rico ;  Cuba  is  independent,  but 
is  in  a  way  under  the  protection  of  the  United  States, 
which  possesses  on  her  coast  the  naval  station  of 
Guantanamo.  The  American  treaty  with  the  new 
republic  of  Panama  practically  created  another 
American  protectorate,  and  the  fortification  of  the 
canal  gave  the  United  States  another  strategic  posi- 
tion. The  negotiation  for  the  purchase  of  the  Dan- 
ish islands  has  been  completed  successfully.  But 
these  obvious  footholds  are  of  less  importance  than 
the  more  indirect  relationships  which  the  United 
States  has  been  steadily  establishing,  through  suc- 
cessive Administrations,  with  the  various  other 
powers  located  on  the  borders  of  the  Caribbean. 

The  Spanish  War  did  not  lull  the  suspicions  of 
the  United  States  regarding  the  dangerous  influ- 
ence which  would  be  exerted  should  the  ambitions 
of  European  powers  be  allowed  a  field  of  action  in 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  CARIBBEAN        261 

the  American  continents,  and  the  United  States 
remained  as  intent  as  ever  on  preventing  any  op- 
portunity for  their  gaining  admittance.  One  such 
contingency,  though  perhaps  a  remote  one,  was  the 
possibility  of  a  rival  canal,  for  there  are  other  isth- 
muses than  that  of  Panama  which  might  be  pierced 
with  the  aid  of  modern  resources  of  capital  and 
genius.  To  prevent  any  such  action  was  not  selfish 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  for  the  American 
canal  was  to  have  an  open  door,  and  there  was  no 
economic  justification  for  another  seaway  from  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Pacific. 

There  might,  however,  be  some  temptation  in 
the  political  and  military  influence  which  such  a 
prospective  second  canal  could  exert.  Negotia- 
tions were  begun,  therefore,  with  all  the  transcon- 
tinental powers  of  Central  America,  offering  liberal 
compensation  for  the  control  of  all  possible  canal 
routes.  These  negotiations  have  been  long  drawn 
out  and  are  only  lately  coming  to  fruition.  They 
have  served,  however,  to  taboo  all  projects  by  other 
nations,  and  one  of  these  treaties  negotiated  with 
Colombia,  but  not  yet  ratified,  holds  out  the  pros- 
pect of  winning  back  her  friendship  which  was 
so  seriously  alienated  by  the  recognition  of  the 
republic  of  Panama  by  the  United  States. 


262  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

In  one  respect  the  changing  world  has  rendered 
quite  obsolete  the  pronouncements  of  President 
Monroe.  In  the  case  of  Japan  there  has  grown  up 
a  great  power  which  is  neither  European  nor  Amer- 
ican. American  policy  in  the  Far  East  has  made 
it  abundantly  evident  that  the  United  States  does 
not  regard  the  self-imposed  limitations  upon  its  ac- 
tivity as  extending  to  Asia.  In  her  case  there  is 
lacking  the  quid  pro  quo  by  which  the  United  States 
has  justified  its  demand  that  European  powers 
refrain  from  interfering  in  America.  By  no  means, 
however,  has  the  Government  admitted  the  right 
of  Asia  to  impinge  on  the  American  continents. 

In  1912  Washington  heard  that  Japan  was  nego- 
tiating with  Mexico  for  a  concession  on  Magdalena 
Bay.  Senator  Lodge  promptly  introduced  a  reso- 
lution in  the  Senate,  declaring  that  "when  any 
harbor  or  other  place  in  the  American  continents 
is  so  situated  that  the  occupation  thereof  for  naval 
or  military  purposes  might  threaten  the  commu- 
nication or  the  safety  of  the  United  States,  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  could  not  see, 
without  grave  concern,  the  possession  of  such  har- 
bor or  other  place  by  any  corporation  or  association 
which  has  such  relation  to  another  government,  not 
American,  as  to  give  that  government  practical 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  CARIBBEAN        263 

power  of  control  for  naval  or  military  purposes." 
This  resolution,  which  passed  the  Senate  by  a 
vote  of  51  to  4,  undoubtedly  represented  Ameri- 
can sentiment,  at  least  with  regard  to  the  for- 
eign occupation  of  any  territory  bordering  on 
the  Caribbean  or  on  the  Pacific  between  Panama 
and  California. 

A  more  subtle  danger  lay  in  the  financial  claims 
of  European  powers  against  the  various  states  in 
Central  America,  and  the  possibility  of  these  claims 
being  used  as  levers  to  establish  permanent  con- 
trol. Most  of  these  foreign  demands  had  a  basis 
in  justice  but  had  been  exaggerated  in  amount. 
They  were  of  two  kinds:  first,  for  damage  to 
persons  or  property  resulting  from  the  numerous 
revolutions  and  perpetual  brigandage  which  have 
scourged  these  semitropic  territories;  second,  for 
debts  contracted  in  the  name  of  the  several  coun- 
tries for  the  most  part  to  conduct  revolutions  or 
to  gild  the  after-career  of  defeated  rulers  in  Paris, 
—  debts  with  a  face  value  far  in  excess  of  the 
amount  received  by  the  debtor  and  with  accu- 
mulated interest  in  many  case£*  far  beyond  the 
capacity  of  the  several  countries  to  pay.  The 
disputes  as  to  the  validity  of  such  claims  have  been 
without  end,  and  they  have  furnished  a  constant 


264  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

temptation  to  the  cupidity  of  individuals  and  the 
ambition  of  the  powers. 

In  1902  Germany  induced  Great  Britain  and  Italy 
to  join  her  in  an  attempt  to  collect  the  amount  of 
some  of  these  claims  from  Venezuela.  A  joint  squad- 
ron undertook  a  "pacific  blockade"  of  the  coast. 
Secretary  Hay  denied  that  a  "pacific  blockade" 
existed  in  international  law  and  urged  that  the 
matter  be  submitted  to  arbitration.  Great  Brit- 
ain and  Italy  were  willing  to  come  to  an  under- 
standing and  withdrew;  but  Germany,  probably 
intent  on  ulterior  objects,  was  unwilling  and  pre- 
ferred to  take  temporary  possession  of  certain  ports. 
President  Roosevelt  then  summoned  the  German 
Ambassador,  Dr.  Holleben,  and  told  him  that, 
unless  Germany  consented  to  arbitrate,  Admiral 
Dewey  would  be  ordered  at  noon  ten  days  later 
to  proceed  to  Venezuela  and  protect  its  coast.  A 
week  passed  with  no  message.  Holleben  called 
on  the  President  but  rose  to  go  without  mention- 
ing Venezuela.  President  Roosevelt  thereupon  in- 
formed the  Ambassador  that  he  had  changed  his 
mind  and  had  decided  to  send  Admiral  Dewey  one 
day  earlier  than  originally  planned;  he  further 
explained  that  in  the  event  the  Kaiser  should  de- 
cide to  arbitrate,  as  not  a  word  had  been  put  on 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  CARIBBEAN       265 

paper,  there  would  be  nothing  to  indicate  coer- 
cion. Within  thirty-six  hours  Holleben  reported 
that  Germany  would  arbitrate.  Only  once  before, 
when  Seward  was  dealing  with  Napoleon  III  con- 
cerning Mexico,  had  forcible  persuasion  been  used 
to  maintain  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

It  was  perfectly  clear  that  if  the  United  States 
sat  idly  by  and  allowed  European  powers  to  do 
what  they  would  to  collect  their  Latin  American 
debts,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  would  soon  become 
a  dead  letter.  It  was  not,  however,  so  plain 
how  American  interference  could  be  justified.  The 
problem  was  obviously  a  difficult  one  and  did  not 
concern  the  United  States  alone.  Latin  America 
was  even  more  vitally  concerned  with  it,  and  her 
statesmen,  always  lucid  exponents  of  international 
law,  were  active  in  devising  remedies.  Carlos 
Calvo  of  Argentina  advanced  the  doctrine  that 
"the  collection  of  pecuniary  claims  made  by 
the  citizens  of  one  country  against  the  govern- 
ment of  another  country  should  never  be  made 
by  force."  Senor  Drago,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  in  the  same  country  in  1902,  urged  upon 
the  United  States  a  modification  of  the  same  view 
by  asserting  that  "the  public  debt  cannot  occasion 
armed  intervention." 


266  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

President  Roosevelt  handled  the  matter  in  his 
messages  of  1903  and  1904.  "That  our  rights  and 
interests  are  deeply  concerned  in  the  maintenance 
of  the  [Monroe]  Doctrine  is  so  clear  as  hardly  to 
need  argument.  This  is  especially  true  in  view  of 
the  construction  of  the  Panama  Canal.  As  a  mere 
matter  of  self  defense  we  must  exercise  a  close 
watch  over  the  approaches  to  this  canal,  and  this 
means  we  must  be  thoroughly  alive  to  our  interests 
in  the  Caribbean  Sea."  "When  we  announce  a 
policy  .  .  .  we  thereby  commit  ourselves  to  the 
consequences  of  the  policy."  "Chronic  wrong- 
doing or  an  impotence  which  results  in  a  general 
loosening  of  the  ties  of  civilized  society,  may  in 
America,  as  elsewhere,  ultimately  require  inter- 
vention by  some  civilized  nation,  and  in  the  West- 
ern Hemisphere  the  adherence  of  the  United  States 
to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  may  force  the  United 
States,  however  reluctantly,  in  flagrant  cases  of 
such  wrongdoing  or  impotence  to  the  exercise  of 
an  international  police  power. ' 

To  prevent  European  intervention  for  the  pur- 
pose of  securing  just  claims  in  America,  then, 
the  United  States  would  undertake  to  handle  the 
case,  and  would  wield  the  "Big  Stick"  against  any 
American  state  which  should  refuse  to  meet  its 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  CARIBBEAN        267 

obligations.  This  was  a  repetition,  in  a  different 
tone,  of  Elaine's  "Elder  Sister"  program.  As  de- 
veloped, it  had  elements  also  of  Cleveland's  Ven- 
ezuela policy.  In  1 907  the  United  States  submitted 
to  the  Hague  Conference  a  modified  form  of  the 
Drago  doctrine,  which  stated  that  the  use  of  force 
to  collect  contract  debts  claimed  from  one  govern- 
ment by  another  as  being  due  to  its  citizens  should 
be  regarded  as  illegal,  unless  the  creditor  nation  first 
offered  to  submit  its  claims  to  arbitration  and  this 
offer  were  refused  by  the  nation  against  which  the 
claim  was  directed.  The  interference  of  the  United 
States,  therefore,  would  be  practically  to  hale  the 
debtor  into  court. 

Around  the  Caribbean,  however,  were  several 
nations  not  only  unwilling  but  unable  to  pay  then* 
debts.  This  inability  was  not  due  to  the  fact  that 
national  resources  were  lacking,  but  that  constant 
revolution  scared  away  conservative  capital  from 
seeking  constructive  investment  or  from  develop- 
ing their  natural  riches,  while  speculators  loaned 
money  at  ruinous  rates  of  discount  to  tottering 
presidents,  gambling  on  the  possibility  of  some 
turn  in  fortune  that  would  return  them  tenfold. 
The  worst  example  of  an  insolvent  and  recalcitrant 
state  was  the  Dominican  Republic,  whose  superb 


268  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

harbors  were  a  constant  temptation  to  ambitious 
powers  willing  to  assume  its  debts  in  return  for 
naval  stations,  and  whose  unscrupulous  rulers  could 
nearly  always  be  bribed  to  sell  their  country  as 
readily  as  anything  else.  In  the  case  of  this  coun- 
try President  Roosevelt  made  a  still  further  ex- 
tension of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  when,  in  1905, 
he  concluded  a  treaty  whereby  the  United  States 
agreed  to  undertake  the  adjustment  of  the  repub- 
lic's obligations  and  the  administration  of  its  cus- 
tom houses,  and  at  the  same  time  guarantee  the 
territorial  integrity  of  the  republic.  This  arrange- 
ment was  hotly  attacked  in  the  United  States  as 
an  indication  of  growing  imperialism,  and,  though 
it  was  defended  as  necessary  to  prevent  the  en- 
trance of  new  foreign  influences  into  the  Carib- 
bean, the  opposition  was  so  strong  that  the  treaty 
was  not  accepted  by  the  Senate  until  1907,  and 
then  only  in  a  modified  form  with  the  omission  of 
the  territorial  guarantee. 

For  the  United  States  thus  to  step  into  a  foreign 
country  as  an  administrator  was  indeed  a  startling 
innovation.  On  the  other  hand,  the  development 
of  such  a  policy  was  a  logical  sequence  of  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine.  That  it  was  a  step  in  the  general 
development  of  policy  on  the  part  of  the  United 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  CARIBBEAN        269 

States  and  not  a  random  leap  is  indicated  by  the 
manner  in  which  it  has  been  followed  up.  In  1911 
treaties  with  Nicaragua  and  Honduras  somewhat 
similar  to  the  Dominican  protocol  were  negotiated 
by  Secretary  Knox  but  failed  of  ratification.  Sub- 
sequently under  President  Wilson's  Administration, 
the  treaty  with  Nicaragua  was  redrafted  and  was 
ratified  by  both  parties.  Hayti,  too,  was  in  finan- 
cial difficulties  and,  at  about  the  time  of  the  out- 
break of  the  Great  War,  it  was  reported  that  Ger- 
many was  about  to  relieve  her  needs  at  the  price 
of  harbors  and  of  control.  In  1915,  however,  the 
United  States  took  the  island  under  its  protection 
by  a  treaty  which  not  only  gave  the  Government 
complete  control  of  the  fiscal  administration  but 
bound  it  to  "lend  an  efficient  aid  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  Haitian  independence  and  the  maintenance 
of  a  government  adequate  for  the  protection  of  life, 
property,  and  individual  liberty. " 

Since  1898,  then,  the  map  of  the  Caribbean  has 
completely  changed  its  aspect.  The  sea  is  not  an 
American  lake,  nor  do  the  Americans  wish  it  to  be 
such.  In  time,  as  the  surrounding  countries  be- 
come bettei  able  to  stand  alone,  direct  interference 
on  the  part  of  the  United  States  will  doubtless 
become  less  than  it  is  today.  There  is,  however, 


270  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

practically  no  present  opportunity  for  a  non- 
American  power  to  establish  itself  and  to  threaten 
the  commerce  or  the  canal  of  the  United  States. 

Few  people  in  the  United  States  and  perhaps 
fewer  in  the  countries  involved  realize  from  what 
American  influence  has  saved  these  small  states. 
A  glance  at  Africa  and  Asia  will  suggest  what 
would  otherwise  have  been  the  case.  Without  the 
United  States  and  its  leadership,  there  can  be  little 
doubt  that  giant  semisovereign  corporations  ow- 
ing allegiance  to  some  great  power  would  now 
possess  these  countries.  They  would  bristle  with 
forts  and  police,  and  their  populations  would  be  in 
a  state  of  absolute  political  and  of  quasi-economic 
servitude.  They  might  today  be  more  orderly 
and  perhaps  wealthier,  but  unless  the  fundamental 
American  belief  in  democracy  and  self-government 
is  wrong  they  would  be  infinitely  farther  from  their 
true  goal,  which  involves  the  working  out  of  their 
own  civilization. 

The  Caribbean  is  but  a  portion  of  the  whole  in- 
ternational problem  of  the  Americas,  and  the  meth- 
ods used  by  the  United  States  in  solving  its  prob- 
lems seemed  likely  to  postpone  that  sympathetic 
union  of  the  whole  to  which  it  has  been  looking  for- 
ward for  a  century.  Yet  this  country  has  not  been 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  CARIBBEAN        271 

unappreciative  of  the  larger  aspects  of  Pan-Ameri- 
canism. In  1899  President  McKinley  revived 
Elaine's  project  and  proposed  a  Pan- American  con- 
gress. To  popularize  this  idea,  a  Pan-American  Ex- 
position was  arranged  at  Buffalo  in  1901 .  Here,  just 
after  he  had  expounded  his  views  of  the  ties  that 
might  bind  the  continents  together,  McKinley  was 
assassinated.  The  idea,  however,  lived  and  in  the 
same  year  a  congress  was  held  at  the  City  of  Mexico, 
where  it  was  proposed  that  such  meetings  be  held 
regularly.  As  a  result,  congresses  were  held  at  Rio  de 
Janeiro  in  1906  and  at  Buenos  Aires  in  19 10,  at  which 
various  measures  of  common  utility  were  discussed 
and  a  number  of  projects  were  actually  undertaken. 
The  movement  of  Pan-Americanism  has  missed 
achieving  the  full  hopes  of  its  supporters  owing  not 
so  much  to  a  difference  of  fundamental  ideas  and 
interests  as  to  suspicion  and  national  pride.  The 
chief  powers  of  southern  South  America  —  Argen- 
tina, Brazil,  and  Chili  —  had  by  the  end  of  the 
nineteenth  century  in  large  measure  successfully 
worked  out  their  own  problems.  They  resented  the 
interference  of  a  power  of  alien  race  such  as  the 
United  States,  and  they  suspected  its  good  inten- 
tions in  wielding  the  "Big  Stick,"  especially  after  the 
cavalier  treatment  which  Colombia  had  received. 


272  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

They  observed  with  alarm  the  strengthening  or 
the  grip  of  the  United  States  about  the  Caribbean. 
United  in  a  group,  known  from  their  initials  as  the 
"A.B.  C."powers,  they  sought  to  assume  the  leader- 
ship of  Latin  America,  basing  their  action,  indeed, 
upon  the  fundamentals  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  — 
the  exclusion  of  foreign  influence  and  the  independ- 
ence of  peoples  —  but  with  themselves  instead  of 
the  United  States  as  chief  guardians. 

Many  of  the  publicists  of  these  three  powers, 
however,  doubted  their  capacity  to  walk  entirely 
alone.  On  the  one  hand  they  noted  the  growing 
influence  of  the  Germans  in  Brazil  and  the  indica- 
tions of  Japanese  interest  in  many  places,  and  on 
the  other  they  divined  the  fundamental  sincerity 
of  the  professions  of  the  United  States  and  were 
anxious  to  cooperate  with  this  nation.  Not  strong 
enough  to  control  the  policy  of  the  various  coun- 
tries, these  men  at  least  countered  those  chauvin- 
ists who  urged  that  hostility  to  the  United  States 
was  a  first  duty  compared  with  which  the  danger 
of  non-American  interference  might  be  neglected. 

Confronted  by  this  divided  attitude,  the  United 
States  sought  to  win  over  but  not  to  compel. 
Nothing  more  completely  met  American  views 
than  that  each  power  should  maintain  for  itself 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  CARIBBEAN        273 

the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by  excluding 
foreign  influences.  Beyond  that  the  United  States 
sought  only  friendship,  and,  if  it  were  agreeable, 
such  unity  as  should  be  mutually  advantageous. 
In  1906  Elihu  Root,  the  Secretary  of  State,  made 
a  tour  of  South  America  with  a  view  of  expressing 
these  sentiments;  and  in  1913-1914  ex-President 
Roosevelt  took  occasion,  on  the  way  to  his  Brazil- 
ian hunting  trip,  to  assure  the  people  of  the  great 
South  American  powers  that  the  "Big  Stick"  was 
not  intended  to  intimidate  them.  Pan-American 
unity  was  still,  when  President  Taft  went  out  of 
office  in  1913,  an  aspiration  rather  than  a  realized 
fact,  though  the  tangible  evidences  of  unity  had 
vastly  multiplied  since  1898,  and  the  recurring 
congresses  provided  a  basis  of  organization  upon 
which  some  substantial  structure  might  be  built. 

The  United  States  had  sincerely  hoped  that 
Mexico,  like  the  "A.  B.  C."  powers,  was  another 
Latin  American  power  which  had  found  itself.  Of 
all  it  was  certainly  the  most  friendly  and  the  most 
intimate.  The  closeness  of  its  relations  with  the 
United  States  is  indicated  by  the  fact  that  in  the 
forty  years  between  1868  and  1908,  forty  agree- 
ments, treaties,  and  conventions  had  been  con- 
cluded between  the  two  countries.  Nor  was 
u 


274  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

intimacy  confined  to  the  Governments.  The  peace 
arranged  by  President  Diaz  had  brought  foreign 
capital  by  the  billion  to  aid  the  internal  develop- 
ment of  the  country,  and  of  this  money  more  had 
come  from  the  United  States  than  from  any  other 
nation.  Nor  was  it  financial  aid  alone  which  had 
gone  across  the  border.  There  was  but  little  Amer- 
ican colonization,  it  is  true,  but  business  managers, 
engineers,  mine  foremen,  and  ranch  superinten- 
dents formed  thousands  of  links  binding  the  na- 
tions together.  The  climax  of  intimacy  seemed 
reached  when,  in  1910,  a  general  treaty  of  arbi- 
tration was  made  after  President  Taft  and  Presi- 
dent Diaz  had  met  at  El  Paso  on  the  Mexican 
border  in  a  personal  conference.  A  personal  in- 
terview between  the  President  of  the  United 
States  and  the  chief  of  a  foreign  state  was  almost 
unique  in  American  history,  owing  to  the  conven- 
tion that  the  President  should  not  depart  from  the 
national  territory. 

It  was,  therefore,  with  a  bitter  sense  of  disap- 
pointment that  Americans  heard  of  the  revolution 
inaugurated  in  1910  by  Francisco  Madero.  In 
common  with  France,  Spain,  Great  Britain,  and 
Germany,  the  United  States  was  disturbed  for 
the  safety  of  the  investments  and  persons  of  its 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  CARIBBEAN        275 

citizens.  The  Government  was  also  concerned  be- 
cause the  points  of  first  and  most  persistent  fight- 
ing were  where  the  various  railroads  crossed  the 
American  boundary.  This  circumstance  brought 
the  whole  border  within  the  range  of  disturbance. 
The  Government  was  apprehensive,  too,  as  to  the 
effect  of  long-continued  war  upon  territories  within 
the  circle  of  its  chief  interest,  the  Caribbean  area. 
Yet,  when  the  first  surprise  caused  by  the  revolu- 
tion had  passed  and  the  reason  for  the  outbreak 
was  perceived,  —  the  fact  that  the  order  and  ap- 
parent prosperity  of  the  Diaz  regime  had  been 
founded  upon  the  oppression  and  exploitation  of 
the  masses,  —  public  sympathy  in  the  United 
States  went  out  to  Madero  and  his  supporters. 

The  Diaz  Government  collapsed  with  surprising 
suddenness.  The  resignation  of  President  Diaz  in 
May,  1911,  was  accepted  as  a  proof  of  the  popular 
character  and  the  success  of  the  revolution,  and 
Madero,  who  was  elected  president  in  October,  was 
promptly  recognized  as  the  constitutional  head  of 
the  Mexican  Government.  The  revolution,  how- 
ever, aroused  the  United  States  to  the  fact  that 
there  still  persisted  the  era  of  disturbance  which 
it  had  hoped  was  drawing  to  a  close  in  Latin 
America.  With  this  disturbing  revelation  ia  mind, 


276  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

Congress  took  another  step  in  the  development 
of  American  policies  consequent  upon  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  by  passing  an  act  authorizing  the  Presi- 
dent, whenever  he  should  "find  that  in  any  Amer- 
ican country  conditions  of  domestic  violence  exist 
which  are  promoted  by  the  use  of  arms  and  muni- 
tions of  war  procured  from  the  United  States, "  to 
prohibit  trade  in  such  articles.  Under  this  author- 
ity, President  Taft  promptly  forbade  the  export  of 
such  articles  to  Mexico  except  to  the  Government. 
Real  revolutions,  however,  seldom  result  simply 
in  the  transfer  of  authority  from  one  group  to  an- 
other. The  breaking  of  the  bonds  of  recognized  au- 
thority releases  all  sorts  of  desires,  represented  in 
the  state  by  separate  groups,  each  of  which  sees  no 
reason  for  accepting  the  control  of  another.  All 
seek  to  seize  the  dropped  reins.  The  inauguration 
of  Madero,  therefore,  did  not  result  in  a  new  and 
popular  government  but  in  continued  disturbance. 
Factions  with  differing  creeds  raised  revolts  in  vari- 
ous sections  of  the  country  until,  in  February, 
1913,  Madero  was  overthrown  by  one  of  these 
groups,  led  by  Felix  Diaz  and  General  Victoriano 
Huerta,  and  representing  a  reactionary  tendency. 
Madero  and  his  vice  president  Pino  Suarez  were 
killed,  it  was  believed  by  order  of  Huerta,  and 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  CARIBBEAN        277 

on  the  27th  of  February,  in  the  City  of  Mexico, 
Huerta  was  proclaimed  President.  Don  Venusti- 
ano  Carranza,  Governor  of  the  State  of  Coahuila, 
straightway  denied  the  constitutionality  of  the  new 
Government  and  led  a  new  revolution  under  the 
banner  of  the  Constitution. 

It  was  in  such  a  condition  that  President  Wilson 
found  the  affairs  of  the  continent  when  he  took 
office  on  March  4,  1913.  The  American  policy  in 
the  Caribbean  was  well  defined  and  to  a  large  ex- 
tent in  operation.  Pan-American  sentiment  was 
developing,  but  its  strength  and  direction  were  yet 
to  be  determined.  Mexico  was  in  chaos,  and  upon 
the  Government's  handling  of  it  would  depend  the 
final  success  of  the  United  States  in  the  Caribbean 
and  the  possibility  of  effecting  a  real  and  fruitful 
cooperation  of  the  Americas. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

WORLD    RELATIONSHIPS 

IT  became  increasingly  evident  that  the  foreign 
policy  of  the  United  States  could  not  consist  solely 
of  a  Caribbean  policy,  a  Pan-American  policy,  and 
a  Far  Eastern  policy,  but  that  it  must  necessarily 
involve  a  world  policy.  During  the  years  after 
the  Spanish  War  the  world  was  actively  discussing 
peace;  but  all  the  while  war  was  in  the  air.  The 
peace  devices  of  1815,  the  Holy  and  the  Quadruple 
Alliances,  had  vanished.  The  world  had  ceased 
to  regard  buffer  states  as  preventives  of  wars 
between  the  great  nations,  although  at  the  time 
few  believed  that  any  nation  would  ever  dare  to 
treat  them  as  Germany  since  then  has  treated 
Belgium.  The  balance  of  power  still  existed,  but 
statesmen  were  ever  uncertain  as  to  whether  such 
a  relation  of  states  was  really  conducive  to  peace 
or  to  war.  A  concert  of  the  Great  Powers  resem- 
bling the  Quadruple  Alliance  sought  to  regulate 

278 


WORLD  RELATIONSHIPS  279 

such  vexing  problems  as  were  presented  by  the 
Balkans  and  China,  but  their  concord  was  not 
loud  enough  to  drown  the  notes  of  discord. 

The  outspoken  word  of  governments  was  still  all 
for  peace;  their  proposals  for  preserving  it  were 
of  two  kinds.  First,  there  was  the  time-honored 
argument  that  the  best  preservative  of  peace  was 
preparation  for  war.  Foremost  in  the  avowed  poli- 
cies of  the  day,  this  was  urged  by  some  who  really 
believed  it,  by  some  who  hoped  for  war  and  in- 
tended to  be  ready  for  it,  and  by  the  cynical  who 
did  not  wish  for  war  but  thought  it  inevitable.  The 
other  proposal  was  that  war  could  and  should  be 
prevented  by  agreements  to  submit  all  differences 
between  nations  to  international  tribunals  for  judg- 
ment. In  the  United  States,  which  had  always 
rejected  the  idea  of  balance  of  power,  and  which 
only  in  Asia,  and  to  a  limited  degree,  assented  to 
the  concert  of  powers,  one  or  the  other  of  these 
two  views  was  urged  by  all  those  who  saw  that  the 
United  States  had  actually  become  a  world  power, 
that  isolation  no  longer  existed,  and  that  a  policy  of 
nonintervention  could  not  keep  us  permanently 
detached  from  the  current  of  world  politics. 

The  foremost  advocates  of  preparedness  were 
Theodore  Roosevelt  and  Admiral  Mahan.  It  was 


280  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

little  enough  that  they  were  able  to  accomplish, 
but  it  was  more  than  most  Americans  realize.  The 
doubling  of  the  regular  army  which  the  Spanish 
War  had  brought  about  was  maintained  but  was 
less  important  than  its  improvement  in  organiza- 
tion. Elihu  Root  and  William  H.  Taft,  as  Secre- 
taries of  War,  profiting  by  the  lessons  learned  in 
Cuba,  established  a  general  staff,  provided  for  the 
advanced  professional  training  of  officers,  and  be- 
came sufficiently  acquainted  with  the  personnel  to 
bring  into  positions  of  responsibility  those  who 
deserved  to  hold  them.  The  navy  grew  with  less 
resistance  on  the  part  of  the  public,  which  now  was 
interested  in  observing  the  advance  in  the  rank  of 
its  fleet  among  the  navies  of  the  world.  When  in 
1907  Roosevelt  sent  the  American  battleship  squad- 
ron on  a  voyage  around  the  world,  the  expedition 
not  only  caused  a  pleased  self-consciousness  at 
home  but  perhaps  impressed  foreign  nations  with 
the  fact  that  the  United  States  now  counted  not 
only  as  a  potential  but  as  an  actual  factor  in 
world  affairs. 

Greater  popular  interest,  if  one  may  judge  from 
relative  achievement,  was  aroused  by  the  pro- 
posal to  substitute  legal  for  military  battles.  The 
United  States  had  always  been  disposed  to  submit 


WORLD  RELATIONSHIPS  281 

to  arbitration  questions  which  seemed  deadlocked. 
The  making  of  general  arrangements  for  the  arbi- 
tration of  cases  that  might  arise  in  the  future  was 
now  advocated.  The  first  important  proposal  of 
this  character  was  made  to  the  United  States  by 
Great  Britain  at  the  time  of  the  Venezuela  affair. 
This  proposal  was  rejected,  for  it  was  regarded  as 
a  device  of  Great  Britain  to  cover  her  retreat  in 
that  particular  case  by  suggesting  a  general  pro- 
vision. The  next  suggestion  was  that  made  by  the 
Czar,  in  1899,  for  a  peace  conference  at  The  Hague. 
This  invitation  the  United  States  accepted  with 
hearty  good  will  and  she  concurred  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  permanent  court  of  arbitration  to 
meet  in  that  city.  Andrew  Carnegie  built  a  home 
for  it,  and  President  Roosevelt  sent  to  it  as  its 
first  case  that  of  the  "Pious  Fund,"  concerning 
which  the  United  States  had  long  been  in  dispute 
with  Mexico. 

The  establishment  of  a  world  court  promoted  the 
formation  of  treaties  between  nations  by  which 
they  agreed  to  submit  their  differences  to  The 
Hague  or  to  similar  courts  especially  formed.  A 
model,  or  as  it  was  called  a  "mondial"  treaty  was 
drawn  up  by  the  conference  for  this  purpose.  Sec- 
retary Hay  proceeded  to  draw  up  treaties  on  such 


282  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

general  lines  with  a  number  of  nations,  and  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt  referred  them  to  the  Senate  with 
his  warm  approval.  That  body,  however,  exceed- 
ingly jealous  of  the  share  in  the  treaty-making 
power  given  it  by  the  Constitution,  disliked  the 
treaties,  because  it  feared  that  under  such  general 
agreements  cases  would  be  submitted  to  The  Hague 
Court  without  its  special  approval. z  Yet,  as  popu- 
lar sentiment  was  strongly  behind  the  movement, 
the  Senate  ventured  only  to  amend  the  procedure 
in  such  a  way  as  to  make  every  "agreement"  a 
treaty  which  would  require  its  concurrence.  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt,  however,  was  so  much  incensed  at; 
this  important  change  that  he  refused  to  continue 
the  negotiations. 

President  Taft  was  perhaps  more  interested  in 
this  problem  than  in  any  other.  His  Secretary  of 
State,  Elihu  Root,  reopened  negotiations  and,  in 
1908  and  1909,  drew  up  a  large  number  of  trea- 
ties in  a  form  which  met  the  wishes  of  the  Sen- 
ate. Before  the  Administration  closed,  the  United 
States  had  agreed  to  submit  to  arbitration  all 
questions,  except  those  of  certain  classes  especially 

1  The  second  article  in  these  treaties  read :  "  In  each  individual  case 
the  high  contracting  parties,  before  appealing  to  the  Permanent  Court 
of  Arbitration,  shall  conclude  a  special  agreement  defining  clearly  the 
matter  in  dispute. " 


WORLD  RELATIONSHIPS  283 

reserved,  that  might  arise  with  Great  Britain, 
France,  Austro-Hungary,  China,  Costa  Rica,  Italy, 
Denmark,  Japan,  Hayti,  Mexico,  the  Nether- 
lands, Norway,  Paraguay,  Spain,  Sweden,  Peru, 
San  Salvador,  and  Switzerland. 

Such  treaties  seemed  to  a  few  fearsome  souls  to 
be  violations  of  the  injunctions  of  Washington  and 
Jefferson  to  avoid  entangling  alliances,  but  to  most 
they  seemed,  rather,  to  be  disentangling.  It  was, 
indeed,  becoming  increasingly  apparent  that  the 
world  was  daily  growing  smaller  and  that,  as  its 
parts  were  brought  together  by  rail  and  steam- 
ships, by  telegraph  and  wireless,  more  and  more 
objects  of  common  interest  must  become  subject  to 
common  regulation.  General  Grant  can  hardly  be 
regarded  as  a  visionary,  and  yet  in  1873  in  his 
second  inaugural  address,  he  had  said :  "  Commerce, 
education,  and  rapid  transit  of  thought  and  matter 
by  telegraph  and  steam  have  changed  all  this. 
...  I  believe  that  our  Great  Maker  is  prepar- 
ing the  world  in  His  own  good  time,  to  become  one 
nation,  speaking  one  language,  and  when  armies 
and  navies  will  be  no  longer  required. " 

Quietly,  without  general  interest,  or  even  par- 
ticular motive,  the  United  States  had  accepted  its 
share  in  handling  many  such  world  problems.  As 


284  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

early  as  1875  it  had  cooperated  in  founding  and 
maintaining  at  Paris  an  International  Bureau  of 
Weights  and  Measures.  In  1886  it  joined  in  an 
international  agreement  for  the  protection  of  sub- 
marine cables;  in  1890,  in  an  agreement  for  the 
suppression  of  the  African  slave  trade;  in  1899,  in 
an  agreement  for  the  regulation  of  the  importation 
of  spirituous  liquors  into  Africa;  in  1902,  in  a  con- 
vention of  American  powers  for  the  Arbitration  of 
Pecuniary  Claims.  In  1903  it  united  with  vari- 
ous American  powers  in  an  International  Sanitary 
Convention;  in  1905  it  joined  with  most  countries 
of  the  world  in  establishing  and  maintaining  an 
International  Institute  of  Agriculture  at  Rome. 
It  would  surprise  most  Americans  to  know  that 
five  hundred  pages  of  their  collection  of  Treaties 
and  Conventions  consist  of  such  international  un- 
dertakings, which  amount  in  fact  to  a  body  of 
international  legislation.  It  is  obvious  that  the 
Government,  in  interpreting  the  injunction  to 
avoid  entangling  alliances,  has  not  found  therein 
prohibition  against  international  cooperation. 

In  1783  the  United  States  had  been  a  little  na- 
tion with  not  sufficient  inhabitants  to  fill  up  its 
million  square  miles  of  territory.  Even  in  1814 


WORLD  RELATIONSHIPS  285 

it  still  reached  only  to  the  Rockies  and  still  found 
a  troublesome  neighbor  lying  between  it  and  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico.  Now  with  the  dawn  of  the  twenti- 
eth century  it  was  a  power  of  imperial  dimensions, 
occupying  three  million  square  miles  between 
the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific,  controlling  the  Carib- 
bean, and  stretching  its  possessions  across  the  Pa- 
cific and  up  into  the  Arctic.  Its  influence  was  a 
potent  factor  in  the  development  of  Asia,  and  it  was 
bound  by  the  bonds  of  treaties,  which  it  has  ever 
regarded  sacred,  to  assist  in  the  regulation  of  many 
matters  of  world  interest. 

Nor  had  the  only  change  during  the  century 
been  that  visible  in  the  United  States.  The  world 
which  seemed  so  vast  and  mysterious  in  1812  had 
opened  up  most  of  its  dark  places  to  the  valor  of 
adventurous  explorers,  of  whom  the  United  States 
had  contributed  its  fair  share.  The  facilities  of 
intercourse  had  conquered  space,  and  along  with 
its  conquest  had  gone  a  penetration  of  the  countries 
of  the  world  by  the  tourist  and  the  immigrant,  the 
missionary  and  the  trader,  so  that  Terence's  state- 
ment that  nothing  human  was  alien  to  him  had 
become  perforce  true  of  the  world. 

Nor  had  the  development  of  governmental  or- 
ganization stood  still.  In  1812  the  United  States 


286  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

was  practically  the  only  democratic  republic  in  the 
world;  in  1912  the  belief  in  a  government  founded 
on  the  consent  of  the  governed,  and  republican  in 
form,  had  spread  over  all  the  Americas,  except  such 
portions  as  were  still  colonies,  and  was  practically 
true  of  even  most  of  them.  Republican  institu- 
tions had  been  adopted  by  France  and  Portugal, 
and  the  spirit  of  democracy  had  permeated  Great 
Britain  and  Norway  and  was  gaining  yearly  vic- 
tories elsewhere.  In  1912  the  giant  bulk  of  China 
adopted  the  form  of  government  commended  to  her 
by  the  experience  of  the  nation  which,  more  than 
any  other,  had  preserved  her  integrity.  Autocracy 
and  divine  right,  however,  were  by  no  means  dead. 
On  the  contrary,  girt  and  prepared,  they  were  arm- 
ing themselves  for  a  final  stand.  But  no  longer,  as 
in  1823,  was  America  pitted  alone  against  Europe. 
It  was  the  world  including  America  which  was  now 
divided  against  itself. 

It  was  chiefly  the  Spanish  War  which  caused  the 
American  people  slowly  and  reluctantly  to  realize 
this  new  state  of  things  —  that  the  ocean  was  no 
longer  a  barrier  in  a  political  or  military  sense,  and 
that  the  fate  of  each  nation  was  irrevocably  bound 
up  with  the  fate  of  all.  As  the  years  went  by, 
however,  Americans  came  to  see  that  the  isolation 


WORLD  RELATIONSHIPS  287 

proclaimed  by  President  Monroe  was  no  longer 
real,  and  that  isolation  even  as  a  tradition  could 
not,  either  for  good  or  for  ill,  long  endure.  All 
thoughtful  men  saw  that  a  new  era  needed  a  new 
policy ;  the  wiser,  however,  were  not  willing  to  give 
up  all  that  they  had  acquired  in  the  experience  of 
the  past.  They  remembered  that  the  separation, 
of  the  continents  was  not  proclaimed  as  an  end  in 
itself  but  as  a  means  of  securing  American  purposes. 
Those  national  purposes  had  been:  first,  the  secur- 
ing of  the  right  of  self-government  on  the  part  of 
the  United  States;  second,  the  securing  of  the  right 
of  other  nations  to  govern  themselves.  Both  of 
these  aims  rested  on  the  belief  that  one  nation 
should  not  interfere  with  the  domestic  affairs  of 
another.  These  fundamental  American  purposes 
remained,  but  it  was  plain  that  the  situation  would 
force  the  nation  to  find  some  different  method  of 
realizing  them.  The  action  of  the  United  States 
indicated  that  the  hopes  of  the  people  ran  to  the 
reorganization  of  the  world  in  such  a  way  as  would 
substitute  the  arbitrament  of  courts  for  that  of 
war.  Year  by  year  the  nation  committed  itself 
more  strongly  to  cooperation  foreshadowing  such 
an  organization.  While  this  feeling  was  growing 
among  the  people,  the  number  of  those  who 


288  THE  PATH  OF  EMPIRE 

doubted  whether  such  a  system  could  ward  off  war 
altogether  and  forever  also  increased.  Looking 
forward  to  the  probability  of  war,  they  could  not 
fail  to  fear  that  the  next  would  prove  a  world  war, 
and  that  in  the  event  of  such  a  conflict,  the  non- 
interference of  the  United  States  would  not  suffice 
to  preserve  it  immune  in  any  real  independence. 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

EACH  President's  Annual  Message  always  gives  a  brief 
survey  of  the  international  relations  of  the  year  and 
often  makes  suggestions  of  future  policy.  Of  these  the 
most  famous  is  Monroe's  message  in  1823.  Since  1860 
they  have  been  accompanied  by  a  volume  of  Foreign 
Relations,  giving  such  correspondence  as  can  be  made 
public  at  the  time.  The  full  correspondence  in  particu- 
lar cases  is  sometimes  called  for  by  the  Congress,  in 
which  case  it  is  found  in  the  Executive  Documents  of 
House  or  Senate.  A  fairly  adequate  selection  of  all 
such  papers  before  1828  is  found  in  American  State 
Papers,  Foreign  Affairs.  Three  volumes  contain  the 
American  Treaties,  Conventions,  International  Acts,  etc., 
to  1913.  A.  B.  Hart's  Foundations  of  American  For- 
eign Policy  (1901)  gives  a  good  bibliography  of  these 
and  other  sources. 

More  intimate  material  is  found  in  the  lives  and  works 
of  diplomats,  American  and  foreign.  Almost  all  leave 
some  record,  but  there  are  unfortunately  fewer  of  value 
since  1830  than  before  that  date.  The  Memoirs  of 
John  Quincy  Adams  (1874-1877),  and  his  Writings, 
(1913-  ),  are  full  of  fire  and  information,  and  W.  C. 
Ford,  in  his  John  Quincy  Adams  and  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, in  the  American  Historical  Review,  vol.  vn,  pp. 
676-696,  and  vol.  vui,  pp.  28-52,  enables  us  to  sit  at  the 
I9  289 


290  BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

council  table  while  that  fundamental  policy  was  being 
evolved.  The  most  interesting  work  of  this  kind  for  the 
later  period  is  The  Life  and  Letters  of  John  Hay,  by  W. 
R.  Thayer,  2  vols.  (1915). 

Treatments  of  American  diplomacy  as  a  whole  are 
few.  J.  W.  Foster's  Century  of  American  Diplomacy 
(1901)  ends  with  1876.  C.  R.  Fish  in  American  Diplo- 
macy (1915)  gives  a  narrative  from  the  beginning  to  the 
present  time.  W.  A.  Dunning's  The  British  Empire  and 
the  United  States  (1914)  is  illuminating  and  interesting. 
Few  countries  possess  so  firm  a  basis  for  the  understand- 
ing of  their  relations  with  the  world  as  J.  B.  Moore  has 
laid  down  in  his  Digest  of  International  Law,  8  vols. 
(1906),  and  his  History  and  Digest  of  International 
Arbitrations,  6  vols.  (1898). 

Particular  episodes  and  subjects  have  attracted  much 
more  the  attention  of  students.  Of  the  library  of  works 
on  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  A.  B.  Hart's  The  Monroe 
Doctrine,  an  Interpretation  (1916)  can  be  most  safely 
recommended.  On  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  M.  W. 
Williams's  Anglo-American  Isthmian  Diplomacy,  1815- 
1915  (1916)  combines  scholarly  accuracy  with  interest. 
A.  R.  Colquhoun's  The  Mastery  of  the  Pacific  (1902)  has 
sweep;  and  no  one  will  regret  reading  R.  L.  Stevenson's 
A  Footnote  to  History  (1892),  though  it  deals  but  with 
the  toy  kingdom  of  Samoa. 

The  most  important  history  of  the  Spanish  War  is 
Admiral  F.  E.  Chadwick's  The  Relations  of  the  United 
States  and  Spain,  one  volume  of  which,  Diplomacy  (1909) , 
deals  with  the  long  course  of  relations  which  explain  the 
war;  and  two  volumes,  Spanish- American  War  (1911), 
give  a  narrative  and  critical  account  of  the  war  itself. 
E.  J.  Benton's  International  Law  and  Diplomacy  of  the 


BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE  291 

Spanish-American  War  (1908)  is  a  good  review  of  the  par- 
ticular aspects  indicated  in  the  title.  The  activity  of  the 
navy  is  discussed  from  various  angles  by  J.  D.  Long, 
The  New  American  Navy,  %  vols.  (1903),  and  by  H.  H. 
Sargent  in  The  Campaign  of  Santiago  de  Cuba,  3  vols. 
(1907),  in  which  he  gives  a  very  valuable  documentary 
and  critical  history  of  the  chief  campaign.  General 
Joseph  Wheeler  has  told  the  story  from  the  military 
point  of  view  in  The  Santiago  Campaign  (1899),  and 
Theodore  Roosevelt  in  The  Rough  Riders  (1899).  A 
good  military  account  of  the  whole  campaign  is  H.  W. 
Wilson's  The  Downfall  of  Spain  (1900).  Russell  A. 
Alger  in  The  Spanish-American  War  (1901)  attempts  to 
defend  his  administration  of  the  War  Department. 
General  Frederick  Funston,  in  his  Memories  of  Two  Wars 
(1911)  proves  himself  as  interesting  as  a  writer  as  he  was 
picturesque  as  a  fighter.  J.  A.  LeRoy,  in  The  Ameri- 
cans in  the  Philippines,  2  vols.  (1914),  gives  a  very  care- 
ful study  of  events  in  those  islands  to  the  outbreak 
of  guerrilla  warfare.  C.  B.  Elliott's  The  Philippines,  % 
vols.  (1917),  is  an  excellent  study  of  American  policy 
and  its  working  up  to  the  Wilson  Administration.  W. 
F.  Willoughby  discusses  governmental  problems  in  his 
Territories  and  Dependencies  of  the  United  States  (1905). 

On  the  period  subsequent  to  the  Spanish  War,  J.  H. 
Latane's  America  as  a  World  Power  (in  the  American 
Nation  Series,  1907)  is  excellent.  A.  C.  Coolidge's  The 
United  States  as  a  World  Power  (1908)  is  based  on  a  pro- 
found understanding  of  European  as  well  as  American 
conditions.  C .  L.  Jones's  Caribbean  Interests  of  the  United 
States  (1916)  is  a  comprehensive  survey.  The  Autobio- 
graphy of  Theodore  Roosevelt  (1913)  is  indispensable  for 
an  understanding  of  the  spirit  of  his  Administration.  W. 


292  BIBLIOGRAPHICAL  NOTE 

H.  Taft's  The  United  States  and  Peace  (1914)  is  a  source, 
a  history,  and  an  argument. 

The  International  Year  Book  and  the  American  Year 
Book  contain  annual  accounts  written  by  men  of  wide 
information  and  with  great  attention  to  accuracy.  Such 
periodic  treatments,  however,  are  intended  to  be,  and 
are,  valuable  for  fact  rather  than  for  interpretation. 


INDEX 


KA..  B.  C."  powers  and  Monroe 
Doctrine,  272 

Adams,  C.  F.,  American  Minister 
to  England,  32;  at  Geneva 
Tribunal,  37 

Adams,  Henry,  and  John  Hay, 
198-99 

Adams,  J.  Q.,  40,  49,  198;  Secre- 
tary of  State,  7;  personal 
characteristics,  8;  outlines 
Monroe  Doctrine,  9-15,  16; 
and  Cuba,  94 

Adler,  German  warship  at  Samoa, 
71 

Africa,  regulation  of  liquor  ship- 
ment to,  284 

Aguinaldo,  Emilio,  leader  of  Fili- 
pino insurgents,  123,  180,  182; 
against  United  States,  204  et 
seq. ;  captured,  211-12;  accepts 
American  rule,  212-13;  son 
serves  United  States  in  Great 
War,  217 

Aix-la-Chapelle,  Congress  at 
(1818),  4 

Alabama  claims,  32-36,  37 

Alaska,  39  etseq. ;  cession,  42-46; 
seal  question,  46-53,  245;  re- 
lation to  United  States,  195; 
boundary  question,  243-44 

Alaska  Commercial  Company,  47 

Alexander  I,  Czar  of  Russia,  and 
"Holy  Alliance,"  1-2 

Alexis,  Grand  Duke,  visit  to 
United  States,  45 

Alger,  R.  A.,  Secretary  of  War, 
146;  Spanish-American  War, 
146,  147;  incompetence,  146- 


147, 170-71;  offers  to  transport 
Spanish  troops  from  Cuba, 
165-66;  indignation  against, 
168 

Allen,  Ethan,  heads  Cuban  com- 
mittee in  New  York,  97 

Alverstone,  Lord,  and  Alaska 
boundary  decision,  244 

"America  for  the  Americans," 
Elaine's  slogan,  125 

Andre,  Eduard,  Belgian  consul 
at  Manila,  181 

Annapolis,  Naval  Training 
School,  92,  146 

Arbitration,  see  International 
arbitration 

Arbitration  of  Pecuniary  Claims, 
Convention  of  American  pow- 
ers for  (1902),  284 

Argentine,  commerce,  90;  as  one 
of  "A.  B.  C."  powers,  271-72 

Armenia,  protest  against  mas- 
sacres in  (1896),  128 

Army,  preparation  for  Spanish 
American  War,  142  et  seq. ;  in 
Cuba,  153-60;  health  condi- 
tions, 167-69;  criticism  of  mis- 
management, 169-71;  expedi- 
tionary force  to  Porto  Rico, 
176-77;  sent  to  Philippines, 
178-81;  against  Aguinaldo, 
206-14;  growth  under  Roose- 
velt, 280;  General  Staff  estab- 
lished, 280 

Arroyo  (Porto  Rico),  Americans 
occupy,  177 

Ashburton,  Lord,  negotiations 
with  Webster,  22-25 


293 


294 


INDEX 


Australia  and  Japanese  immigra- 
tion, 236 

-Austria,  attitude  toward  United 
States,  124;  arbitration  treaty 
with,  283 

.Aylesworth,  A.  B.,  on  Alaska 
boundary  commission,  244 

Bag-bag  River,  Funston  crosses, 

207-08 

Balance  of  power,  278,  279 
Balfour,  A.  J.,  Hay  meets,  86 
Baltimore,     American     warship, 

118 
Bay   Islands,    rival    claims    for, 

30 
Bayard,  T.  F.,  Secretary  of  State, 

48,  79 

Bering  Sea  controversy,  46-53 
Belize    (British   Honduras),    27, 

30;  see  also  British  Honduras 
Bernhardi,  Germany  and  the  Next 

War,  cited,  56 
Biddle,  Commodore  James,  visits 

Japan,  67 
Bigelow,  John,  Hay's  letter  to, 

186-87 
Bingham,    Miss,    marries    Lord 

Ashburton,  22 
Bismarck,   Prince,    and    Samoa, 

71;  colonial  policy,  126 
Elaine,  J.  G.,  Secretary  of  State, 

49-50,  58,  73;  and  Bering  Sea 

controversy,     50-53;     "Elder 

Sister"     program,     59,     267; 

Pan- Americanism,  63-64,   93; 

and  Hawaii,  76;  and  Clayton- 

Bulwer  Treaty,  249 
Blanco,    General    Ramon,    suc- 
ceeds  Weyler   in   Cuba,    104, 

160 

Bliss,  Lieutenant  Tasker,  93 
Blockade,  of  Manila,  123,  130; 

of  Cuba,  131  et  seq.-,    160-61; 

"pacific  blockade"   of   Vene- 
zuela, 264 
BIpunt,  J.  H.,  commissioner  to 

investigate  revolt  in  Hawaii, 

77-78 


Blue,  Lieutenant  Victor,  117 
Boer  War  (1899-1902),  242 
Bogota,  Colombian  gunboat,  256 
Bolivia,  Bolivar  liberates,  4;  war 

with  Chili  and  Peru,  60 
Bond,  Sir  Robert,  Prime  Minis- 
ter of  Newfoundland,  247-48 
Borneo,    United    States    treaty 

relations  with,  67 
Boxer  uprising,  228-30 
Brazil,  independence,  4;  Germans 

in,  58,  272;  one  of  "A.  B.  C." 

powers,  271-72 
British  Columbia  and  Japanese 

immigration,  236 
British  Honduras,  on  the  Carib- 
bean, 259;  see  also  Belize 
Brooke,  General  J.  R.,  177 
Brooklyn,    Schley's    flagship,   in 

Santiago  campaign,  161,  162, 

163,  164 
Bryan,  W.  J.,  Secretary  of  State, 

88;    defeated    for    Presidency, 

211 
Buchanan,     James,     negotiates 

with  Palmerston,  30-31 
Buenos  Aires  independence,  3 
Buffalo  (N.  Y.),  Pan-American 

Exposition  at,  271 
Bulwer,    Sir    Henry,    negotiates 

with  Clayton,  28-29 
Bunau-Varilla,  Philippe,  254,  256 
Bureau  of  American  Republics, 

64 

Cables,  international  agreement 
for  protection  of  submarine 
(1886),  284 

Cagayan  Sulu,  United  States 
acquires,  200 

Calhoun,  J.  C.,  Secretary  of 
War,  7 

California,  195;  discovery  of 
gold  (1848),  27;  and  Japanese, 
234,  237 

Calumpit,  stronghold  of  Fili- 
pinos, 207 

Calvo,  Carlos,  of  Argentina,  on 
collection  of  debts,  265 


INDEX 


295 


Camara,  Admiral,  with  Spanish 
fleet  to  Philippines,  139,  173- 
174;  ordered  to  Spain,  175 

Cambon,  Jules,  French  Ambas- 
sador at  Washington,  183 

Campos,  Martinez,  the  "Pacifi- 
cator" of  Cuba,  98 

Canada,  and  Bering  Sea  contro- 
versy, 48-49;  fisheries  ques- 
tion, 49;  diplomacy  in  regard 
to,  245-48;  reciprocity  with, 
246 

Canning,  George,  5-7,  9,  10,  11, 
12,  13 

Cannon,  J.  G.,  introduces  na- 
tional defense  bill,  108 

Carnegie,  Andrew,  Hay  writes 
to,  186;  Distant  Possessions — 
The  Parting  of  the  Ways,  186; 
and  Hague  Tribunal,  281 

Caroline,  steamer,  controversy 
with  Great  Britain  regarding, 
20-21,  24 

Caroline  Islands,  Germany  ac- 
quires, 219 

Carranza,  Venustiano,  revolu- 
tionary leader  in  Mexico, 
277 

Carter,  J.  C.,  counsel  in  Bering 
Sea  case,  52 

Castillo,  Antonio  Canovas  del, 
Spanish  Prime  Minister,  104 

Central  America,  negotiations 
regarding  canal  routes,  261; 
see  also  names  of  Central  Amer- 
ican countries 

Cervera,  Admiral  Pascual,  with 
Spanish  squadron  in  Cuba, 
135-41,  159-60 

Chadwick,  Admiral  F.E.,  quoted, 
134  (note) ;  cited,  140,  144 

Chamberlain,  Joseph,  quoted, 
129;  on  alliance  with  United 
States,  242 

Chandler,  W.  E.,  Secretary  of 
Navy,  9? 

Chichester,  Captain,  commander 
of  British  squadron  at  Manila, 
130,  182 


Chili,  San  Martin  in,  3;  war  with 
Bolivia  and  Peru,  60;  one  of 
"A.  B.  C."  powers,  271-72 

China,  treaty  relations  with 
United  States,  67;  weakness, 
219;  Germany  in,  220;  Euro- 
pean states  secure  ports  in, 
221-22;  American  policy  re- 
garding, 222-28,  232,  233,  235; 
Chinese  Exclusion  Act,  224, 
236;  "Open  Door,"  226,  231; 
Boxer  uprising,  228-30;  Hay's 
circular,  230-31;  integrity 
threatened,  234;  Knox  fosters 
American  interests  in,  237-38; 
"six-power  loan,"  238-39; 
arbitration  treaty  with,  283; 
becomes  republic,  286 

Chinese  Exclusion  Act,  224; 
applied  to  Japanese,  236 

Chino-Japanese  War  (1894-95) 
219,  220-21 

Cienfuegas,  Schley  at,  137,  138 

Civil  War,  relations  between 
Great  Britain  and  United 
States  as  result  of,  31-38; 
effect  on  Monroe  Doctrine, 
55, 57-58 

Clay,  Henry,  Secretary  of  State, 
5,  14,  63 

Clayton,  J.  M.,  Secretary  of 
State,  28,  30 

Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  28-31. 
62,  63,  249,  250,  251;  bibliog- 
raphy, 290 

Cleveland,  Grover,  and  inter- 
oceanic  canal,  63;  and  Hawaii, 
77-78;  as  President,  79;  poli- 
cies, 79-80;  and  Venezuela 
boundary  dispute,  81-89,  267; 
and  Cuban  question,  100-02; 
and  fisheries,  247 

Cockburn,  Sir  Alexander,  at 
Geneva  Tribunal,  37 

Colombia,  Bolivar  and,  3;  treaty 
of  1846  with  United  States, 
252,  254,  256;  rejects  canal 
treaty,  252-53,  secession  of 
Panama,  254-57;  on  the  Carib- 


296 


INDEX 


Colombia — Continued 
bean,  259;  further  treaty  nego- 
tiations, 261 

Commerce,  58,  66,  90,  222 

Communication,  lack  in  Cuba 
of  means  of  army,  157 

Concert  of  Powers,  278-79;  and 
China,  230 

Corwin,  revenue  cutter,  48 

Costa  Rica,  boundary  dispute, 
28;  on  the  Caribbean,  259; 
arbitration  treaty  with,  283 

Coudert,  F.  R.,  counsel  in  Bering 
Sea  case,  52 

Crawford,  W.  H.,  Secretary  of 
Treasury,  7 

Cristdbal  Col6n,  Spanish  battle- 
ship, 135,  163,  164 

Crowder,  E.  H.,  code  of  criminal 
procedure  for  Philippines,  215 

Crowninshield,  Captain  A.  S., 
on  Naval  War  Board,  117 

Cuba,  American  policy  regard- 
ing, 94-97,  100-04;  in  revolu- 
tion, 95-101;  Congress  calls 
on  Spain  to  withdraw  from, 
114-15;  blockade  of,  131  et 
seq.;  Spanish  troops  in,  152; 
campaign  of  Santiago,  153  et 
seq.;  Spain  relinquishes  claim 
to,  183;  disposition  of,  184-85, 
193;  United  States  interven- 
tion, 201-03;  and  the  Great 
War,  203;  independence,  260 

Cushing,  Caleb,  34,  37 

Daiquiri  (Cuba),  American  troops 
disembark  at,  153 

Dalny,  Russia  builds,  221 

Dana,  Paul,  Hay  writes  to, 
225 

"Daughters  of  the  American 
Revolution,  "91 

Davis,  C.  K.,  on  peace  commis- 
sion, 183,  191 

Davis,  J.  C.  B.,  at  Geneva  Tribu- 
nal, 37 

Day,  W.  R.,  Secretary  of  State, 
109-10;  meteoric  career,  110; 


president  of  peace  commission, 
183,  191 

De  Lesseps'  French  company 
and  Panama  Canal,  251,  252 

Democratic  party  and  the  Philip- 
pines, 196-97 

Denby,  Colonel  Charles,  on 
Philippine  commission,  215 

Denmark,  West  Indian  islands, 
41,  201,  259,  260;  arbitration 
treaty  with,  283 

Dewey,  Commodore  George,  and 
Manila  Bay,  116  et  seq.,  139- 
140,  173-79,  181-82,  183,  189; 
a  hero,  178;  quoted,  189-90; 
on  Philippine  commission,  215; 
and  Venezuela  controversy, 
264 

Diaz,  Felix,  revolutionary  leader 
in  Mexico,  276 

Diaz,  Porfirio,  President  of 
Mexico,  274,  275 

Diedrichs,  Admiral,  German  com- 
mander at  Manila,  130 

"Divine  Right,"  2,  4,  5 

Dole,  S.  B.,  78 

Dominican  Republic,  259; 
United  States  intervention, 
267-68;  see  also  Santo  Domingo 

Drago,  L.  M.,  doctrine  of  con- 
tract debts,  265,  267 

Duffield,  General,  159 

East,    Far,    see     China,     India, 

Japan 

Ecuador  and  Bolivar,  4 
El  Caney,  battle  of,  154-55 
El    Paso,     conference    between 

Taft  and  Diaz  at,  274 
England,  see  Great  Britain 
Escario,  Colonel,  Spanish  leader 

in  Cuba,  159,  160 
Evarts,  W.  M.,  counsel  at  Geneva 

Tribunal,  37 
Expansion,    18,    194-95;    J.    Q. 

Adams  on,  9,   12;  growth  of 

policy,  39;  Seward  and,  41-42; 

Alaskan  purchase,  42^46;  Fish 

on,  44,  75 


INDEX 


297 


Fenian  Brotherhood,  32 

Finance,  Cuban  responsibility 
for  Spanish  obligations,  184- 
185;  claimsof  European  powers 
against  Central  America,  263- 
264;  Drago  doctrine  of  contract 
debts,  265,  267;  Dominican 
Republic,  267-68 

Fish,  Hamilton,  Secretary  of 
State,  44,  100-01;  quoted,  75 

Florida  acquired  by  United 
States,  9,  194 

Florida,  Confederate  ram,  32 

Flying  Squadron,  137 

Formosa,  Japan  acquires,  221 

Foster,  J.  W.,  and  Bering  Sea 
controversy,  52;  Secretary  of 
State,  77 

France,  in  America,  55-56;  and 
Venezuela,  61;  and  Panama 
Canal,  61,  251,  252;  and  Span- 
ish American  War,  124;  in 
Far  East,  218,  222,  232; 
friendly  toward  United  States, 
241 ;  islands  in  Caribbean,  259; 
and  Mexico,  274;  arbitration 
treaty  with,  283;  spirit  of 
democracy  in,  286 

Frelinghuysen,  F.  T.,  Secretary 
of  State,  59,  60 

Frye,  W.  P.,  on  peace  commis- 
sion, 184,  191 

Funston,  General  Frederick,  in 
Philippines,  207-09,  211,  212 

Fur  seals,  protection  of,  see 
Alaska,  Bering  Sea  Contro- 
versy 

Furor,  Spanish  destroyer,  163 

Gadsden  Purchase  (1853),  46 

Gallatin,  Albert,  12 

Garcia,  General  Calixto,  Cuban 

leader,  152,  153 
Garfield,  J.  A.,  and  Blaine,  58 
Geier,  German  cruiser  at  Havana, 

160 

Geneva  Tribunal,  35-38 
Germany,    Germans    in    Brazil, 

58,    272;   and   Samoa,    70-72, 


200;  commerce,  90;  and  Span- 
ish American  War,  123-24, 
125-27,  129-30,  181-82,  190; 
in  Far  East,  218-19,  220,  221, 
228,  230,  232;  friendship  with 
United  States,  241;  blockade 
of  ports  of  Venezuela,  264-65; 
and  Hayti,  269;  and  Mexico, 
274;  see  also  William  II 

Gladstone;  W.  E.,  protests 
against  Armenian  massacres, 
128 

"Golden  Rule,"  226 

Gorgas,  W.  C.,  168 

Grant,  U.  S.,  34,  73;  and  expan- 
sion, 41;  quoted,  283 

Granville,  Lord,  50 

Gray,  George,  on  peace  commis- 
sion, 184,  191 

Great  Britain,  moderate  policy, 
5;  on  American  independence, 
5-7,  10;  controversies  with 
United  States,  19  et  seq.; 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  28- 
31,  62,  63,  249,  250,  251;  Ber- 
ing Sea  controversy,  46-53; 
commerce,  58,  90;  in  Far  East, 
68,  218,  220,  221-22,  227,  232, 
234, 236;  in  Samoa,  70, 72, 200; 
colonial  policy,  73;  and  Hawaii, 
76;  Venezuela  boundary  dis- 
pute, 80-89:  joins  in  offer  of 
mediation  between  United 
States  and  Spain,  125;  and 
Spanish  American  War,  127- 
129, 130, 182;  friendly  relations 
with  United  States,  241-42; 
Alaska  boundary  question, 
243-45;  fisheries  agreements, 
245,  247-48;  canal  treaties, 
249,  250;  islands  of  the  Carib- 
bean belong  to,  259;  blockade 
of  ports  of  Venezuela,  264; 
and  Mexico,  274;  general 
arbitration,  281,  283;  spirit  of 
democracy  in,  286 

Great  War,  and  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 18;  Cuba  and,  203;  and 
Filipinos,  217 


298 


INDEX 


Greene,  General  F.  V.,  180 

Greytown,  British  at,  28 

Guam,  capture  of,  179;  ceded  to 
United  States,  193 

Guanica  (Porto  Rico),  Miles 
lands  at,  176,  177 

Guantanamo  Bay,  General  Miles 
leaves,  176;  United  States  ob- 
tains, 201,  260 

Guatemala,  259 

Guiana,  boundary  troubles,  80 

Hague  Peace  Conferences,  267, 
281 

Hague  tribunal,  248,  281,  282 

Harcpurt,  Sir  William,  86 

Harris,  Townsend,  treaty  with 
Japan,  68 

Harrison,  Benjamin,  59,  73 

Harvard,  ship,  132 

Harvard  University  invites 
Cuban  teachers,  201-02 

Havana  (Cuba),  137;  plan  for 
siege  of,  151 

Hawaii,  harbor  concession  se- 
cured from,  70;  discovery,  74; 
American  missionaries  in,  74- 
75;  and  Monroe  Doctrine, 
75;  question  of  annexation  of, 
75,  80;  Blaine  and,  76;  revolu- 
tion in,  77;  Cleveland  inter- 
feres, 77-78;  annexation,  200; 
and  Japanese,  236 

Hawkins,  General,  157 

Hay,  John,  and  Venezuela  bound- 
ary dispute,  85-86;  Ambas- 
sador to  England,  128;  letters 
quoted,  128-29,  186,  186-87; 
Secretary  of  State,  183;  and 
Philippines,  191,  192;  as  a 
statesman,  198-99;  and  the 
Far  East,  224-33 ;  death  ( 1905) , 
234;  and  boundary  treaties 
with  Great  Britain,  243;  reci- 
procity agreement,  247-48; 
canal  treaty,  249-50;  and 
blockade  of  ports  of  Venezuela, 
264;  arbitration  treaties,  281- 


Hayes,  R.  B.,  on  Panama  Canal 
policy,  61-62 

Hayti,  259;  under  United  States 
protection,  269;  arbitration 
treaty  with,  283 

Hearst,  W.  R.,  and  Spanish 
American  War,  100,  144 

Henry,  General  G.  V.,  in  Cuba, 
178 

Henry,  Prince,  visits  United 
States,  241 

Herran,  Dr.,  Colombian  charge 
d'affaires,  253 

Hobson,  Lieutenant  R.  P.,  and 
the  Merrimac,  140;  in  Spanish 
hands,  165 

Holland,  see  Netherlands 

Holleben,  Dr.,  German  Ambas- 
sador to  United  States,  264, 
265 

Holmes,  O.  W.,  quoted,  45 

"Holy  Alliance,"  2, 4, 12, 13,  278 

Honduras,  boundary  dispute,  28; 
and  Bay  Islands,  30;  on  Carib- 
bean, 259;  treaty  with  United 
States,  269 

Honolulu,  consular  agent  ap- 
pointed (1820),  67;  munitions 
sent  to  Philippines  by  way  of, 
118 

Howe,  S.  G.,  5 

Ho  well,  Commodore,  134  (note) 

Hubbard,  Elbert,  Message  to 
Garcia,  117 

Huerta,  Victpriano,  revolution- 
ary leader  in  Mexico,  276 

Immigration,  224,  235-37 

Immortalite,  British  vessel  at 
Manila,  182 

India  threatened  by  encroach 
of  European  powers,  218 

Indo-China  owned  by  France, 
218 

"Insular  Cases/' 216 

International  arbitration,  Ge- 
neva Tribunal,  35-33;  Civil 
War  claims,  36;  fisheries,  36, 
248;  possession  of  San  Juan 


INDEX 


299 


International  arbitration — Cont'd 
Islands,  36;  Bering  Sea  case, 
52-53;  Venezuela  boundary 
settlement,  86-87;  arbitra- 
tion treaties,  88,  281-82; 
Alaska  boundary  commission, 
244 

International  Bureau  of  Weights 
and  Measures,  284 

International  Fisheries  Commis- 
sion, 246 

International  Institute  of  Agri- 
culture at  Rome  established 
(1905),  284 

International  Sanitary  Conven- 
tion (1903),  284 

Intervention,  Metternich's  policy 
of,  2, 54;  Blaine  and  Venezuela, 
61;  policy  of  United  States, 
233;  between  Germany  and 
Venezuela,  264-65;  Roosevelt 
on,  266;  in  Dominican  Re- 
public, 267-68;  in  Hayti, 
269 

Italy,  in  Far  East,  222;  and 
blockade  of  ports  of  Venezuela, 
264;  arbitration  treaty  with, 
283 

Japan,  opens  ports,  67-68;  war 
with  China,  219,  220-21;  rela- 
tions with  United  States,  222, 
223-24,  234,  235-37;  war  with 
Russia,  231-33;  recognized  as 
major  power,  234;  interests 
in  China,  234,  238;  fur-seal 
protection,  245;  and  Monroe 
Doctrine,  262;  arbitration 
treaty  with,  283 

Jaudenes,  Fermin,  Governor- 
General  of  Philippines,  181 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  11 

Jette,  L.  A.,  on  Alaska  boundary 
commission,  244 

Johnson,  Andrew,  and  expansion, 
41 

Johnson,  Reverdy,  Minister  to 
Great  Britain,  32 

Journal,  New  York,  100 


Kaiser,  German  vessel  at  Manila, 

130 

Kettle  Hill,  battle  on,  157-58 
Key  West,  Oregon  arrives  at,  134 ; 

Spanish  prizes  taken  to,  134 
Kiao-chau  Bay,  Germany  secures 

lease  of,  221 
Kipling,  Rudyard,  White  Man'* 

Burden,  quoted,  187-88  I 

Knox,  P.  C.,  Secretary  of  State. 

237-38,  269 
Korea,    separates    from    China, 

221;  Japanese  in,  235 
Kriiger,  President,   Kaiser  con- 
gratulates, 85 
Kwang-chau,  France  takes,  222 

Labrador,  fisheries  dispute,  246- 
247 

Lacuna,  insurgent  leader  in 
Philippines,  212,  213 

Laibach,  Congress  at  (1821),  4 

Las  Guasimas  (Cuba),  engage- 
ment at,  154 

Lawton,  General,  at  El  Caney, 
154;  round  robin  to  General 
Shatter,  167;  in  Philippines, 
209,  214 

Lee,  General  Fitzhugh,  105 

Liliuokalani,  Queen  of  Hawaii. 
76,  77.  78 

Liquors,  regulation  of  shipment 
into  Africa,  284 

Lodge,  H.  C.,  128,  244,  262 

L6me,  Dupuy  de,  Spanish  Min- 
ister to  United  States,  105-06 

Long,  J.  D.,  Secretary  of  Navy, 
116,  118,  146,  172 

Louisiana  as  part  of  United 
States,  194 

Louisiana  Purchase,  9 

Luna,  General,  Filipino  com- 
mander, 207 

Luzon,  Tagalogs  on,  205;  fighting 
in,  207 

Macabebes,  Filipino  tribe,  212 
Mac  Arthur.  General,  in  Philip- 
pines, 207 


300 


INDEX 


McKinley,  William,  and  Hay, 
86,  250;  President,  102;  and 
Spanish  American  War,  102- 
104,  110-11,  131;  messages  to 
Congress,  105,  114;  appoints 
peace  commission,  183-84; 
Schurz's  letter  to,  180  (note); 
and  retention  of  Philippines, 
188,  190-91,  192;  reelection, 
197,  211;  provides  for  govern- 
ment of  Philippines,  215-16; 
proposes  Pan-American  Con- 
gress, 271;  assassinated,  271 

McKinley  tariff  bill,  64 

McLean,  John,  Postmaster- 
General,  7 

McLeod,  Alexander.  20,  24 

Madero,  Francisco,  revolution- 
ary leader  in  Mexico,  274, 
276 

Madison,  James,  16 

Maiiun,  Admiral  A.  T.,  studies 
in  naval  history,  92;  and  war 
with  Spain,  116,  117;  and 
interoceanic  canal,  248;  ad- 
vocate of  preparation,  279 

Maine,  boundary  question,  24 

Maine,  United  States  battleship, 
106-08,  118 

Malietoa,  King  of  Samoa,  71 

Malolos,  Aguinaldo  at,  205; 
MacArthur  enters,  207 

Manchuria  and  Japan,  232,  234, 
235 

Manila,  Dewey  at,  116  et  seq., 
139-40,  173,  179,  181-82,  183, 
189;  Spaniards  in,  179-80; 
insurgents,  180;  American 
army  reaches,  180;  capture  of, 
182,  183 

Marcy,  Secretary  of  State,  75 

Maria  Teresa,  Admiral  Cervera's 
flagship,  163 

Marshall,  John,  14,  198 

Massachusetts,  boundary  ques- 
tion, 24 

Mataafa,  King  of  Samoa,  71 

Maximilian,  Emperor  of  Mexico, 
124 


Mayaguez,  General  Schwan  occu- 
pies, 178 

Mayflower,  private  yacht,  132 

Merchant  marine,  117;  in  Span- 
ish American  War,  131-32 

Merrimac,  collier,  sunk  in  San- 
tiago harbor,  140-41 

Merritt,  General  Wesley,  in 
Philippines,  178-79,  180,  183; 
ordered  to  Paris,  189 

Metternich,  Prince,  forms  "Quad- 
ruple Alliance,  1-2;  and  "Di- 
vine Right,"  2 

Mexico,  independence,  4;  rela- 
tions with  United  States,  27, 
262,  265,  273-74,  281,  283; 
Napoleon  III  and,  56,  265; 
and  Spain,  194;  on  the  Carib- 
bean, 259;  and  Japan,  262; 
revolution,  274-77 

Midway  Island,  United  States 
obtains,  201 

Miles,  General  N.  A.,  147,  151, 
170,  171;  and  Porto  Rico,  176, 
182 

Mirs  Bay,  Dewey  in,  121;  Great 
Britain  commands,  222 

Monadnock,  monitor,  140 

Monroe,  James,  as  statesman,  7; 
favors  Canning's  proposal,  11; 
and  the  Greeks,  12;  message 
to  Congress  (1823),  12-13,  16 

Monroe  Doctrine,  formation  of, 
1-18;  effects,  54,  58;  effects  of 
Civil  War  on,  55,  57-58;  and 
Hawaii,  75;  Cleveland  upholds, 
80,  81;  present  status,  262; 
upholding  of,  265-67,  272;  ex- 
tension of,  268;  bibliography, 
290 

!   Montauk    Point    (L.  I.),   Camp 
|       Wikoff  at,  168 
1    Monterey,  monitor,  139,  181 

Montevideo,  French  colony  in, 
56 

Montojo,  Patricio,  Spanish  Ad- 
miral, 121 

Moore,  J.  B.,  secretary  of  peace 
commission,  184 


INDEX 


301 


Morley,  John,   Viscount,   Recol- 
lections, cited,  49 
Moros,  Filipino  tribe,  213 
Mosquito  Indians,  27,  28,  30 
Motley,  J.  L.,  American  Minister 
to  Great  Britain,  34 

Naples,  revolution  in,  4,  5 

Napoleon  III,  55-56,  265 

Nationalism,  growth  of  spirit  of, 
90-91 

Naval  War  Board,  116-17,  135, 
174 

Naval  War  College,  92,  146 

Navy,  development  of,  70,  91- 
92,  280;  in  Spanish  American 
War,  116-18,  131  et  seq.; 
assists  army  to  land  in  Cuba, 
153;  efficiency,  169,  206-07; 
controversy  after  Spanish 
American  War,  171-72;  United 
States  seeks  naval  stations, 
201;  ships  sent  to  Panama, 
255;  voyage  of  American 
squadron  around  the  world, 
280;  see  also  Dewey 

Nelson,  American  Minister  to 
Spain,  Adams's  dispatch  to,  94 

Netherlands,  islands  in  Carib- 
bean belonging  to,  259;  ar- 
bitration treaty  with,  283 

New  Granada,  Republic  of  (Co- 
lombia), 27,  252  (note);  see 
also  Colombia 

New  York,  Sampson's  flagship, 
132,  161,  164 

Newfoundland  fisheries  ques- 
tion, 246-48 

Newport  (R.  I.),  Naval  War 
College  at,  92,  146 

Nicaragua,  route  for  interoceanic 
canal,  27,  63,  251;  rival  claims 
for  San  Juan  River,  28;  on  the 
Caribbean,259;treaty  with,  269 

Norway,  arbitration  treaty,  283; 
spirit  of  democracy  in,  286 

Olney,  Richard,  Secretary  of 
State,  82,  89 


"Open  Door,"  218  et  seq. 
Oquendo,  Spanish  ship,  163 
Oregon,  25,  195 
Oregon,  battleship,  133-34,  136, 

163,  164,  248 
Otis,  General  E.  S.,  206,  215 

Pago  Pago,  Samoan  harbor, 
United  States  makes  agree- 
ment for  use  of,  69,  200 

Palmerston,  Lord,  30 

Pan-American  Congress,  Blaine 
arranges  for,  64;  Hawaii  in- 
vited to  send  representatives 
to,  76;  McKinley  proposes, 
271;  at  City  of  Mexico  (1901), 
271 ;  at  Rio  Janeiro  (1906),  271 ; 
at  Buenos  Aires^  (1910),  271; 
as  basis  of  organization,  273 

Pan-American  Exposition,  Buf- 
falo (1901),  271 

Pan-Americanism,  Blaine  and, 
59,  63-64,  93;  Cleveland  op- 
poses, 80;  revived,  271 

Panama,  route  of  interoceanic 
canal,  27,  31,  61-62,  251-53; 
railroad  across,  31;  secedes 
from  Colombia,  253-58;  treaty 
with,  260 

Panama  Canal,  240  et  seq.; 
French  project,  61-62 

Panama  Congress  (1825),  14,  63 

Paraguay,  arbitration  treaty 
with,  283 

Paris,  American  ship,  132 

Paris  Peace  Commission,  183- 
193;  Day  president  of,  110, 
183 

Pauncefote,  Sir  Julian,  British 
Ambassador  to  United  States, 
89,  243,  250 

Perry,  Commodore,  and  opening 
of  Japanese  ports,  67 

Peru,  San  Martin  in,  3;  war  with 
Spain,  55;  war  with  Bolivia 
and  Chili,  60;  arbitration 
treaty,  283 

Petition  for  annexation  of  Hawaii, 
200 


302 


INDEX 


Phelps,  E.  J.,  counsel  in  Bering 
Sea  case,  52 

Philippines,  and  Spanish  Ameri- 
can War,  119-30,  139-40,  178- 
182,  183;  disposition  of,  185- 
197;  insurrection,  204-17; 
troops  sent  to  China  from, 
229;  Japan  and,  236 

Pitt,  William,  119 

Platt  Amendment,  202 

Pluton,  Spanish  destroyer,  163 

Ponce  (Porto  Rico),  American 
army  at,  177 

Port  Arthur,  Russia  secures,  221 

Port  Said,  Camara  at,  173 

Porto  Rico,  and  Spanish  Ameri- 
can War,  137,  144,  151,  176- 
178,  182;  disposition  of,  184, 
195,  203-04,  216,  260 

Portsmouth  (N.  H.),  Treaty  of 
(1905),  233 

Portugal,  republican  institu- 
tions in,  286 

Pownall,  Thomas,  16 

Preparedness,    279-80 

Press,  and  Spanish  American 
War,  100,  144 

Price-fixing,  226-27 

Proctor,  Senator,  visits  Cuba,  108 

Puerto  Principe  (Cuba),  151 

Pulitzer,  Joseph,  100 

"Quadruple  Alliance,"  2,  4,  13, 

278 

Reciprocity,  under  McKinley 
tariff  bill,  64;  with  Hawaii,  76; 
with  Canada,  246;  agreement 
as  to  fisheries,  247-48 

"Red  Line  "map,  23,  24 

Red  Sea,  Spanish  fleet  reaches, 
174 

Reed,  T.  B.,  107,  113 

Reid,  Whitelaw,  on  peace  com- 
mission, 184,  191 

Republican  party,  and  Bering 
Sea  controversy,  51-52;  Cuban 
policy,  103,  196 

Rhodes,  Cecil,  241-42 


Rio  Grande  River,  Funston 
crosses,  207,  208 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  "Big 
Stick,"  59,  266,  273;  and  Santo 
Domingo,  61,  268;  in  Spanish 
American  War,  149-50,  157, 
158;  round  robin  on  health  of 
army,  167;  and  Hay,  199;  and 
Treaty  of  Portsmouth,  232-33; 
awarded  Nobel  prize,  233;  and 
Panama,  251,  253-57;  Venezu- 
elan difficulty,  264 ;  quoted,266; 
policy  of  preparation,  279-80; 
arbitration  treaties,  282 

Root,  Elihu,  169,  280;  Secretary 
of  State,  234 ;  on  Alaska  bound- 
ary arbitration  board,  244; 
tour  of  South  America,  273; 
and  arbitration  treaties,  282 

Rose,  John,  34-35 

"Rough  Riders,"  150,  154,  157, 
166 

Rowan,  Lieutenant  A.  S.,  117 

Rozhestvensky,  commander  of 
Russian  fleet,  176 

Rush,  Richard,  United  States 
Minister  to  Great  Britain,  6 

Russia,  41 ;  sells  Alaska  to  United 
States,  42-43;  friendship  for, 
45-46;  in  Far  East,  218,  221, 
226,  227,  238;  war  with  Japan, 
231-33;  agreement  as  to  pro- 
tection of  fur-seals,  245 

Sackville-West,  Lord,  British 
Minister  to  United  States,  52 

Sagasta,  Praxedes  Mateo,  Span- 
ish Prime  Minister,  104 

St.  Louis,  American  ship,  132 

St.  Paul,  American  ship,  132 

Salisbury,  Lord,  British  foreign 
minister,  49,  50,  85,  127 

Samoa.  United  States  in,  69-70, 
72;  difficulty  with  Germany, 
70-72;  partition  of,  200,  218 

Sampson,  Admiral  W.  T.,  com- 
mands Atlantic  fleet,  115,  133, 
134,  136,  138,  144,  153,  160, 
162,  164,  171-72,  174 


INDEX 


303 


San  Francisco  made  rendezvous 
for  volunteers,  178 

San  Juan,  capital  of  Porto  Rico, 
137 

San  Juan,  fortress  in  Cuba,  177 

San  Juan  Hill,  154,  158 

San  Juan  Islands,  arbitration 
concerning,  36 

San  Juan  River,  dispute  over,  28 

San  Martin,  Jose  de,  3 

Sanmen,  Italy  receives,  222 

San  Salvador,  arbitration  treaty 
with,  283 

Santiago  de  Cuba,  Cervera  at, 
137,  138-41;  Merrimac  sunk 
in  harbor,  140-41;  troops  at, 
151-52;  campaign  of,  153  et 
seq. 

Santo  Domingo,  question  of 
annexation  of,  35,  41,  44; 
Spain  and,  55;  Roosevelt  and, 
61 ;  see  also  Dominican  Repub- 
lic, Hayti 

Schley,  Commodore  W.  S.,  com- 
mands Flying  Squadron,  134, 
137,  138,  161,  162,  171-72 

Schurman,  J.  G.,  on  Philippine 
commission,  215 

Schurz,  Carl,  on  expansion,  44; 
on  disposition  of  Philippines, 
186  (note) 

Schwan,  General,  in  Porto  Rico, 
177-78 

"Scrap  of  paper,"  226 

Seals,  see  Alaska,  Bering  Sea 
controversy 

Seward,  W.  H.,  Secretary  of 
State,  40,  223-24,  265;  and 
expansion,  41;  purchase  of 
Alaska,  43,  46 

Sewell,  American  consul  in  Sa- 
moa, 71 

Shafter,  General  W.  R.,  149. 171; 
in  Cuba,  151.  153,  156,  159, 
164-65,  167 

Shaw,  Dr.  Albert,  Roosevelt's 
letter  to,  quoted,  254-55 

Sherman,  John,  Secretary  of 
State.  103.  109 


Shimonoseki  Straits  opened,  68, 
224 

Siam,  218;  treaty  relations  with 
United  States,  67 

Siboney  (Cuba)  made  base  of 
American  expedition  against 
Santiago,  153 

Sibutu  bought  by  United  States 
from  Spain,  200 

Sicard,  Rear-Admiral,  on  Naval 
War  Board,  117 

Sigsbee,  Captain  C.  D.,  of  the 
Maine,  107 

Slave-trade,  African,  policing 
of  seas  for  suppression  of,  20, 
24;  agreement  for  suppression 
of,  284 

South  and  Cuba,  95 

Spain,  revolution  in,  4,  5;  and 
America,  6;  invades  Santo 
Domingo,  55;  war  with  United 
States,  see  Spanish  American 
War;  United  States  buys 
islands  from,  200;  refuses  to 
recognize  Cuban  government, 
201;  Germany  buys  Caroline 
Islands  from,  219;  islands  in 
Mexico,  274;  arbitration  treaty 
with,  283 

Spanish  America,  3-4,  5,  7;  see 
also  names  of  countries 

Spanish  American  War,  out- 
break of,  90-115;  Dewey  and 
Manila  Bay,  116-30;  blockade 
of  Cuba,  131-41;  preparation 
of  army,  142-52;  Santiago 
campaign,  153-72;  close  of, 
173-97;  campaign  in  Porto 
Rico,  176-78;  treaty,  193; 
bibliography,  290-91 

Spanish  Treaty  Claims  Commis- 
sion, 99 

Stevens,  J.  L.,  American  Minis- 
ter to  Honolulu,  77 

Stoeckl,  Baron.  Russian  Min- 
ister, sells  Alaska  to  United 
States,  42,  43 

Suarez,  Pino,  vice  president  in 
Mexico,  276 


304 


INDEX 


Suez  Canal,  Hearst  orders  vessel 

sunk  in,  144;  Camara's  fleet 

passes  through,  174 
Sumner,   Charles,   demands  on 

Great  Britain,  32-33,  34;  and 

purchase  of  Alaska,  43 
Sumner,  General  S.  S.,  158,  167 
Supreme  Court,  "Insular  Cases," 

216 
Sweden,  arbitration  treaty  with, 

283 
Switzerland,    arbitration    treaty 

with,  283 

Taft,  W.  H.,  273;  Governor  of 
Philippines,  215,  216;  and 
Mexico,  276;  Secretary  of 
War,  280;  arbitration  treaties 
under,  282 

Tagalogs,  tribe  supporting  Agui- 
naldo,  205 

Talien-wan,  Russia  secures,  221 

Tamasese,  King  of  Samoa,  71 

Tampa  (Fla.)>  embarkation  point 
for  Cuba,  143 

Texas,  annexation  of,  25,  195 

Texas,  United  States  battleship, 
163,  164 

Tibet,  Great  Britain  in,  234 

Tientsin,  American  naval  forces 
at,  229 

Tigre  Island,  proposed  annexa- 
tion of,  28 

Togo,  Admiral,  Japanese  com- 
mander, 176 

Trent  affair,  31 

Trescot,  W.  H.,  of  South  Caro- 
lina, 60 

Troppau,  Congress  at  (1820),  4 

Turner,  George,  on  Alaska 
boundary  arbitration  board, 
244 

Tutuila,  one  of  Samoan  Islands, 
69,  200 

Typhoid  fever,  failure  to  protect 
soldiers  in  Cuba  from,  151 

United  States,  "entangling  alli- 
ances," 15,  17;  offers  media- 


tion between  Great  Britain 
and  Venezuela,  81;  and  Far 
Eastern  policy,  222  et  seq.; 
recognizes  republic  in  China, 
238-39;  recognizes  Republic 
of  Panama,  256;  cooperation 
in  international  affairs,  283- 
284;  growth  in  last  century, 
284-86 

Vancouver  and  seal  industry,  47 
Vanderbilt,  Cornelius,  27 
Venezuela,    revolution,    3;    and 
French   claim,    61;    boundary 
difficulty  with  Great  Britain, 
79  et  seq.;  on  the  Caribbean, 
259;    "pacific    blockade"    of 
ports,  264 

Verona,  Congress  of  (1822),  5 
Virginius,  dispute,  119  (note) 
Vixen,  armed  yacht,  164 
Vizcaya,  Spanish  ship,  162,  163 

Waite,  M.  R.,  counsel  at  Geneva 
Tribunal,  37 

Wake  Island,  United  States  ob- 
tains, 201 

Waldersee,  Graf  von,  given  com- 
mand in  China,  230 

Washington,  George,  Farewell 
Address,  15 

Washington,  Treaty  of  (1871), 
35,38 

Watson,  Commodore,  starts  for 
Spain,  174,  182 

Webster,  Daniel,  5;  Secretary 
of  State,  21-22;  negotiates 
with  Lord  Ashburton,  22-25; 
seeks  agreement  with  Great 
Britain  on  canal  question,  30; 
and  Hawaii,  75 

Wei-hai-wei,  Great  Britain  occu- 
pies, 222 

West  Point,  93,  146;  volunteer 
officers  graduates  of,  148 

Weyler,  General  Valeriano,  Span- 
ish leader  in  Cuba,  98, 101, 104 

Wheaton,  General,  in  Philip- 
pines, 207,  213 


INDEX 


305 


Wheeler,  General  Joseph,  149, 
156,  167 

Whitney,  Lieutenant,  in  Porto 
Rico,  144 

Whitney,  W.  C.,  Secretary  of 
Navy,  92 

Wikoff,  Camp,  Montauk  Point 
(L.  I.),  168 

William  II,  Kaiser,  congratu- 
lates Kruger,  85;  and  the 
Philippines,  126-27;  initiates 
Teuton  frightfulness  in  China, 
220;  friendly  to  United  States, 
241;  see  also  Germany 

Wilson,  General  J.  H.,  in  Porto 
Rico,  177-78 

Wilson,  Woodrow,  277;  and 
Philippines,  216;  and  Republic 
of  China,  238-39 


Wirt,  William,  Attorney-General, 
7 

Wood,  Colonel  Leonard,  and 
"Rough  Riders,"  149,  150; 
military  governor  in  Cuba, 
202 

Wpodford,  General  S.  L.,  Min- 
ister to  Spain,  110-13 

Worcester,  D.  C.,  on  Philippine 
commission,  215 

World,  New  York,  100 

Yale,  American  ship,  132 
Yellow  fever,  151,  168 
Yukon,  discovery  of  gold  on  the, 
244 

Zapoti  Bridge,  battle  at,  209 


